Problems of COMMUNISM

The Indian CP, Moscow and Peking

H. Gelman

AN END TO COERCION?

J. Azrael

LIBERALIZATION: Balance Sheet

R. Conquest

Communism & Nationalism

An Essay by R. Lowenthal

VOL. XI No. 6
Nov-Dec 1962

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Problems of COMMUNISM

NUMBER 6 NOV-DEC VOL. XI 1962

Problems of Communism is a bimonthly publication. Its purpose is to provide analyses and significant background information on various aspects of world communism today. Opinions expressed by contributors do not necessarily reflect the views or policies of the United States Government. Any reprinted materials in *Problems of Communism* have been copyright cleared and, unless specific restrictions are noted, may be republished in all countries except the United States and Canada. Subscriptions or single copies may be obtained from the distributing sources noted at the bottom of this page. Comments and suggestions from readers should be addressed to:

The Editors, *Problems of Communism*
United States Information Agency
1776 Pennsylvania Ave., N.W.
Washington 25, D. C.

THE SOVIET UNION

The New Image of Russia: I Liberalization: A Balance Sheet, *by Robert Conquest* 1
Is Coercion Withering Away?, *by Jeremy R. Azrael* 9

NONCOMMUNIST AREAS

The Indian CP Between Moscow and Peking, *by Harry Gelman* 18
The PKI and the Peasants, *by Donald Hindley* 28

BOOKS

Communism and Nationalism, *by Richard Lowenthal* 37
Cuba's Charismatic Communism, *by Karl E. Meyer* 44

NOTES AND VIEWS

Sino-Soviet Trade: A Barometer, *by Marshall I. Goldman* 47
Literary Ferment in the Ukraine, *by George Luckyj* 51
Correspondence 55
Index to Vol. XI 57

PLEASE NOTE:
Outside the United States, *Problems of Communism* may be obtained from the nearest office of the United States Information Service. For sale within the United States by the Superintendent of Documents, U.S. Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price per copy: $.35. Subscription price: $1.50 a year. Additional $.50 for foreign mailing.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The New Image of Russia: I

EDITORS' NOTE: Ever since Stalin's death it has become fashionable in some quarters to regard the changes ushered in by the new Soviet leadership as an evolution progressing slowly but inexorably towards the eventual "liberalization" or "democratization" of Soviet society. That this view is by no means restricted to chronic well-wishers (such as those who, say, welcomed Stalin's wartime appeal to the patriotism of the Russian people as the beginning of the end of intellectual and ideological regimentation) seems clear, even if one considers only the writings of those eminent sociologists who maintain that the processes of industrialization are helping to eliminate the essential differences between the Soviet and Western political systems. It has been the deliberate policy of this journal, of course, to examine all the pertinent changes in the Communist world at large as objectively and judiciously as possible, and to evaluate them in terms of their impact on the evolution of Soviet totalitarianism. At this time, however, it seems proper to focus one's attention not only on what is new, but what is "old" and perennial in the Soviet system; not only on the reforms but on the lack of them; not only on the changing but also on the persistent features of Communist totalitarianism.

The current series of articles, therefore, is frankly designed to do just that. Mr. Conquest addresses himself to the notion of "liberalization" in general, and attempts to delineate its basic limitations. Mr. Azrael, on the other hand, deals with the tendency to regard coercion in the USSR as a thing of the past. Future articles will deal with the continuing function of Soviet ideology, the role of industrialization, and the attempts of the USSR to project a favorable image of itself in both its own and the press of other countries.

Liberalization: A Balance Sheet

By Robert Conquest

THE STALIN REGIME was so outstandingly frightful that anything less bad must seem, and actually be, a great and welcome improvement. But if Khrushchev's Russia were judged by any standards operating before the rise of Hitler and Stalin, it would be thought a revoltingly oppressive dictatorship. Even now, if political justifications and partisanships are put aside, one must judge it very much more oppressive than the dictatorships of Salazar or Franco or Tito—though it is true that, even apart from China, there are several regimes in Eastern Europe that are less liberal still.

Nevertheless, it can be argued—and Khrushchevite propaganda is quick to argue, or at least to imply—that it is the direction in which a regime is evolving that counts. Going from worse to bad, it is felt, may be a vector pointing towards good. And Western journalists and visitors, particularly those with some experience of the USSR of earlier times, are quick to remark on

A British poet and specialist on the USSR, Mr. Conquest is author of Power and Policy in the USSR *(New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961),* Courage of Genius—The Pasternak Affair *(London, Collins and Harvill Press, 1961) and other works in his two fields of endeavor.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the improvements. The new Soviet image is the product of such reports, inadequately related to their background and strengthened by the dynamic and purposeful tone of Khrushchev's speeches and "plans."

"Liberalization" is seen mainly in an increase in freedom of expression. Let us consider the sort of report which has contributed to this part of the new image. Over the past year or so, there have been a variety of items in the Soviet press which have helped foster a general impression of greater freedom. To cite a few examples: The official atheist journal *Nauka i religiia* (March 1962) can print a long critical letter from an agnostic. Academician Mikhail Strogovich, a legal expert, can actually criticize the new Party Program in the pages of *Kommunist* (Sept.-Oct. 1961) as "vague on the subject of individual liberty." Heated controversies on Soviet architecture can take place, as when *Moskva* (March 1962) carried an attack on the Moscow Executive Committee's policy—although a heavy counterattack by *Pravda* (May 10) seems to have ended this one. Igor Tamm, the physicist and Nobel Prize winner, can complain in *Izvestia* (Jan. 3, 1962) about the bad effects of the current Soviet policy, based on ideology, of having students do part-time "productive work." Shostakovich can complain of the victimization of music teachers at the Moscow Conservatory (*Sovetskaia muzyka,* No. 6, 1962). *Izvestia* (Feb. 9 and May 25, 1962) and *Sovetskaia yustitsiia* (April 1962) can carry attacks on a "reactionary" school of jurisprudence. *Literaturnaia gazeta* (Feb. 24, 1962) can deplore the damage done to Soviet science by dogmatism and can point its finger at a small circle of biologists who "to this day" oppose progress. An article by the British philosopher A. J. Ayer can appear in *Voprosy filosofii* (No. 6, 1962)—even though the editors were afterwards strongly admonished by *Kommunist* (No. 8, 1962) and obliged to make an apology for not giving Ayer a "worthy rebuke."

Occasionally there is a greater sensation like the one caused in the non-Communist world by the recent controversy about a quack cancer cure, publicized in *Pravda* on August 1. The affair was notable mainly for two things: first, for the evidence it gave of the existence of an ignorantly anti-scientific public in the USSR, even including numbers of writers; secondly, and more important, for the open concession by the Central Committee that doctors, rather than the party, are the right people to decide on the treatment of disease. As other observers have pointed out, this was in principle a retreat from the full claims of Stalinism—although in practice one does not recall that medicine strictly as such was ever made a partisan issue. Biology, of course, was, and still is; and only when the party disavows its monopolistic support of Lysenkoism may we begin to speak of a genuine relaxation.

These sporadic symptoms of "liberalism" are not the only ones. There are also the various attacks now appearing in Soviet literature proper against the period of the personality cult. These are in accordance, in a general way at least, with the First Secretary's policy of publicly blackening the Stalinist past. Stories like Yuri Bondarev's "Quietude" (*Novyi mir,* No. 5, 1962), Tvardovsky's poem against Stalin, and even Ilya Ehrenburg's memoirs (also appearing in *Novyi mir*) can be viewed to some extent in this light. Ehrenburg, it is true, does go a little beyond the orthodox Khrushchevian position: in particular, in the second installment of his memoirs, he praises Lunacharsky's view that we "must allow all persons and groups in art free development." (*Kommunist* [No. 10, 1962] countered with a powerful attack on Lunacharsky and such ideas.)

THIS COMPARATIVE TOLERANCE in cultural matters was certainly granted for internal tactical reasons. But it has also had a particularly powerful effect on the international Soviet image, and this has been reinforced by the visits to the West of Yevtushenko and others like him. The young poet and like-minded fellow writers, when actually in the Soviet Union, are engaged in a continual struggle with the obscurantist elements which still retain much power, and which may at an time reassert their full authority. In attacking actual abuses in Russia, as Yevtushenko did in his poem *Babi Yar*, the young writers are showing considerable courage and perhaps, in the long run, taking considerable risks. When they come abroad, they are bound to protect their flanks by saying nothing in the least hostile to the Soviet establishment which they criticize so outspokenly at home. To do otherwise would be to make themselves extremely vulnerable to counterattack on their return to the Soviet Union. And apart from this obvious calculation, some of them doubtless feel general loyalty to a political abstraction called the Soviet Union, and to an ideal communism which does not resemble what actually exists, but whose image is perhaps more powerful in their minds than the reality. This again is natural enough and applies to some extent to all patriotisms. Kipling could write:

> **If England was what England seems,**
> **An' not the England of our dreams,**
> **But only putty, brass, an' paint,**
> **'Ow quick we'd drop 'er! *But she ain't!***

For all these reasons, the picture of the Soviet

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Union given by Yevtushenko when he writes in the London *Observer* (May 27, 1962) or grants formal interviews abroad is a much more favorable one than anybody would gather from his poetry. But one would not want to give the impression that this reflects simply cold calculation on his part. Yevtushenko appears to be a perfectly honest man, and when he presents a different picture abroad, it represents an adjustment of tone so natural that it is, perhaps, hardly a matter of conscious thought. Moreover, by letting him out of the country—in addition to permitting publication of his poetry in the first place—the Soviet authorities provide incarnate proof of their tolerance.

Notwithstanding all that can be said in Yevtushenko's favor, it is fairly clear that he is not—and perhaps none of the writers are—representative of any general principle of freedom. His enthusiasm for Castroite Cuba, a sentiment now fashionable in young Moscow circles, is perhaps an attempt to return to revolutionary dynamism and verve, but it is scarcely a demonstration for civil liberty. Come to that, his poem about the anti-Communist demonstrations in Helsinki during the World Youth Festival last July[1] sinks to Stalinist levels —the demonstrators are "Fascist" and "chew gum." Of course, no one can expect a comparatively humanist and non-political poet like Yevtushenko to involve himself in spheres which do not interest him. It is just that we should not fall into the error of thinking of him in an unsuitable way. To talk about him in terms of Pope's *"The rights a court attacked, a poet saved"* is going a little too far.

A noteworthy and genuine advance in another area has been the beginnings of realistic discussion of economic problems. The census, the publication of absolute figures of production, and similar measures made a good start. It is true that no estimate of wage rates, for example, is yet published in the USSR. Nevertheless, we now even get such things as an article in the *Bulletin of the Academy of Sciences* (No. 1, 1962) giving a generally realistic estimate of the extent to which Soviet productivity lags behind that in the United States. Such revelations, indeed, are usually restricted to limited-circulation specialist journals, and their publication is to a large extent dependent on the political tactics of the moment. Even so, the improvement is notable. Yet here again, we are surely not expected to say that the publishing of accurate statistics is a piece of positive libertarianism. It is quite compatible, particularly in its present limited degree, with tyranny.

[1] For an account of the festival and demonstrations, see Paul E. Sigmund, "Helsinki—The Last Youth Festival?", *Problems of Communism*, No. 5 (Sept.-Oct.) 1962, pp. 58-62.

Nevertheless, all these new phenomena when taken together do clearly tend to give the impression of an advance, an increase, in liberalism in the USSR. The question is: How much are we to read into them? The immediate, unconsidered impression one gets is a favorable one; but how substantial is the real change?

NOW, FIRST OF ALL, controversies were sometimes permitted even in Stalin's time (for example, the long row between Voznesensky and Varga in 1948-49).[2] Secondly, some of the new outspokenness seems to reflect a definite decision by the regime to make certain changes (*e.g.*, in scientific education, which will presumably be restored to the position it enjoyed before 1957): that is to say, many of the present "controversies" are one-sided, just as were some in earlier times (*cf.* the 1950 attack on the linguistics of Marr, replete with demands for an end to oppressive methods in science). Thirdly, the genuine controversies seem to reflect, or take advantage of, disunity at the top.

For assessing the present "liberalization," perhaps the most instructive lesson is furnished by the *Voprosy istorii* controversy of 1956-57, when the outburst of historical "objectivism" supported by most historians ultimately ended in a defeat at the hands of the party authorities and a purge of the historical journal's editorial board. The pages to watch, now as then, are those of *Kommunist*. That organ continues to speak up as firmly as ever for the less liberal line. The current official view of the 1956-57 period is that the relaxation was a good thing but produced "excesses" which were afterwards curbed. To put it more bluntly, the liberal tendencies of that time were of general assistance to Khrushchev, and the movement could not have happened at all without its energy spilling out of the containers it was intended to fill. Yet this was tolerable, so long as the excess could be mopped up afterwards. It is natural to foresee a similar prospect today.

Current revelations about the past give us the idea that "The Truth" is now being told in this field too. But Khrushchev is, in fact, very little more addicted to the truth than was Stalin, except when the truth, or part of it, suits his book. The impression of frankness is a false one. The purges of the 1930's have simply served Khrushchev as a convenient weapon against Molotov and the others. Although several of the First Secretary's opponents—Malenkov and Shepilov in par-

[2] See this writer's *Power and Policy in the USSR*, London, Macmillan, and New York, St. Martin's Press, 1961, pp. 88-91.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

ticular—actually were earlier in the field with progressive suggestions than he was, it is a politically useful maneuver for Khrushchev to contrast his regime with the "Stalinist," "conservative," "reactionary" principles that he attributes to the "Anti-party Group." Some of the group, at least, certainly held such views. By contrast with Molotov any political tortoise would indeed appear to be an outstanding progressive. But even a fairly limber tortoise is far from being a hare.

The dramatic exposure of parts of the foul Soviet past that were not wholly known before is combined with the hint that there are still forces of darkness abroad which would like to restore such a regime—a "Brand X" that makes Khrushchev's shine by comparison. But even though the charges in the 1938 Bukharin trial have been reduced to nonsense by the rehabilitation of three "conspirators" named at the trial (Ikramov, Tukhachevsky and Rudzutak), just as those in the 1937 Pyatakov trial have also been by the revelation at the 22nd Congress that the supposed major terrorist act of the accused (the attempted assasination of Molotov in a car crash in Siberia) was a fake, and those in the 1936 Zinoviev trial by the assertion that the Kirov murder was improperly presented at the time—still, notwithstanding all this, no rehabilitation of the leaders of the opposition has taken place. Stalin had one story —a straight lie—and stuck to it; at least it was coherent. Khrushchev, ever since 1956, has had no coherent story at all on this important issue, but only a mixture of quite incompatible truths and falsehoods. Furthermore there is no more reason to believe the present versions of given incidents than those offered in Stalin's day: Ordzhonikidze's heart attack, for instance, has been changed to suicide, but the best evidence is that he was really killed on Stalin's orders, like Kirov. For that matter, Khrushchev is himself committed to ridiculous falsehoods: *e.g.,* that Beria was a British agent, and that the Germans committed the Katyn massacre. Again, to take one of many examples, the absence from the latest *Small Soviet Encyclopedia* of four out of the five premiers of the Soviet Union between Lenin and Khrushchev is a notable blemish on objectivity, and one that shows the complete persistence of the tradition of manipulating facts for reasons of political expediency.

Words To Ponder Upon

We demand immediate and unconditional recognition by the authorities of freedom of assembly, freedom of press, and an amnesty for all "political" prisoners and dissenters. Until this is done, all words about tolerance, about religious liberty, will remain a miserable game and an indecent lie. Until freedom of assembly, of speech and of the press is declared, there will not disappear the shameful Russian inquisition which persecutes the profession of unofficial faith, unofficial opinions, unofficial doctrines.

—V. I. Lenin, "The Autocracy is Tottering" (March 1, 1903), Works (in Russian), Moscow, 1946, Vol VI, p. 314.

. . . the press is our main ideological weapon. It is called upon to rout the enemies of the working class, enemies of the toilers. Just as an army cannot fight without weapons, so the party cannot successfully carry out its ideological work without such a sharp and militant weapon as the press. We cannot surrender the organs of the press to unreliable hands; they must be in the hands of the workers who are most faithful, most reliable, politically staunch and loyal to our cause.

—N. S. Khrushchev, "For a Close Tie of Literature and Art with the Life of the People," Kommunist (Moscow), No. 12, 1957, p. 23.

INDEED, FROM WHATEVER point of view we look at the new Soviet image, qualms arise at once. Anything truly or at least overtly heterodox in writing still attracts the rigor of the law. Olga Ivinskaia was jailed on a trumped-up economic charge because she had attempted to get Pasternak's surviving work taken abroad. Yesenin-Volpin is in jail through a similar frame-up concocted because of his overtly heterodox poetry, only published abroad. Mikhail Naritsa is in the hands of the KGB for the same reason.

The party's interventions in literature remain heavy and frequent. In the last few years resolutions issued in the name of the Central Committee have formally charged various "ideological and artistic errors" to magazines like *Ogoniok* (September 9, 1958), *Soviet Press* (May 22, 1958), *Voprosy filosofii* (July 31, 1959), and *Smena* (January 6, 1960); to books, such as *New Facts about Mayakovsky* (March 31, 1959); and to publishers like the Foreign Literature Publishing House (June 4, 1959). And of course there have been other less formal interventions, such as Khrushchev's against *Molodaia gvardiia.*

Further revealing evidence is furnished by an account, reported in the London *Observer* of August 5, 1962, of the petty censorship exercised by the Soviet

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

authorities in circulating foreign scientific material among their own scientists. *Nature,* the leading English scientific journal, is centrally received in Moscow and then photocopied and distributed to Soviet laboratories and institutes. But before the photocopying of each issue, passages are removed in a truly grotesque fashion. Out of 28 issues covering a period of just over six months, 18 were censored, often with the loss of entire articles—editorials in particular. The main deletions affected articles discussing Science and Religion, Science and Government, aid to underdeveloped countries, and fallout from Soviet nuclear tests. But, in addition, references to the fact that Marconi sent the first radio signals across the Atlantic and that Fleming discovered penicillin were also removed.

Again, one must recall that certain innovations of the Khrushchev regime, especially in the social field, amount to an actual increase in repression. The death penalty, whose scope is usually regarded as a test of liberalism in other countries, has been continually extended since Stalin's death. In May 1961 it already covered treason, espionage, sabotage, murder in the first degree, and banditry, and it was then introduced for large-scale economic offenses, forgery, and violent behavior in prison by habitual criminals. In July 1961 it was extended to serious infringement of currency regulations (and applied retroactively to two offenders previously given long prison sentences). In February 1962 it was further extended to attempts on the life, health, or dignity of the police and members of the volunteer guards as well as to certain cases of rape and of bribery. Executions have been reported almost daily in the Soviet press.

ANOTHER FAIRLY WIDELY publicized measure of Khrushchevian "liberalization" has been the encouragement of extra-legal action by "popular" organizations—sometimes represented as a step towards the withering away of the state. Actually, the supposedly "spontaneous" meetings of residents in a neighborhood to condemn the behavior of certain of their number are party-sponsored on all occasions and amount in practice to a sort of official lynch law. The same can be said of the action of Komsomol groups which are now encouraged to harass people for what they regard as anti-social behavior. The Soviet press itself reports dozens of ludicrous instances of young prigs making nuisances of themselves by trying to suppress Western hair styles and so on. Nevertheless, the groups continue to operate on a very large scale; and just as the popular meeting is even less responsible than a Soviet court, so the actions of the Komsomol are considerably more of a pest than those of the militia. The hard-working police official in the USSR, as has often been pointed out, does his best to avoid involving himself in minor social troubles like illicit distilling, let alone patrolling dance halls to see that the bands steer clear of the more decadent types of jazz. Not so the little horrors of the youth organizations.

Moreover, these young zealots are used to prevent activities the party disapproves of, but against which no legal action can be taken. For example, the poetry recitals around the Mayakovsky statue, which became such a rallying point for students and other young progressives, were broken up by bands of "young workers" whose action was represented as a spontaneous "democratic" demonstration. Detestation of the Komsomol activist is, of course, widespread in Russia. It was the current head of the organization himself, S. P. Pavlov, who complained in *Molodoi Kommunist* (April 1958) that in book after book, play after play, film after film, "the youth leaders, the Komsomol activists, are invariably hidebound bureaucrats, formalists and fools . . .". The thought is bound to occur that these are precisely the cadres who are destined to rise in the party and to become the next generation of Soviet rulers—a prospect not easily reconcilable with any great hope of serious liberalization.

Stalin's last years were bad and showed every prospect of getting worse. But strictly speaking the present should not be compared with that time so much as with the immediate post-Stalin period when those whom Khrushchev now denounces as Stalinists were the most powerful figures in the state. The political climate of 1953-54 may indeed be regarded as Stalinism with its extreme acerbities removed, and if the present is compared with that period, the improvement is not enormous. That time was no more marked by Leningrad Cases and Doctor's Plots than is the current one. A policy of greater emphasis on consumer goods and a literary "thaw" were both under way in 1954—and indeed were both wrecked later on with the aid of Khrushchev himself. Thus, one might reasonably feel that Khrushchev's contributions to the betterment of Soviet life have been more apparent than real. And it is difficult anyhow to estimate to what extent the improvements since 1954 have been due to the positive policies of the Khrushchev regime, and to what extent they merely represent concessions that *any* Soviet government would have felt bound to make.

The image projected by the Russia of Khrushchev is not only "liberal"; it is also "dynamic," "self-confident," "forward-looking." It is an image of a regime that has

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

supposedly broken with dogmatism and freed Soviet economics, and politics too, from conservative tendencies —something that makes it attractive both inside and outside the USSR. And this image has just enough truth in it to make it fairly easily acceptable.

But to launch vast changes is not, in itself, "progressive." One of Khrushchev's most vaunted economic schemes—that of the virgin lands—is of the most dubious real advantage, except in the very short run. In fact, it gives an air of movement and progress not so much by being an actual advance as by simply being a change, something new. (A change that really would be revolutionary and would genuinely improve Soviet agriculture would be the practical, even if not theoretical, abolition of the state and collective farms.) In general, Khrushchev's tremendous, far-flung, noisy enterprises only nibble at the edges of the real problems. The decentralization of the economy, to cite another example, has indeed resulted in certain advantages, but in the main it has simply substituted party and Gosplan machinery for the old government ministries. Real economic reform, such as a revolutionary change in the system of supply and of distribution, perhaps along Yugoslav lines, is not in sight. As in the civic and cultural fields, we find when the dust dies down that some progress has been made, but only on a modest scale. And even if Khrushchev is not modest about it, that is no reason why the rest of us should take his word rather than the facts.

Mr. Boris Nicolaevsky once characterized the Malenkov period as "rational" and that of Khrushchev as "mythopoeic." Khrushchev's "style of leadership," as the Russians call it, is one of vast new plans and initiatives, promising enormous results at some future date. For instance, his repeated promises some years back to catch up with the United States in meat and milk production were announced with vast publicity, and although all independent experts thought them impossible, they received a great deal of publicity in the West as well. Yet, their abandonment after a few years passed more or less unnoticed, particularly as it was covered up by the spectacular proposals of the Seven-Year Plan. Later on that plan in turn was overtaken by the long-term plan of last year. In each case a dynamic air of self-confidence emanated from Khrushchev personally and from his followers everywhere. The plans evaporate, but the air of confidence remains, and there is no doubt that a picture of immense economic perspectives remains in the public eye even abroad.

Even Stalin's propaganda was not without results. But Stalin's method of keeping his claims large and vague and concealing the results is worth comparing with Khrushchev's. The latter gives the figures of the plans and later allows the fact of their non-fulfillment to trickle out, relying on each successive glorious future to distract attention from the failure of the last.

One of the few areas—indeed perhaps the only one—in which Russia is really ahead is that of rocketry. Khrushchev has built on this foundation an image of not only the most advanced science in the world but also the most vital and progressive society. And this again has not been without effect on persons by no means in sympathy with the Soviet Union. But if rocketry is the test, then Hitler's Germany was the superior society in 1944-45.

KHRUSHCHEV'S PERSONAL IMAGE, as distinguished from that of his regime, has not been a complete success in the West—or, for that matter, in Russia. Yet the notion of a bouncing, uninhibited, even

Now whom did the cartoonist have in mind?

ОТЧЕТНЫЕ МАТЕРИАЛЫ

— Что же это такое я обещал в минувшем отчетном году?

Рисунок М. ЧЕРЕМНЫХ

Caption on paper: Lecture
Below: Lecture materials.
—"Now what did I promise in the past lecture year?"

—From Krokodil (Moscow), January 30, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rather clownish fellow, rough and crude in certain ways no doubt, but basically likeable and honest, still has its effect abroad, particularly in Britain where people like a certain hominess—and at one point were even prepared to put Stalin's pipe in the balance against the reports of purges and labor camps, and to refer to him as "Uucle Joe." This, however, was at a time when Stalin was a Western ally, whereas now most people in the West look on Russia, more or less automatically, as the enemy. Hence Western misapprehension about Khrushchev is perhaps more likely to resemble the impression some people had of Hitler before World War II as a ridculous figure with a toothbrush mustache —a view which, oddly enough, they were able to combine with recognition that he was a terrorist dictator as well. Khrushchev has certainly spoiled any image of himself as an easygoing fellow by his banging with his shoes at the UN, his violent rows with Western labor and trade union leaders, and his crude threats with rockets. But while such behavior must have affected his popularity, it may not have wholly destroyed the notion that he was somehow just an amusing charlatan not to be taken seriously.

No doubt what has just been said deals with the Khrushchev image at a very low level, as it reaches that part of the populace who are only just conscious of international politics at all—the Khrushchev of the cartoonists. Yet the instincts and feelings of the mass of the population are an important political factor in the West. Moreover, I am sure that it would be wrong to think that this sort of misapprehension is confined to the uninstructed. It may be only with them that it constitutes the entire or almost the entire, picture of the Soviet leader. But among the much more sophisticated and politically conscious sections of the Western public, too, such notions enter into the general idea of Khrushchev to a greater or lesser extent, even if they are partly balanced by more considered estimates.

WHAT, THEN, IS the full balance sheet of the Khrushchev period?

If we consider the basic internal issue of civil liberty, the improvements in the Soviet Union since Stalin's time have been almost entirely negative. That is, the citizen is today no longer anywhere near so subject as before to terrorist, oppressive, or economically damaging action against him by the state: in this field, a limited "liberalization" has indeed taken place; but as for any positive improvement in his active political position, the advance has been nil. The citizen has precisely as little positive say in the way Russia is run as he did in Stalin's time. All power remains entirely in the hands of the self-perpetuating apparat. The vote is still totally worthless. And even within the party, there have been only very slight signs of a devolution of authority certainly going no further than the provincial committees. The *pays légal* may thus have expanded from a dozen to a hundred people, or perhaps even a couple of thousand. This, however, is not an increase in democracy, but merely an expansion of oligarchy. The enlargement of the Roman ruling circle from the few scores in the Senate to the thousands in the Pretorian Guard did not bring any democratic advantage.

This is not, of course, to rule out the possibility that such changes may indirectly lead to democratization inasmuch as they may show the beginnings of a certain disintegration in the ruling machine; but that is rather a different point. Partly as a result of Khrushchev's initiatives, the mood of the country—particularly of those in the great cities who are nearest and most sensitive to political change, and above all of the intellectual elite—is one of greatly increased aspiration towards greater liberties and economic improvements. At the same time, factional struggle inside the *apparat* continues. In these circumstances, it is natural for one group of contenders to exploit the popular and intellectual mood against the others. Khrushchev's attack on the Stalinist past is a platform which can gain him considerable support both outside and even inside party circles.

The question to be considered is how far the Khrushchevite reformers are willing to go toward really satisfying the inchoate aspirations of the Soviet public. We can perhaps judge the probable answer by asking how far they have gone already. First of all, it may be worth listing the areas in which the "permanent" characteristics of Stalinism still remain in evidence:

1) Most important, a self-perpetuating party bureaucracy remains completely in charge. No sharing whatever of its power with any other part of the population has taken place.

2) The peasant, in spite of minor improvements in terms of tenure, continues to be a collectivized serf.

3) The trade unions remain, in practice, simply adjuncts of the party and governmental machine. Wage decisions are still imposed on the worker.

4) The consumer, though to a lesser degree than formerly, still has to put up with low standards because of the channeling into capital goods and defense products of a proportion of the national income far higher than he would freely grant.

5) "Socialist realism" remains the official law of the arts. Truly heterodox work is still banned.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

6) Control of all organs of information remains strictly a party monopoly. Foreign broadcasts are jammed. And even foreign books are admitted only as selected by cultural bureaucrats.

7) The minority nationalities continue to live under strictly centralized control from Moscow. Great purges, carried out in reprisal against an extremely mild degree of nationalism, have lately swept away the party leaderships of republics from Latvia to Azerbaidzhan and Central Asia; the influx of Russians has led to the virtual partition of Kazakhstan.

8) Travel abroad is permitted only to a limited number of citizens.

9) The labor camp network, though much shrunken since Stalin's time, continues to function. The laws against political opposition remain draconic; and the Ivinskaia case adequately demonstrates the animus of the political authorities.

10) Soviet political history, including the record of collectivization and the purges, is still taught in an entirely false and misleading fashion. So is foreign history.

A formidable list! And what can be set against it? That all the same basic policies were imposed in a more intolerable and rigid fashion under Stalin.

For someone who has been chastised with scorpions for any length of time, it is no doubt quite a relief to have the chastiser go back to whips again. And it would be quite false to ignore the change for the better in Soviet conditions. Yet a double objection still remains: First, even whips are unpleasant enough. Second—and in some ways a more cogent objection—Soviet society remains divided into whippers and whipped, and the whippers retain the right to decide what form the relationship between the two shall take in future.

Insofar as the new image of the Soviet Union obscures these facts, it is a dangerous mirage. We may welcome the improvements already made and may hope for new ones, but to delude ourselves serves no useful purpose whatsoever.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is Coercion Withering Away?

By Jeremy R. Azrael

THERE ARE FEW responsible analysts of Soviet politics who would deny that the level of coercion in Soviet society has dropped since Stalin's death or who would argue now, as they did formerly, that terror is *the* central attribute of the Soviet political system. At the same time, some analysts go to the extreme of suggesting or implying that coercion has largely given way to persuasion and that it will inevitably recede still further into the background, with the result that the Soviet political system will become libertarian and democratic in the relatively near future. While this latter view is far from dominant, it has been disseminated on a wide enough scale to warrant rigorous examination.[1]

Ideally, such an examination should take the form of a systematic study of all of the aspects and dimensions of coercion in the Soviet political system. In these few pages, however, the focus must be limited to aspects of coercion which seem clearly to contravene the principles of constitutional democracy and the standards ordinarily observed in constitutional-democratic politics. Although concrete evidence on this subject is scarce, what evidence is available is sufficient, in the author's judgment, to suggest the need to discount heavily the more sanguine claims and predictions now being aired.

The most graphic institutional expression of the decline in the level of coercion since Stalin's death is the downgrading of the secret police. Today the secret police no longer constitutes a state within a state. It has lost its "private" economic empire and has been subjected to firm party control. However, while its potential as an independent power base has been greatly impaired, the secret police remains an important *instrument* of rule, and one whose prestige and authority Stalin's heirs have been careful to maintain. Even at the 20th Party Congress in February 1956, Khrushchev expressed his concern lest revelation of the incredible abuses perpetrated by the secret police impede the latter's efficiency. He warned that the "distrust of the workers of the state security organs" shown by "some comrades" was "incorrect and harmful" and announced that the task of the party was "to strengthen the state security agencies in every way."[2] At the 21st Congress in 1959, he spoke of the need "to consolidate the state security organs" and characterized as "stupid and criminal" suggestions that they be weakened.[3]

Role of the Secret Police

Statements of this sort (many others could be cited) should serve as a caution against exaggerating the degree to which the secret police has been emasculated. Now, as under Stalin, every sizable plant, farm, military unit, office, and higher school has its own *spetsodel* (special department). The regime still attempts to imbue the population with the conviction that nothing of political significance escapes the attention of the secret police, and there is every reason to believe that the latter continues to maintain an extensive network of informers and to keep dossiers on a considerable segment of the population. The Soviet leaders, it is true, claim that today the primary function of the secret police is to thwart foreign espionage, but this does not in any sense imply

[1] Among supporters of this viewpoint in one or another form are Isaac Deutscher, Herbert Marcuse, Alexander Werth, Edward Crankshaw, Maurice Hindus, and Harrison Salisbury.

Mr. Azrael is Assistant Professor of Political Science (and not of sociology, as mistakingly identified in the last issue of this journal) at the University of Chicago, currently on leave at Harvard University's Russian Research Center.

[2] *XX Sezd KPSS*, Moscow, I, p. 95.

[3] *XXI Sezd KPSS*, Moscow, I, p. 105.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

that the secret police is limited to ordinary counter-intelligence activities. Soviet security-consciousness is such that immense areas of life are "classified," and Soviet suspiciousness is such that almost all forms of deviant behavior are seen as signs of potential footholds for capitalist subversion. Indeed, one important article on the need for "vigilance" argues that even exemplary behavior is no proof of loyalty, warning that "it is difficult to recognize *the hidden enemy* . . . [who] is usually disguised as an honest Soviet man, even as a patriot and activist."[4]

Here we find the ultimate in terroristic logic, the position that everyone in the society is suspect. Today this logic, which was characteristic of Stalinism, does not often find overt expression. However, even in the more typical statements where only "deviants" are identified as "suspects," this logic shows through in the extreme vagueness with which "deviant" behavior is defined. Thus, at the 21st Congress, Aleksander Shelepin, head of the State Security Commission, spoke of the need to eliminate "apostates, degenerates, drunkards, and loudmouths" as types which might "fall for the bait of the enemy."[5] At the 22nd Congress in October 1961, he mentioned "complacency, carelessness, and gullibility" as traits which "the enemy" regularly exploits. The fact that he felt compelled to add the remark, "it goes without saying . . . that we must not permit in our ranks a spy mania which sows suspicion and mistrust among people," while perhaps indicative of the new-found "restraint", suggests a level of secret police activities such as to require this sort of radical reassurance.[6]

What Soviet sources stress is not so much that the secret police is less active or that its area of discretion vis-à-vis the public has been narrowed, but rather (1) that the secret police is no longer empowered to impose penal sanctions directly, and (2) that more of its activities are now designed to have a "prophylactic" instead of a "punitive" effect. The first of these assertions is true, but only in a very qualified sense. The secret police "special boards," which under Stalin disposed of many cases on their own authority, have probably been abolished.[7] However, this does not mean that the secret police must channel all their "punitive" activities through the regular courts. The police is specifically authorized to impose up to five years' administrative exile at forced labor on "parasites," provided only that the approval of the executive committee of a local soviet is secured. It is unlikely that these committees often deny the "petitions" of the police; and as we shall see below, even those cases which are publicized suffice to show that the "anti-parasite" law is frequently invoked as a weapon of political coercion.

As for the second assertion, its validity is impossible to determine. What should become clear during the following discussion, however, is that the increased Soviet stress on "prophylaxis"—a stress which is by no means confined to the activities of the secret police—means a greater, not a lesser, degree of political intervention in the lives of Soviet citizens. Before elaborating on this point, it will be useful to examine the role of Soviet courts as agencies of political coercion.

Political Crimes

At the 21st Party Congress, Khrushchev claimed that "at the present time there are no instances of people being brought to trial for political crimes (*za politicheskiie prestupleniia*)."[8] In appraising this claim one is entitled, at a minimum, to presume bad faith on Khrushchev's part. On the very eve of the Congress, the Supreme Soviet approved a new "law on state crimes" which added "conspiracy to seize power" to the list of acts defined as treasonable, in what was clearly an effort to pave the way for the prosecution of the so-called "anti-party group." The fact that none of the members of the "anti-party group" has been prosecuted is more a consequence of high-level politics than of judicial policy and does nothing to mitigate the hypocrisy of Khrushchev's claim—unless one takes the phrase "at the present moment" literally, which makes the statement merely ridiculous.

As is well known, the early phases of the succession struggle after Stalin's death witnessed a number of executions for "political crimes," and as late as 1957 Khrushchev admitted to an American journalist that trials for "political crimes" were still taking place, claiming only that "political crimes have become "*rarities*" and that "of those deservedly punished for anti-Soviet activities in recent years, *most* are agents sent into the Soviet Union from abroad."[9] Furthermore, trials for "political crimes" continued after the 21st Congress. Leaving aside the trials of "agents sent

[4] *Partiinaia zhizn,* No. 21 (1958). It is noteworthy that this article was written by a high official serving in Khrushchev's own special preserve, the party's Russian Republic Bureau.

[5] *XXI Sezd KPSS,* II, p. 253.

[6] *XXII Sezd KPSS,* II, p. 401.

[7] It is worth noting, however, that the operations of the "special boards" were always shrouded in secrecy, and that their alleged abolition in 1953 was not announced until 1956.

[8] *XXI Sezd KPSS,* I, p. 103.

[9] Interview with Henry Schapiro, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* IX, 46, p. 1; author's italics here and throughout.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

from abroad," there are cases on record of convictions for "especially dangerous state crimes" committed by "Nazi collaborators" (generally brought to trial under the totalitarian formula—"In view of the especially serious nature of the crimes the court decided to suspend the statute of limitations"),[10] by pacifists (guilty of "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda"),[11] and by unsuccessful defectors (flight abroad being defined as *treason* in the USSR).[12] In addition, reliable Soviet informants have reported that sentences of seven years' imprisonment have been imposed on people possessing unauthorized Western literature (such as the *New York Times*), and that as of May 1962 prosecutions have been resumed for the telling of "political" jokes. In both instances the charges involve the "especially dangerous state crime" of possessing materials for, or engaging in, "anti-Soviet agitation and propaganda."

Moreover, it should be remembered that Soviet trials are not regularly or even frequently reported, especially where their nature is such as to suggest the existence of political disaffection. It is therefore reasonable to assume that trials for "political crimes" occur much more often than is acknowledged in the Soviet press. That they occur at all is enough to demolish Khrushchev's claim about recent Soviet court practice.

In his speech to the 21st Congress, however, the Soviet Premier went even further than claiming that "political crimes" are no longer prosecuted: he also alleged that "we now have no one in prison for political reasons (*po politicheskim motivam*)." This claim—which has been widely propagandized by the Soviets and accepted without question by some Westerners[13]—was more mendacious than the first, for it suggested not merely a change in court practice but a fundamental change in the nature of the Soviet political system. By replacing the phrase "political crimes" with the phrase "political reasons" Khrushchev undoubtedly aimed to convey the impression that Soviet law and justice have been completely "depoliticized." No such "depoliticization" has of course occurred.

WHETHER THE RECENT secret trial of Olga Ivinskaia and her daughter was impelled by a desire for revenge or by a long-range plan to "rehabilitate" Boris Pasternak is unclear. However, there can be no reasonable doubt that the motivation was basically political. Pasternak himself, of course, was not tried, but two lesser-known Soviet writers—A. Yesenin-Volpin and M. Naritza (Narymov)—who also committed the "crime" of publishing works abroad without official authorization, were secretly tried and are currently in prison. Likewise, politics governed the trial for "forgery" of the editor of the dissident journal *Syntax*.[14]

In many other judicial actions political motivation is evident. How else could one characterize the trials recently reported in the Soviet press in which parents have been imprisoned and/or deprived of their "parental rights" (*i.e.*, forcibly separated from their children) because of an "unhealthy"—that is, religious—home environment?[15] The courts have also been led by political considerations to classify certain crimes as especially "socially dangerous" and hence liable to extreme penalties, when all considerations of legality and equity point toward a much more moderate punishment or even acquittal. One such case involved a villager who had shot and killed a thief raiding his small private orchard. For the simple reason that the regime was at that time intensifying its campaign against the "property instinct" and private plots, the villager was subjected to a "show trial" (personally witnessed by this author) in which his crime was classified as an especially "socially dangerous" premeditated murder.[16] A case that was identical except that it involved public property led to an acquittal.[17]

These few examples are enough to demonstrate the continued "politicization" of Soviet justice and the invalidity of Khrushchev's claims at the 21st Congress. There is no reason to believe that such cases are isolated or atypical. Soviet law and judicial policy may be less of a mockery than they were under Stalin, but it remains true—as the preamble to the new law on "state crimes" makes clear—that they are still based "on the need for *the greatest possible* defense of . . . [the] state." Indeed, Soviet jurists are still disputing the very legitimacy of recognizing defense of the rights of citizens as one of the functions of law.[18]

[10] *Cf., Sovetskaia Rossiia,* March 29, 1960.

[11] *Cf., Krymskaia pravda,* August 11, 1959.

[12] *Cf., Komsomolskaia pravda,* June 10, 1962.

[13] Alexander Werth, *Russia under Khrushchev,* New York, Hill & Wang, 1962, p. 45.

[14] *Cf.* David Burg, "The 'Cold War' on the Literary Front," Part I, *Problems of Communism,* Vol. XI, No. 4 (July-August, 1962).

[15] *Cf. Pravda,* July 25, 1962; *Sovetskaia Litva,* December 25, 1959; *Turkmenskaia iskra,* September 20, 1960.

[16] *Cf.* this author's "Murder Trial in Moscow," *The Atlantic,* May 1962.

[17] *Cf. Izvestia,* July 25, 1961. This case originally resulted in a five-year sentence, but *Izvestia* intervened, calling the sentence completely unjust. In view of this intervention there is little doubt that the prisoner was acquitted.

[18] Izvestia, December 26, 1958; *Voprosy stroitelstva kommunizma v SSSR,* Moscow, 1959, p. 296 ff.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Ius Populi—Soviet Style

If Soviet law as enforced by the police and administered by the courts falls far short of constitutional-democratic standards of legality, this is even more true of Soviet law as enforced and administered by the so-called "public organizations"—the "comrades' courts," "voluntary brigades," and "public meetings," recently endowed by the regime with quasi-police and quasi-judicial functions. The broadening of the function of the "public organizations" has been heralded by the Soviets and some Westerners as a sign of increasing "democratization." However, this view is untenable if one takes democracy to mean more than mass participation. The "public organizations" are in no sense autonomous bodies but are merely "transmission belts" functioning under the firm control of the central authorities. The Soviet regime has always sought to manipulate group pressure for its own ends and to use the *kollektiv* to reinforce and supplement formal governmental coercion. The "public organizations," viewed in this perspective, simply represent a further stage in the institutionalization of group pressures.

It is the strengthening of the "public organizations" that forms the basis of Soviet claims of achieving a transition from "punitive" to "prophylactic" coercion. The distinction, as we shall see, is often meaningless—*e.g.*, the "anti-parasite" laws are depicted as "prophylactic" in character. But even where there is a distinction, what is involved in "prophylaxis" is not a relaxation of pressure but a fundamental assault on all aspects of privacy, including those which are not formally prescribed by law. In sum, the "public organizations" do not represent "democratization" in any meaningful sense, but rather a simultaneous effort on the regime's part to increase its ideological legitimacy, to remove from its own shoulders the immediate onus for coercive measures, to force more and more citizens to become its active accomplices, and to extend its range of effective control.

Since their establishment, the jurisdiction of all the "public organizations" has become progressively wider and more political. Here we shall deal primarily with the "public meetings," but the same tendency has marked the operations of the other public organizations. For example, the original Central Committee decree on the "volunteer brigades" specified only that they were to deal with drunkards, hooligans, and those guilty of other misdemeanors. In practice, the brigades have been given authority to expose offenders to "public shaming"; to hand them over to collectives or to "comrades' courts" for reprimand, "reeducation," or "public trial"; or to deliver them into the custody of the regular or the secret police. Since the founding of the brigades, increased emphasis has been placed on their role as instruments supplementing instead of merely reinforcing the regular law enforcement agencies, and in this role their actions have reflected growing involvement in political control. Cases are known of brigades (espe-

"POPULAR" JUSTICE IN ACTION

Honest people hate loafers and try to struggle against them by the force of the law and, especially, by the force of public opinion. . .

In organizing the struggle against loafers, the Odessa City party committee and *raion* party committees strive to see that public influence on these people is organically combined with the precise work of agencies of the militia, prosecutor's office, and courts. What have we undertaken in practice for this? A total of 610 comrades' courts have been established in the city; they are actively struggling against violators of Soviet morals. General meetings of workers at enterprises and residences are an effective form of unmasking loafers and influencing them. Hundreds of people come to the meetings to talk about those who shame their native city. . .

The notorious conduct of A. Korotkova was discussed at one such meeting in the Leninski *raion*. She had worked anywhere for five years, drank, regularly violated public order, and abandoned her children. Korotkova was brought to criminal responsibility by petition of the meeting, and the people's court sentenced her to five years' deprivation of freedom. The inveterate loafers Yaniuk, Semenishina, and Oinas were exiled from the city by decisions of workers' meetings. They had poisoned the life of the people for years; they loafed, drank, arranged deals, and depraved other families. The public commissions of *raion* executive committees have been well received in the city. They consist of representatives of party and public organizations, old Communists, and senior workers. The commissions hold circuit sessions in clubs and house administrations, especially on the outskirts of the city. People declining socially useful labor and leading ostentatious lives appear before the commissions. By decisions of the commissions, 62 persons have been exiled from the city. In addition, 134 loafers have been exiled from Odessa by decisions of local court agencies. The main concern of the commissions is preventive, public, educational influence.

Pravda Ukrainy *(Kiev), June 10, 1962.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cially Komsomol brigades) detaining ordinary Soviet citizens who have appeared in the company of foreigners, of their indiscriminately arresting people whose taste in clothes or hair style deviates from accepted norms, breaking up gatherings in private apartments in which "modernistic" (jazz and classical) music was being played, dispersing crowds gathered to listen to "underground" poets, and confiscating formally sanctioned but disapproved "alien" literature (*e.g.,* the magazine *Amerika,* pamphlets distributed at Western exhibits, *etc.*).

THE "COMRADES' COURTS," which have been set up in residences, factories and farms and are empowered to impose "public shaming," fines, and other measures short of imprisonment, have been turned into agencies of political control in much the same way as the "brigades." At the 21st Party Congress, Khrushchev demanded that the "comrades' courts" henceforth take up "not only questions of an industrial-productive character but also questions of a moral and daily-living character, instances of incorrect behavior by members of the collective which permit deviations from the norms of public order."[19] That this constituted an authorization to invade the realm of politics was made clear by an editorial in *Sovetskaia Rossiia* which stated that "*the basic task* of the comrades' courts is the struggle for the purity of Communist morality and against manifestations of alien bourgeois ideology."[20]

Among the "public organizations," the "public meeting" is of particular interest because it has become one of the basic instruments for implementing the so-called "anti-parasite" laws. The latter provide that on petition of a "public meeting" (or of the police, or of both) the executive committees of local soviets can impose administrative exile with compulsory labor for a period of from two to five years on "parasites, idlers, and loafers." Just what constitutes "parasitism" has never been clearly defined. However, the assumption made by some observers that the "public meetings" deal only with petty speculators, loose women, perpetual drunkards, and juvenile delinquents is unfounded. There is evidence, for example, that "political" offenders are sometimes referred to public meetings by the secret police, in cases where the latter does not feel pressed to preserve secrecy by petitioning the local executive committees directly (or where it actively seeks publicity for purposes of general intimidation). *Izvestia* has reported one such case in which the secret police invoked the help of a "public meeting" to deal with a worker who had been caught disseminating "all sorts of rumors and scandal" acquired from listening to "hostile broadcasts."[21] In this instance, the "public meeting" put the worker on parole for "reeducation," but other cases have resulted in sentences of exile. Since the renewal of the regime's campaign against religion, for example, Soviet press reports have revealed that "public meetings" have exiled a number of sectarians and at least one rabbi.[22]

In other press reports, the label of "parasite" has been variously attached to young "modernist" poets, to Soviet citizens who receive packages from relatives abroad, to people whose only apparent "crime" is having talked too freely to foreigners inside the Soviet Union, and to students who have refused job assignments in outlying areas.[23] While no actual "trials" have been reported in these instances, specific individuals have been named in every case, and there can be little doubt that at least some of them have been prosecuted under the "anti-parasite" laws. Moreover, the term "parasite" has been applied to the whole group or category "represented" by the individuals under attack, suggesting that other, unadvertised trials may have occurred or are in the offing. Worth noting in this connection is Khrushchev's statement last April at the 14th Komsomol Congress that, where the struggle against "parasitism" was concerned, "the Central Committee and government are thinking of intensifying control so as to eliminate shortcomings faster."[24]

Coercion: Direct and Indirect

Thus far we have discussed political coercion with reference to the operations of its major instruments: of the secret police, the courts, and the "public organizations." In conclusion, it is necessary to take note of phenomena which, while less directly associated with specific agencies of coercion, are nonetheless immensely relevant to the subject of this article.

Perhaps the broadest application of coercion since Stalin's death has occurred in conjunction with the settlement of the Virgin Lands. There is no doubt that many of the well over one million "volunteers" who

[19] *XXI Sezd KPSS,* I, p. 104.

[20] *Sovetskaia Rossiia,* February 11, 1960.

[21] *Izvestia,* September 6, 1959.

[22] *Cf., Sovetskaia Rossiia,* March 16, 1961; *Kazakhstanskaia pravda.* July 2, 1961 and October 7, 1961; *Sovetskaia Moldavia,* April 28, 1960.

[23] *Cf. Trud.* September 17, 1960; *Sovetskaia Litva,* October 12, 1961; *Sovetskaia Moldavia,* April 15, 1960; *Izvestia,* July 9, 1961 and December 27, 1961.

[24] *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* XIV, 16, p. 14.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

WHAT IS A CRIME?

TO OUR READERS: Those who can define the precise nature of the crime for which Adolf Yosifovitch Yutson (see below) was apprehended and sentenced to four years of exile and forced labor, and who can point to any other civilized country boasting similar legal concepts will receive a bound copy of Problems of Leninism, *by J. V. Stalin. Please address your letters to The Editors,* Problems of Communism, *U. S. Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, Washington, D.C.*

Adolf Yosifovitch Yutson is 31 years old, tall and broad-shouldered. Looking at him one automatically thinks: "Such a person yields large quantities of production."

The judge announces the essence of the case. Yutson has been unemployed for several years. He haunts the thresholds of restaurants, drinks heavily, and steals money and valuable articles from his parents.

The tender-hearted father "tossed" his offspring" sufficiently large sums of money. Since this was not enough for his drinking sprees, Adolf turned to his mother with requests for "subsidies."

"Why do you not want to work?," asks the judge.

"And why should I work? My parents have much money, and it is enough for me."

With this phrase, he very precisely shaped his attitude toward life.

The People's Court sentenced Yutson to exile from Moscow for a period of four years with compulsory labor.

—A. Lavrentiev, in Moskovskaia pravda *(Moscow), August 4, 1962.*

have journeyed to Siberia and Kazakhstan did so unwillingly. The very vocabulary which the Soviets use is indicative. People rarely "go" to the Virgin Lands; they are always "allocated," "dispatched," or "sent"—of course, on a "voluntary" basis.[25] At a minimum, "volunteers" are enlisted at open public meetings in an atmosphere of artificially generated enthusiasm. Regularly, appeals for "volunteers" are accompanied by warnings that those who hold back will be looked upon as "idlers" and "shirkers" of doubtful commitment and loyalty to the Communist cause.[26] Where students have been solicited to aid in summer harvesting, failure to "volunteer" has regularly been followed by expulsion from the Komsomol and university. The prevailing climate is suggested by one of the author's own experiences when he expressed his sympathy to a young Soviet friend who had broken his leg. The friend replied, "Oh, it's not really so bad, at least I can get a medical release from this year's Virgin Land detail." In this connection, it is worth noting that (according to *Komsomolskaia pravda*) at Leningrad University even those with medical releases were treated as "malingerers" and "deserters."[27]

Another realm in which coercion has been broadly applied is that of the peasants' private homes, plots and herds. In conjunction with the movement to merge collective farms (and/or transform them into state farms), many peasants have been forced to evacuate their homes and move into new, consolidated village centers. That this resettlement has always, or even often, been voluntary is doubtful; indeed, if rumor in Moscow is to be believed, it has regularly been accomplished by brute force, complete with the razing of old homesteads. Also, in a good many cases, the regime's campaign to transfer all privately-owned cows to the collective farms has involved the use of force and violence. Thus, *Pravda* reported in 1958 that *kolkhoz* chairmen in a number of raions in the Ukraine were "compelling *kolkhozniks* to transfer privately-owned cattle to the common herds under guise of purchase."[28] That this practice has continued despite *Pravda's* criticism has been borne out by Khrushchev himself, who at a February 1961 meeting with Ukrainian agricultural officials criticized "people who compel the collective farmers to sell their cows."[29] It is difficult to imagine that the "people" whom Khrushchev had in mind engaged in this practice entirely on their own initiative: more likely, in responding to central directives, they

[25] *Cf. Pravda,* April 13, 1956, for Khrushchev's appeal to youth, in which he speaks of the Komsomol's "assigning" youth to the Virgin Lands and factories' "allocating" workers. Khrushchev recognizes in this appeal that real volunteers will not be numerous and calls on the Komsomol "to surmount this difficulty," warning that "a great deal of educational work and public influence will be necessary."

[26] *Cf. Sovetskaia Moldavia,* December 14, 1956, for references to "shirkers" and suggestions that fleeing such assignments reflects a "poor political upbringing." Also, *Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* VIII, 35, p. 5.

[27] *Komsomolskaia pravda,* April 28, 1960.

[28] *Pravda,* February 13, 1958.

[29] *Ibid.,* February 1, 1961.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

*over*reacted, and then were used as scapegoats in traditional Soviet style (shades of "Dizzy With Success"!). The transfer of cows goes on—as does the regime's program of transferring all private plots to the collectives. The latter is an extremely sensitive issue, and the authorities have been proceeding with great caution. However, it is proceeding, most likely to the accompaniment of coercion—an assumption which is grounded in everything we know about Soviet peasant attitudes.[30]

FINALLY, BRIEF MENTION should be made of what might be called *latent* coercion—that is, coercion in the form of *threats.* Even a random sampling of the relevant sources is enough to demonstrate the continued prevalence of this particular form of political coercion. To some extent this may signify nothing more than a sort of rhetorical residue of Stalinism. However, the rulers of the Soviet Union do not ordinarily choose their words lightly, and there can be little doubt that they look upon threats as important weapons.

The most conspicuous threats in recent years have been directed, of course, against the "anti-party group," which has been denounced as an "anti-people group" (recalling Stalin's phrase "enemy of the people"), a "real conspiracy against the party," and a clique intending to "decapitate the party leadership." Less conspicuous but no less ominous threats have been directed at party and executive cadres, as a warning, no doubt, not to take the campaign against the "anti-party group" as a further step in "de-Stalinization" and hence, in some respects, a pledge to abstain from Stalin-like practices.[31] Similarly, economic officials have been warned that certain kinds of failures and "deviations" in industry and agriculture may be treated as "political crimes." This is the clear import, for example, of Khrushchev's warnings to agricultural officials who engaged in practices in which "only enemies of the socialist state" could engage.[32] The same applies to his statement at the 21st Congress that it was necessary to replace those officials who "because of age or for other reasons can no longer carry out with the necessary energy and active spirit the work entrusted to them." True, Khrushchev went on to state that "in the majority of cases they are good comrades, loyal to the party," but, while a relatively sanguine outsider might consider this last sentence conciliatory, almost a guarantee against political coercion,[33] to an *apparatchik* or manager the crucial question may be how to avoid being numbered among the *minority* which is *not* considered loyal to the party.

Another group which has been the object of constant threats is the cultural intelligentsia. At his famous meetings with writers and artists in 1957, Khrushchev interlarded his pleas for a voluntary restoration of discipline with a heavy admixture of threats, including, it is alleged on good authority, a promise that in the event of continued dissidence "our hand will not tremble." In 1960, at another meeting with members of the intelligentsia, Khrushchev went out of his way to cite the case of three young institute staff members who had been expelled from the party for "anti-party activities;" after disclosing that he had rejected an appeal on their behalf by a prominent Academician, he went on to warn those concerned that if they "did not understand the stern warning given them, more serious measures would be used against them." Characteristically, the metaphor he chose to depict the party's relation to the writers was that of a forester who periodically has to thin the forest in order to maintain its general health.[34] More recently an even more ominous note has been sounded by Shelepin, who lashed out against certain "unstable elements" among the cultural intelligentsia, accusing them of engaging in "sabotage on the ideological front."[35]

Many more examples of threats could be cited if space permitted. But only two more general points about the role of threats in Soviet society need be noted. First, thanks to the lingering memory of Stalinism, the present regime can count on its threats being taken in

[30] It may be indicative that cases have been reported of the exiling as "parasites" of peasants who are devoting too much attention to their private plots. (*Cf. Selskaia zhizn,* August 11, 1961.) A related campaign, which we cannot discuss here, has occurred in the cities, where tremendous pressure has been placed on the owners of private homes and *dachas* in an effort to force them to turn their holdings over to the state and thus deprive themselves of all possibility of withdrawing from collective life and state supervision and of acquiring a sense of, or economic basis for, independence.

[31] Tendencies of this sort have also probably been counteracted by the widespread bloodless purge which has been under way among middle-level cadres in recent years. So far the purge has led only to demotion or removal from office, but the coincidence of the purge with the threats of violence directed at the former leaders is more ominous than either would be alone.

[32] *Cf. Pravda,* January 22, 1961, and February 1, 1961.

[33] *Cf.* Edward Crankshaw, *Khrushchev's Russia,* Gloucester, Mass., Smith, 1960.

[34] *Kommunist,* No. 7, 1961. It is noteworthy that at this meeting Khrushchev expressed his pleasure at the absence of the "thunder and lightning" which had marked the preceding meetings. To a considerable extent this is an index of the effectiveness of his earlier threats, since his demands remained unchanged.

[35] *XXII Sezd,* II, p. 401.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

earnest even when they are only irregularly implemented. Actually, threats are more regularly implemented than is commonly realized. To take the case of the cultural intelligentsia, for every Yevtushenko who enjoys apparent immunity, there are many others whose "deviations" *are* punished.[36] We have already cited the cases of Yesenin-Volpin and Naritza, but one should particularly note in this connection the extensive purges carried out among the cultural intelligentsia of the national minorities.[37] However, to repeat, even where implementation is only irregular, memory serves to make threats much more effective in shaping behavior than would otherwise be the case.

Hallmark of Totalitarianism

The second thing to be noted is that quite apart from their immediate content and direction and quite apart from their role in forestalling or inducing specific actions by specific individuals and groups, threats serve to create an atmosphere of intimidation, if not of terror, which inhibits the growth of unauthorized ties of solidarity and of a spirit of "normalcy," trust, and confidence. Here, too, memory plays a key role, leading many people to exaggerate the intensity of threats and to assume that they are intended to apply broadly rather than narrowly even when this is not the case. However, as the vagueness of the categories of action and attitude which are the target of threats indicates, this indeed is very often the case.

The main purpose of the preceding pages has been to delineate some of the major dimensions of political coercion in the Soviet Union today. As noted at the outset, the evidence is too scanty and ambiguous to permit firm conclusions or far-reaching generalizations. However, it is certainly adequate to show that the role of coercion is much greater in the Soviet Union than in democratic countries, and to demonstrate the inappropriateness of references to the USSR as a society in which "people are no longer scared of the police,"[38] or as one characterized by a "new reign of law."[39] Nor does the evidence lend much support to the notion that references of this sort are merely "slightly premature."[40] It is worth noting that the evidence points to a *rise* in the level of coercion since the 21st Party Congress. The fact that this was the first congress to meet after the succession struggle had been resolved (by the rout of the "anti-party group") suggests that the decrease in coercion which followed Stalin's death was partly due to tactical considerations on the part of those participating in the struggle for power, and that it was merely of temporary significance. At the same time, the rise in the level of coercion seems less likely to be short-lived, because it is intimately related to Khrushchev's effort to revitalize Bolshevik ideology and his programmatic commitment to the realization of what is called full-fledged communism.

We have already noted the relationship between ideology and the role of the "public organizations" and have cited Khrushchev's promise that this role will be yet further enhanced. The ultimate goal is that "every Soviet citizen should not merely obey the law himself, observe labor discipline, guard and strengthen state and public property, and observe the norms of the socialist community, but also demand that other citizens do the same and struggle against all anti-social acts."[41] What the Soviets envision, therefore, is a society in which every citizen will become a policeman, thus "fulfilling and over-fulfilling" Lenin's old aspiration that "every Communist should be a Chekist," a society which will in effect take on the character of a penal system. There will be a complete merger of law, morality, and even decorum, so that breaches of the latter two will be treated as crimes.[42]

[36] One notes with particular horror the resuscitation of the term "cosmopolitanism." (*Cf. Pravda,* January 9, 1960, the decree of the Central Committee on current failings in ideological work.) That the term is still used with special reference to the Jews is suggested by its appearance in a vicious attack on Yevgenii Yevtushenko's protest against anti-Semitism, "Babi Yar." (*Literatura i Zhizn,* September 24, 1961. Yevtushenko himself, of course, is not Jewish.) Now, as earlier, however, it has a broader connotation, embracing all members of the intelligentsia who lean too much towards Western culture. More particularly, it is used with regard to all members of the intelligentsia of the national minorities who do not emphasize sufficiently the degree to which their native cultures are indebted to Russian culture (*Cf. Sovetskaia Rossiia,* April 2, 1960, for the use of "cosmopolitanism" in reference to "modernist" composers; *Sovetskaia Litva,* March 2, 1960; *Sovetskaia Latvia,* January 19, 1960.)

[37] In Lithuania in 1959-60 there was a wholesale purge of universities, aimed at rooting out "nationalist distortions" in the curriculum and teaching; in 1962, there was a broader and more intensive purge of "nationalist elements." (*Cf. Sovetskaia Litva,* March 2, 1960; *XXII Sezd,* II, pp. 50-52.) A similar purge of universities, writers, etc., as well as party cadres who "did not display the necessary political awareness" in combatting them, took place in Latvia. (*Sovetskaia Latvia,* February 2, 1960.) In Moldavia, the purge was only slightly less extensive, as it was in Central Asia. (*Cf. Sovetskaia Moldavia,* March 27, 1960.)

[38] Werth, *op. cit.* (see f.n. 13), p. 45.

[39] Harrison E. Salisbury, *A New Russia?,* New York, Harper, 1962, p. 127.

[40] *Ibid.*, p. 128. *Cf.* also, Crankshaw, *op. cit.*, p. 127.

[41] *Cf. Current Digest of the Soviet Press,* XI, 10, p. 1.

[42] *Cf.* N. G. Aleksandrov, *Pravo i zakonnost* (Moscow, 1961). This leading text puts the matter as follows: "In the

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Likewise—and perhaps of more immediate and pressing significance—the newly intensified campaign against sectarians which was mentioned in the preceding pages is clearly related to the ideological postulate that all "survivals of the past" must be eradicated before full-fledged communism can be achieved: it may thus well presage an all-out assault on religion and the churches. The sectarians have been identified, in effect, as "objective enemies" of the regime, and although this status has not yet been extended to other believers, already all "Christian and Moslem ministers" as well as all believers devout enough to observe fasts have been characterized as malicious "parasites."[43]

Finally, the increased application of coercion in the agricultural sector is related to the ideological premise that communism means an end to all private property. The Soviets allege that only persuasion will be used to affect the demise of private property, but their current practice gives one pause, and where the future is concerned, it is not irrelevant to note that rapid collectivization is still cited in Soviet writings as a prime example of "persuasion." [44]

THOUGH IT HAS risen in recent years, the level of coercion in Soviet society has certainly not reached Stalinist heights. That it could not do so is far from clear. Many have argued that social and economic developments make a "return to Stalinism" impossible, but there is good reason to remain skeptical. The arguments are too complex to be treated here and have in any case received considerable attention elsewhere; but surely the example of Nazi Germany suffices to suggest that neither a high degree of "industrial maturity" nor an eminently educated population are guarantees against a terroristic political system—quite apart from the fact that in Russia, as Khrushchev's successful implementation of major programs opposed by key professional and managerial groups indicates, the powers of resistance of the Soviet "new class" are very slight indeed. Certainly there are no *institutional* barriers against a "return to Stalinism." The Procurator-General of the USSR has argued that the Soviet constitution and legal system provide "reliable guarantees" against a reversion to Stalinism,[45] but one has only to recall the sundry "guarantees" in the so-called "Stalinist Constitution (still in force to this day) to realize how specious this argument is. Police Chief Shelepin was perhaps more realistic when he assured the 21st Congress that "this shameful business . . . will never be repeated" *because* "the party and the Central Committee will never allow it."[46] The desire of the leadership is now and will be for some time to come *the* key factor determining the level of coercion in Soviet society.

We have seen that, having consolidated its position, the leadership has increased the level of coercion and shown signs of desiring to increase it still further. However, that it desires or will desire to increase it to Stalinist heights seems unlikely. The reason is not that the present regime is less committed than Stalin to total control, but rather that it is less paranoiac; that it is possessed of more subtle means of control deriving from successful industrialization; and that, thanks in part to the massive indoctrination (intellectual coercion) of the past 45 years, as well as to the relaxation of outright terror, it can count upon a wider acceptance of its policies, even when these policies contribute to the further consolidation of totalitarian rule. The Soviet Union is still very far from a "consensual" or "popular" totalitarianism in which external coercion would be superfluous due to the internalization of totalitarian *mores*. However, it is equally far—indeed farther—from constitutional democracy.

process of development of laws into Communist social norms, the difference between law and morality becomes less and less marked. In this connection . . . the reaction of society to breaches of moral norms is not limited to unorganized and informal condemnation of immoral acts but involves, beyond this, fully defined, predetermined consequences merging in external form with methods of legal influence on lawbreakers."

[43] *Cf. Trud,* September 17, 1960.

[44] *Sovetskaia obshchestvennost na strazhe sotsialisticheskoi zakonnosti* (Soviet Society on Guard of Socialist Legality), (Moscow, 1960), p. 50.

[45] *Cf. New York Times,* May 28, 1962.

[46] *XXI Sezd,* II, p. 251.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The Indian CP Between Moscow and Peking

By Harry Gelman

EDITORS' NOTE: The policy conflict between the Soviet and Chinese Communist Parties has generated a tendency among the other member parties of the world Communist movement to gravitate into either the Moscow or the Peking camp, with the CPSU thus far successful in retaining the allegiance of the overwhelming majority of parties. But the division has also penetrated inside a number of individual Communist parties, especially in Asia. Nowhere has the resultant tug-of-war between opposing party factions been more acute than in the Indian CP. Written before the recent eruption of Sino-Indian hostilities, Mr. Gelman's article provides the background necessary for understanding the peculiar position in which the Sino-Soviet conflict has placed one of the world's largest Communist parties.

MOSCOW'S RENEWED campaign since the 22nd CPSU Congress to pressure member parties of the world Communist movement into committing themselves to the support of the CPSU in its dispute with the Chinese and Albanian party leaderships has fostered evident dissension, recrimination, and factional struggle in the ranks of many Communist parties, but nowhere more than in the Communist Party of India (CPI). As a combined result of geography, the importance of India, and the party's own history, the CPI was destined to become sort of a borderline ground in the Communist internecine conflict, an arena where the opposing influences of the Soviet and Chinese parties now clash more openly and on more equal terms than in any other Communist party of comparable importance.

The Indian party occupies a borderline position in another sense as well. The response of the world's Communist parties to the CPSU's call for support against its "fraternal" adversaries has shown a striking geographic pattern: on the one hand, public backing for Moscow—in the form of denunciations of Tirana and, in some cases, of Peking as well—from nearly all the CP's of Europe, the Western Hemisphere, North Africa, and the Middle East; on the other, refusal to render such support—ranging from polite criticisms of Khrushchev's attack on Hoxha to explicit endorsement of Chinese policy positions—on the part of nearly all the parties of Asia and the Far East.[1] In between the broadly pro-CPSU Middle East and the broadly pro-CPC Far East lies India, where the Communist Party—long under Soviet tutelage—now has a large and vociferous anti-CPSU and pro-Chinese minority which controls several of the provincial party organizations, is well represented in the party center, and can no longer be purged without the danger of splitting the party in two.

Mr. Gelman is an American student of Indian affairs. His article is a condensed version of a paper originally presented at the last meeting of the Association for Asian Studies (Boston, April 1962) and is soon to be published as part of the compendium Communism in Asia *(New York, Praeger).*

[1] Until the CPI did so in August 1962, the only Communist parties in the Far Eastern area which had followed the CPSU in criticizing Albania were those of Outer Mongolia, Ceylon, and Australia.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

This situation in the CPI has come about as a result of forces which have been at work within the party for over a decade, some of them independent of the Sino-Soviet conflict. They include the growth of unprecedented factionalism and indiscipline, with a corollary weakening of the authority of the party center at the hands of defiant provincial party committees; the emergence of incompatible views among the rival factions on the line to be taken towards Nehru's "national bourgeois" government; the declining authority of the CPSU and growing prestige of the CPC in the eyes of many Indian Communists; and finally, the steady polarization of the party into leftist and rightest factions divided along pro-Chinese and pro-Soviet lines.

The Intrusion of Chinese Influence

The beginnings of such a division became discernible during the controversy which developed within the CPI between 1947 and 1951 over the methods of struggle the party should adopt for the conquest of power, the immediate objectives it should pursue, and the classes to be admitted into alliance with it. In the course of the controversy, one of the provincial party committees advocated the methods of the Chinese Communists as a more suitable model for the CPI than the Soviet, while the orthodox party leadership under B. T. Ranadive, in attempting to suppress the oppositionists, openly attacked Mao Tse-tung as a heretic and deviator from Marxist and Stalinist teachings. Ranadive eventually fell from power and was replaced in command of the party by the pro-Chinese group, who publicly apologized to Mao in the name of the CPI.

Two lasting consequences flowed from these events. First, although the avowedly Maoist CPI leaders were themselves later replaced in control by a middle-of-the-road group led by Ajoy Ghosh, and though the Chinese "path" was ruled not entirely applicable to India, a degree of Chinese influence was nevertheless firmly implanted and legitimized within the party, with the result that Peking became a source of inspiration and guidance for the CPI second only to Moscow. Secondly, the factionalism, indiscipline, and blatant regional disregard of central party authority which developed during the struggle against Ranadive became permanent features of CPI life, to a degree not seen in virtually any other Communist party. So weakened was the control of the central leadership that it could no longer arbitrarily impose a single, rigid policy line upon the often defiant provincial party organizations. The national leaders tended to depend more and more on the latter as a power base, and at times the party Politburo itself virtually ceased to meet.[2]

The fragmentation of authority in the party was a major factor behind the CPI's halting, halfhearted response to the shift in Moscow's policy toward Nehru between 1951 and 1955. By degrees the party leadership had to adjust its line to the gradually softening Soviet attitude, conceding initially that there were some positive aspects to Nehru's generally black foreign policy, next that his foreign policy was generally good but his domestic policy bad, and finally that even his domestic policy had some favorable features. Each of these successive modifications was accomplished only over the strenuous opposition of a large section of the party, whose contention was that to accept them would be to sacrifice the CPI's own chances of gaining political power to the interests of Soviet foreign policy. The strength of the opposition was reflected in the 1951 CPI program and was again manifested at the Third Party Congress at Madurai in December 1953.

While Secretary-General Ghosh led the fight for rightward adjustment of the party line to accommodate Soviet policy, the leftist opposition—now spearheaded by Ranadive—became increasingly centered in three provincial party organizations: those of West Bengal and the Punjab, traditionally centers of terrorist activity, and of Andhra. This opposition manifested itself with growing force as the shift of Soviet policy, cautiously begun three years before Stalin's death,[3] accelerated greatly in the 1954-55 "Bandung" period, during which Nehru exchanged visits with Soviet and Chinese leaders and the USSR began economic assistance to India.

The 20th Congress and Kerala

Against this background of mounting antagonism to Soviet policy within the CPI, the 20th CPSU Congress of February 1956 and the events that flowed from it subjected the party to a new series of shocks. The first and most profound was the impact of de-Stalinization, which not only intensified the disorganization, indis-

[2] Published CPI documents provide evidence that the leaders of rival groups within the central party leadership looked primarily to the privincial party committees for support of their conflicting policy positions. See "Report to the [Fourth] Party Congress" (p. 58) and "Organizational Methods and Practices of the Party Centre" (p. 97), both published in Democratic Research Service brochure, *Communist Double Talk at Palghat,* Bombay, 1956.

[3] The Soviet shift of policy began after an exchange of letters in July 1950 between Stalin and Nehru regarding settlement of the Korean War. See Allen S. Whiting, *China Crosses the Yalu,* New York, Macmillan, 1960, pp. 60-62.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

cipline, and spirit of cynicism rampant within the party, but also accelerated the decline of CPSU authority and prestige while bolstering those sections of the CPI which tended to sympathize with Peking's viewpoint.[4] Another blow was the 20th Congress' line on the possibility of peaceful transition to socialism, and especially the interpretation placed on it with specific reference to India in an authoritative Soviet article which implied that Nehru, and not the CPI, would lead the nation into socialism.[5] This essentially "revisionist" interpretation was publicly challenged by Secretary-General Ghosh himself,[6] and the CPSU subsequently retreated to a more orthodox view, though still insisting on qualified CPI support of Nehru and primary reliance upon parliamentary tactics. Soviet armed suppression of the Hungarian revolt in the fall of 1956 added to the unrest in Indian Communist ranks, weakening the influence of the CPSU among the moderate CPI elements which were its natural supporters.[7]

Then, in April 1957, the CPI forces favoring parliamentary tactics and restrained support of Nehru received a major windfall with the Communists' electoral victory and consequent formation of the government in Kerala state, marking the first time in history that a Communist party had achieved even localized governing power solely through the ballot. This first apparent vindication of the 20th Congress dictum on the feasibility of the parliamentary path to power helped to keep the predominant weight of CPI opinion on the side of the moderates for the next three years, and its effect was reflected in a shift from the line of the April 1956 Palghat (Fourth) Party Congress, which had cautiously acknowledged the possibility of a peaceful transition to socialism by parliamentary means backed up by mass movements, to that of the Amritsar (Fifth) Congress of April 1958, which exuded confidence that the peaceful Communist takeover in Kerala could be repeated in other Indian states, and eventually even at the center. This further move to the right in CPI policy was again made over the bitter opposition of Ranadive and the party militants, whose hostility to parliamentary tactics was aggravated by the fact that the presence of a Communist government in Kerala hampered them from agitating any issue that might endanger that regime.

Widening of the Breach

In 1959, the marked growth of Sino-Soviet friction —over Communist policy towards the "imperialist camp," the attitude to be taken towards the national bourgeoisie in emerging nations, and the most appropriate means of achieving ruling power—began for the first time to have serious repercussions within the CPI. The gap between Moscow and Peking suddenly widened, partly as a result of events beyond the control of either party (*e.g.*, the Tibetan revolt, Nehru's decision to oust the Communist government in Kerala, and Washington's invitation of Khrushchev to visit the United States), but partly also because of a conscious turn to the right by the CPSU and a contrary turn to the left by the CPC. In the fall of 1959, Khrushchev not only aroused Peking's bitter resentment by taking a publicly neutral position regarding the Sino-Indian border conflict, but also followed up his American visit with the adoption of a generally softer line toward the West than ever before—or since. Peking, on the other hand, grew increasingly shrill and uncompromising in its warnings against "imperialist" treachery and the dangers of conciliation. Against this background of sharpening Sino-Soviet divergence, the rightist and leftist factions of the CPI began identifying themselves to an increasing degree with the respective policy lines of Moscow and Peking.

Khrushchev's refusal to take Communist China's side in the border dispute with India emphasized differences that had already become manifest in connection with the Tibetan revolt some months before. After reporting the outbreak of the rebellion, Moscow excised all hostile

[4] In his report to the Fourth CPI Congress at Palghat, which followed the 20th Congress, Ghosh alluded to the consternation caused in the Indian party by the exposure of Stalin's crimes, stating that "some of our comrades say that the whole moral basis on which they stood is shaken and there is nothing on which to stand." He appealed to the party not to give way to "cynicism" and argued that the CPSU still remained "the leading party" of the international Communist movement. (See Ghosh report in *Communist Double Talk, op. cit.*, pp. 117-25.) The CPI Central Committee later adopted a resolution warning against aiding the "enemies of communism" by a negatively "one-sided appraisal" of Stalin's role. (*New Age*, July 15, 1956.)

[5] Modeste Rubinstein, "A Non-Capitalist Path for Underdeveloped Countries," *New Times* (Moscow), Nos. 28 and 32, 1956; reprinted in the CPI monthly *New Age*, Vol. V, No. 10, October 1956, pp. 19-28. This article stressed the endorsement by Nehru and the Congress party of "socialism" for India and hailed the growth of state capitalism in the Indian economy as a "progressive" step toward eventual socialism. (The CPI publishes separate monthly and weekly organs, both entitled *New Age*.)

[6] Writing in the same issue of *New Age* (pp. 6-18) which reprinted the Rubinstein article.

[7] In an open letter replying to a Socialist challenge to the CPI on the Hungarian issue (*New Age*, November 18, 1956), Ghosh apologetically defended the Soviet action but admitted that the CPI had been wrong in "idealizing the USSR" in the past.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

references to India from its press coverage, placing the blame for the uprising on Tibetan reactionaries, Western imperialism, and Chiang Kai-shek. Peking, on the other hand, mounted a concerted propaganda campaign accusing the Indian government of being implicated in the revolt and in the "abduction" of the Dalai Lama across the Indian border. Public denunciations of Nehru at mass meetings throughout Communist China culminated in a *Jen-min jih-pao* editorial (May 6, 1959) reiterating charges of Indian interference in Tibet and alleging that Nehru, in spite of his differences with the "imperialists," nevertheless was strongly influenced in some of his policies by the Indian "big bourgeoisie" tied in with imperialism.

Soon thereafter, in midsummer of 1959, came the Indian government's removal of the Communist regime in Kerala. While the CPI at the time reacted to this long-expected event with comparative restraint, the Kerala ouster probably confirmed the Chinese Communist leadership in its estimate that Nehru's policies were becoming increasingly inimical to Communist interests, and this estimate in turn was an important motivation behind Peking's belligerence towards India in the border conflict that followed in the fall.

Communist China's aggressive posture in the frontier dispute was calamitous for the CPI. Following Nehru's statement in the Lok Sabha on August 29 announcing Chinese Communist infringement of Indian territory, the CPI Secretariat issued an evasive declaration which aroused widespread public attack by its failure to come out in clear-cut support of the government. Chinese Communist diplomatic notes to New Delhi on September 3 and 8 added fuel to the fire by accusing India of "aggression" and by laying down enlarged Chinese territorial demands. The effect of these developments was not only to precipitate intensified factional dissension within the CPI, but also to threaten the party with grave political isolation.

Moscow in the Sino-Indian Conflict

The Soviet Union chose this moment to intervene. Simultaneously with the delivery of the second Chinese note to New Delhi, *Pravda* on September 8 reported that Ghosh was in Moscow. This was followed the next day by an official statement, disseminated by the Soviet news agency TASS, which deplored the clashes on the Sino-Indian border and urged a negotiated settlement, but conspicuously refrained from taking any stand on the merits of either disputant's claims.[8] This tacit expression of Soviet neutrality was apparently decided upon after consultations with Ghosh and obviously was intended to dissociate the Soviet Union from the action of its Chinese ally in the eyes of the Indian government and public, and at the same time to relieve the domestic pressure on the CPI. The Soviet move naturally angered Peking, where it was apparently viewed as a betrayal of the duty to support a fraternal member of the Communist bloc against a bourgeois government, and reinforced Chinese Communist determination to oppose Khrushchev's general line of "unprincipled" conciliation of the West.

A few weeks later, both Khrushchev and Ghosh were simultaneously in Peking for the October 1 celebration of the tenth anniversary of the Chinese People's Republic. The Soviet leader used this occasion to voice a pointed public warning against attempting to "test the stability of the capitalist system by force," and he presumably also lent his support to efforts which, according to later-published Indian press reports,[9] were made by Ghosh to persuade the Chinese Communist leaders to moderate their harsh Indian policy. These efforts apparently met with no success. Chinese intransigence was reflected in a Peking article, published even before the conclusion of Ghosh's talks, which asserted that "the leaders of India" had shown themselves to be "double-faced neutralists" who "maintain such intricate relations with the imperialists that they are led to manifest expansionist ambitions."[10]

Nevertheless, after returning home, Ghosh claimed at an October 18 press conference—given extensive publicity in the party press[11]—that Mao had given him firm assurances of Peking's peaceful intentions towards India. Almost immediately his statement was belied by a new frontier clash in the Ladakh area, in which Chinese Communist troops killed some Indian border guards and took others prisoner, Peking officially protesting to New Delhi that the clash had resulted from Indian provocation. Placed in a ridiculous position, Ghosh reacted sharply. A declaration issued by the CPI Secretariat on October 24 called the Ladakh clash a "tragic event" and affirmed that there was "no justification whatever" for the firing upon Indian border personnel. Also, at meetings of the party's Central Executive Committee and National Council at Meerut during November, Ghosh evidently supported demands by the rightist faction led by S. A. Dange for concessions to Indian public sentiment. After intense resistance by the party militants, these deliberations finally

[8] Published in *Pravda*, September 10, 1959.

[9] *Link* (New Delhi weekly), September 11, 1960.

[10] *Shih-chieh Chih-shih* (Peking), October 5, 1959.

[11] *New Age*, October 25, 1959.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

produced a compromise resolution which, though still ambivalent, brought the CPI stand on the border conflict somewhat closer to the nationalist position.

Meanwhile, the CPSU was shifting from neutrality to at least implicit criticism of the Chinese course. The CPI publication *New Age* on November 15 carried an interview given by Khrushchev to its Moscow correspondent, who quoted the Soviet leader as saying that the border conflict was "a sad and stupid story" because the area in dispute was virtually uninhabited and without strategic value. Khrushchev pointedly cited the USSR's past cession of frontier territory to Iran as a lesson in the amicable settlement of such differences, remarking: "We gave up more than we gained; what were a few kilometers for a country like the Soviet Union?" Though perhaps intended to placate the Indian government, these remarks also had an immediate impact on the CPI rank-and-file and helped to widen the division between the right-wing and leftist factions of the party.

The CPI Under Pressure

As the divergencies between Moscow and Peking became more openly and repeatedly manifest during 1960, the conflict took on the character of an organizational struggle in which the CPSU and CPC began vying with each other for the allegiance of the other party leaderships. It was at the Rumanian Party Congress in Bucharest in June 1960 that the CPI was first called upon to take a position in this struggle. As it happened, the Indian party was represented at the meeting by two leftist members of the CPI Secretariat, Basavapunniah and Bhupesh Gupta. They not only heard Khrushchev assail Chinese policies—without naming the CPC—in his public address to the congress, but also were reported to have been present at a behind-the-scenes gathering of party representatives at which the Soviet leader specifically attacked the Chinese "for their attitude towards India and other Asian countries."[12] Although most of the foreign delegates who spoke at this and other private meetings at Bucharest supported Khrushchev, Bhupesh Gupta reportedly delivered an evasive speech which failed to commit the CPI to the Soviet position.[13]

In the wake of the developments at Bucharest, the right-wing faction of the CPI renewed its offensive against the party leftists in an effort to identify them clearly with the Chinese resistance to CPSU authority. When the issue was finally pressed to a decision at a Central Executive Committee meeting in early September, a majority of the members, who had hitherto been vacillating, swung to the side of the right-wing leaders identified with the CPSU, and the Committee passed and published a resolution which, without mentioning China, espoused the positions of the Soviet party on peaceful coexistence, policy towards the Indian national

[12] *Link*, July 31, 1960; also see *Blitz* (New Delhi), July 30, 1960.

[13] *Link*, July 31, 1960.

Applying Marxism-Leninism to Concrete Conditions:
Two Views from the CPI

It is the primary responsibility of a Socialist Government like that of China to see that a vast country like India remains friendly to the socialist states and that the unity of the peace camp is not impaired. The correctness or otherwise of historical claims should be subordinated to the paramount need of strengthening the unity of the peace camp and to the interests of the democratic movement. It is to be deeply regretted that this is not how the Chinese leaders approached the question. They made a basically wrong assessment of the Indian situation; this was done without any effort to ascertain the views of the CPI. . . . Throughout the development of the crisis in India-China relations, the USSR played a correct role, treating it as a conflict between two countries of the peace camp.

—CPI Central Executive Committee resolution of Sept. 7, 1960.
Link, *September 18, 1960.*

In the opinion of the West Bengal Council, the Central Executive Committee itself, by criticizing a brother party without hearing its views . . . has adopted a method which is much more reprehensible than what it sought to deprecate. . . . Utmost care and caution was all the more necessary before coming to any conclusions because the divergencies of opinion were primarily between two great Communist parties of the world, both of whom have rich revolutionary experiences, have successfully applied Marxism-Leninism to concrete conditions and have led great revolutions and both of whom exert influence on the course of the world revolutionary movement. It can not be anything else but utter irresponsibility to rush to conclusions without caring to know the viewpoint of one of the great parties.

—West Bengal Communist Party State Council resolution of Oct. 21, 1960.
Hindustan Times, *November 14, 1960.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

government, and the possibility of non-violent transition to socialism.

In addition, the right-wing faction reportedly succeeded in forcing through—over the strenuous objections of Ranadive and the representatives of the West Bengal and Punjab party organizations—a secret CEC resolution explicitly condemning the policies of the Chinese Communist Party and upholding Soviet insistence upon a general Communist policy of preserving and cultivating Indian national good will towards the "socialist camp." On Sino-Indian issues, the resolution disapproved the Indian government's action in giving sanctuary to the Dalai Lama, but was much more emphatic in denouncing Peking's charges that the Indian town of Kalimpong had been the command center of the Tibetan revolt, that the Dalai Lama had been "abducted" to India under duress, and that the cause of trouble lay in "Indian expansionism." Peking was accused of basing its policy towards India on a new and mistaken assessment of the Indian situation (in particular, of the role of the "national bourgeoisie") "without any effort to ascertain the views of the CPI," whereas the resolution credited Moscow with having taken a correct stand in treating the Sino-Indian dispute as an unjustified conflict "between two countries of the peace camp."[14]

THE CENTRAL EXECUTIVE Committee's adoption of the secret resolution evoked angry protests from the provincial party organizations backing the leftist group of CPI leaders, many of whom had continued to flaunt publicly their sympathy for the militant views of the Chinese Communists. On October 21, 1960, the West Bengal party organization reportedly passed a resolution accusing the CEC of having taken "wrong and harmful" action almost solely on the basis of Soviet accusations and without properly acquainting itself with "the views of the CPC."[15] The committee was alleged to have overemphasized the evidence of "one or two *Red Flag* articles and one or two speeches" by Chinese leaders while conveniently refusing to take into account the numerous Soviet official articles, speeches, and CPSU documents which had provoked the Chinese reaction. The West Bengal party resolution further charged that the CEC had acted despite knowing that the Chinese delegates at Bucharest had "refuted" Khrushchev's criticism there as being "untrue and slanderous."

The "views of the CPC" alluded to in the West Bengal resolution apparently had been communicated directly to one of the provincial party leaders, Hare Krishna Konar, when he attended the (North) Vietnamese party congress in September as a member of the CPI delegation. According to Indian press sources, Konar subsequently reported to the West Bengal party on his talks with the Chinese representatives at the congress, reciting a list of CPC grievances against Moscow dating back to the 20th CPSU Congress. In particular, he stressed Peking's charges that Khrushchev's peaceful coexistence line was "sowing illusions" about "Western imperialism," that the bourgeois governments of newly-independent Asian countries were bound eventually to line up with the imperialists, and that the Nehru government was already demonstrating this by its "expansionist" tendencies while showing its "true reactionary colors" in domestic policy.[16]

The outcome of the crucial Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties in November 1960, rather than chastening the CPI leftists, appears to have intensified their opposition to the CPSU policy line. The strong fight waged by the Chinese in defense of their views at the Moscow gathering,[17] the near-standoff between the Chinese and Soviet positions reflected in the final, published declaration of the conference, and the apparent failure of the CPSU to secure any guarantee against a repetition of Chinese public attacks on Soviet policy had the effect of encouraging the militant wing of the CPI to step up its efforts to win support in preparation for an attempt to capture control of the party at the Sixth CPI Congress in April 1961.

On the eve of the congress, the publication in *Pravda* (April 5, 1961) of an article by Ghosh made it clear that CPSU support was firmly behind the CPI moderates. The contents of the article also suggested that Ghosh and the Soviet party leadership had agreed beforehand on a balanced CPI policy line to be presented to the congress, providing for Communist support of certain aspects of Nehru's foreign and domestic policies coupled with a critical attitude towards others, and emphasizing the harmful effect of the Sino-Indian dis-

[14] *Ibid.*, September 11 and 18, 1960.

[15] The purported text of the resolution was published in the *Hindustan Times*, November 14, 1960. Another passage implied that the secret CEC "inner-party resolution" had been leaked to the press by the right-wing members of the committee, suggesting that the West Bengal party's counter-resolution may have been similarly leaked in retaliation.

[16] *Link*, October 16, 1960.

[17] Much new light was shed on the Sino-Soviet confrontation at the November 1960 Moscow conference by the publication in Italy and Poland early in 1962 of a speech made at the conference by Luigi Longo, one of the Italian delegates. (See *Paese*, January 25, 1962; also *Polityka* [Warsaw], February 17, 1962.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

pute on the Communist cause in India. Ghosh's article also suggested agreement on a CPI strategy of working for a "very broad" national-democratic front designed to achieve limited short-term political objectives.

Addressing the Sixth Congress itself on April 8, the chief CPSU delegate, M. A. Suslov, urged the adoption of policies along these same lines. The Chinese party, on the other hand, failed to send any delegation, depriving the CPI militants of outside support, and the congress confirmed the party leadership in the hands of the moderates considered loyal to the CPSU. The militants nevertheless commanded sufficient strength to secure modifications in the political resolution adopted by the congress so as to make it much harsher toward the Nehru government than the leadership had originally proposed. Ghosh also recognized in his address to the congress that the CPI would have to fight the next election on the basis of its own program, necessarily making the government the clear target of its electoral attack; but he emphasized that this would not mean abandonment of the long-term effort to draw the "progressive" section of the Indian Congress party leadership, as well as its popular following, into the broad political alliance which the CPI planned to build and dominate. In short, while the militants showed themselves strong enough to exact some concessions to their views, the moderate Ghosh leadership emerged from the Sixth Congress with sufficient strength in the party's policy-making bodies to attempt to apply the line advocated by the CPSU.

Impact of the 22nd Congress

Six months later, however, developments at the 22nd CPSU Congress in October 1961 threatened the Indian party with a new and grave internal crisis. Even the moderate pro-Soviet faction controlling the CPI leadership was shaken by the vehemence of Khrushchev's open assault on the Albanian party, the implicit but obvious purpose of which was to force a showdown on the broader issue of Peking's challenge to CPSU authority over the international Communist movement. Ghosh, who headed the CPI delegation to the 22nd Congress, could easily foresee that Khrushchev's initiative would provoke a hostile reaction among the leftist elements of the CPI, and that Chou En-lai's countercharge that Khrushchev's action represented an un-Marxist way of trying to resolve inter-party differences might possibly receive sympathy even in sections of the Indian party ordinarily inclined toward Moscow. Ghosh's primary concern was to preserve his own leadership position and, if at all possible, to avoid a collapse of the public facade of CPI unity on the eve of a national election. In his speech to the congress, he therefore refrained from joining in the attack on the Albanian leadership, preferring to sit on the fence as did the representatives of several other non-bloc Communist parties which had hitherto explicitly supported the CPSU against the CPC.

Even more ominous for CPI internal harmony was the renewed—and this time open—attack on Stalin unleashed at the 22nd Congress. The attack elaborated upon, and put on public record, the details of Stalin's crimes, which had been partially revealed by Khrushchev in his "secret" speech at the 20th Congress. In view of the staggering and lasting effect of the first denigration of Stalin upon CPI morale and discipline, it was evident that the new revelations would likewise produce serious repercussions in the party, and Ghosh later reported (in *New Age,* December 10, 1961) that the CPI delegation to the 22nd Congress had protested the action of the Soviet party leadership in reopening the de-Stalinization campaign.

The developments in Moscow did indeed produce evidences of turmoil in the CPI even before Ghosh and his fellow delegates returned to India. The organ of the CPI leftists in Uttar Pradesh showed its defiance of the CPSU by publishing an article eulogizing the Albanians. The Kerala party organ *Janayangam* (October 31, 1961) called it tragic that the battle against Stalinism had degenerated into an attack on Stalin's body; and one Kerala Communist leader, according to a PTI news agency report (November 12), declared himself in favor of asking that Stalin's remains be sent to the Kerala party. A left-wing Communist leader in Andhra reportedly protested the republication of the 22nd Congress "slanders" against Stalin in the central CPI weekly *New Age.* And the secretariat of the West Bengal provincial party organization was later reported to have adopted a resolution censuring the CPSU both for the renewed anti-Stalin campaign and for the attack on the Albanian party leadership, which was termed a "direct violation" of the 1960 Moscow declaration of 81 Communist parties.[18]

Ghosh's December 10 article in *New Age,* referred to above, sought to calm the rising storm of dissension in the party ranks. In it Ghosh declared that a thorough evaluation of the Soviet attack on the Albanian party and of "the comment made by Chou En-lai on the propriety of making such open criticism" should be deferred to a later CPI meeting. At the same time, however, he went beyond his non-committal stand at

[18] Reported in the Yugoslav daily *Borba* (Belgrade), January 10, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Moscow in expressing at least mild condemnation of Albanian attacks on Soviet foreign policy and the decisions of the 20th CPSU Congress as "not in the conformity" with the 1960 Moscow declaration. While attempting to combat disillusionment with the Soviet party, Ghosh acknowledged that a "big majority" of CPI members had been "deeply hurt" by the 22nd Congress decision to move Stalin's body; he insisted that Stalin was a distinguished Marxist-Leninist, and expressed "deep regret" that the struggle against the Stalin cult had been carried so far. Moreover, Ghosh sided with the view of the Italian party in declaring that the questions of why the excesses of the Stalin era had occurred and how they could be prevented from recurring in the future had not yet been satisfactorily answered. He added a pointed reminder that Khrushchev, in destroying Stalin's reputation, had also undermined the authority of the CPSU:

The 20th Congress . . . not merely ended the deification of Stalin, but also demolished the belief in the infallibility *of any party* or any leader. This was necessary, for such a belief is contrary to the very spirit of Marxism-Leninism. (Emphasis added.)

MEANWHILE, THE OCCURRENCE of new clashes on the Sino-Indian border during the summer and fall of 1961 had reinflamed India's relations with Communist China, further complicating the factional struggle within the CPI. On November 20, Nehru again brought the Sino-Indian conflict before the Lok Sabha, setting in motion new and violent denunciations of Communist China by the Indian press. The following day, Ghosh, acting on his own initiative as CPI Secretary-General, issued a public statement strongly criticizing the Chinese border infringements as bound to embitter relations between the two countries and "demanding" that the Peking government take measures to ensure that they would not recur.[19]

These developments in India brought a sharp reaction from Peking. Publication of the official Chinese notes sent to New Delhi regarding the border dispute was followed up by a strongly-worded editorial in the central CPC organ *Jen-min jih-pao,* which denounced the "anti-Chinese campaign launched by Nehru in India" and summed up Peking's charges indicting the Indian leader as an enemy of progressive mankind. In addition, the editorial gave vent to the CPC leadership's animosity toward Ghosh, accusing him of having "trailed behind Nehru and hurriedly issued a statement in condemnation of China . . . without bothering to find out the truth or to look into the rights and wrongs of the case."[20]

This unprecedented attack upon Ghosh in the official organ of the CPC was also an indirect slap at his Soviet backers and a move to encourage the leftist op-

Two Views of Indian Foreign Policy

Under the leadership of Prime Minister Nehru India has made an outstanding contribution to solving the problems of disarmament and general peace, a contribution which has won India the respect of all peace-loving peoples. India has resisted the attempts of the imperialists to exert pressure on her with the object of obtaining changes in her foreign policy. India stands in the camp of peace and anti-colonialism, speaking against war and for disarmament.

—Ajoy Ghosh in* Pravda *(Moscow), April 5, 1961.

Nehru is not at all interested in solving the Sino-Indian boundary question; on the contrary, he prefers to leave the question open indefinitely. . . . The Indian ruling circles in their view have nothing to lose but on the contrary something to gain in leaving the Sino-Indian boundary question permanently open. In this way they can at any time fan up anti-Chinese feelings, and conduct anti-Chinese propaganda to meet the needs of the internal and external policies of the Indian Government. . . . The current anti-Chinese campaign was unleashed in India after Nehru's visit to the United States. This, too, is by no means fortuitous. . . . In fact, the foreign policy pursued by the Indian ruling clique in recent years has received increasingly open approval and praise from Washington. . . . This anti-Chinese campaign has an international background that goes beyond India —it is part of the international anti-Chinese campaign designed mainly to meet the needs of U. S. imperialism. . . . As for the anti-Chinese campaign, it will eventually boomerang on those who stage it, whether it be U. S. imperialism, or Nehru, or *anybody else.* [Emphasis added.]

—Editorial,* People's Daily *(Peking), December 7, 1961.

[19] Ghosh's statement was later carried on the first page of *New Age* (November 26, 1961) under the headline, "China Must Put an End to Such Acts."

[20] December 7, 1961.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

position in the CPI. The resolution subsequently adopted by the West Bengal provincial party secretariat (see above) reportedly echoed the Chinese criticism of Ghosh in asserting that his November 21 statement on the border conflict represented "the attitude of a section of the party only." On the other hand, the central CPI organs controlled by the party leadership began to acknowledge more and more openly the existence of differences between the Indian and Chinese parties.

The CPI on the Tightrope

Thus, by the end of 1961, the internal division of the CPI into moderate and leftist factions reflecting the divergent attitudes and policy positions of Moscow and Peking had become clearly defined. The moderates, controlling the leadership, were openly criticizing the CPC and being criticized by it, and were generally supporting Moscow against Tirana and Peking, though regretting Khrushchev's method of attacking the Albanian leadership, as well as his reopening of the anti-Stalin campaign. On the other hand, the left-wing faction was publishing statements supporting the Chinese line on Nehru, censuring Ghosh for his anti-Chinese posture, and voicing outright opposition to the CPSU on the Albanian (hence Chinese) and Stalin issues.

Coming at this juncture, the death of Secretary-General Ghosh on January 13, 1962, confronted Moscow with the thorny problem of ensuring the installation of a new CPI leadership which would still faithfully support the CPSU but at the same time be capable of holding the Indian party together in the face of the challenge of the strong and rebellious pro-Chinese minority. The difficulty of the task was underlined by the results of the Indian national elections in February, for while the elections showed no substantial change in overall Communist strength, the CPI fared much better in the provinces where the left-wing faction was strongest (West Bengal, the Punjab, Andhra and Kerala) than in the right-wing strongholds (such as Maharashtra, where Dange lost his parliamentary seat).

Not until late April was the leadership issue at last resolved, and then only by an unstable compromise that was characteristic of the CPI, settling nothing and merely postponing a showdown between the opposing factions. Chosen to replace Ghosh as CPI Secretary-General was E. M. S. Namboodiripad, former Chief Minister of the Communist government in Kerala. Though formerly identified as a moderate, Namboodiripad had made some friendly gestures toward the party leftists during 1961 in view of their growing strength. At the same time, the ill-defined post of party chairman was created and given to the right-wing leader, Dange, while the leftist faction, in return for agreeing to this, received greatly augmented representation in the Central Secretariat charged with the day-to-day running of the party. In short, an uneasy equilibrium was set up between the factions at the party center, corresponding to the general situation in the party as a whole.

This arrangement seems sure to be precarious, partly because of the vagueness of Dange's position and the uncertainty of Namboodiripad's intentions, and partly because the CPI, as of this writing (October), has yet to take a clear and unqualified position in the Sino-Albanian-Soviet conflict. Although the party's National Council in August finally issued a resolution commenting on the results of the 22nd CPSU Congress,[21] this declaration—like Ghosh's December 1961 statement—was hardly the unequivocal endorsement of the Soviet position that Moscow would have liked. While paying generous tribute to the new CPSU Program and voicing a brief and mild criticism of Albanian attacks on the Soviet party as "regrettable and unjustified," the resolution fell far short of echoing the massive Soviet denunciations of the Albanian leadership and did not even mention the Chinese party. Furthermore, it took a rather neutral tone—resembling that of the North Vietnamese party—in chiding both sides for allowing the dispute to continue and in appealing to the disputants to settle their differences through "friendly and fraternal discussions." Finally, although the resolution upheld the renewed Soviet anti-Stalin campaign as generally "beneficial," it explicitly declined to endorse "every statement made by the CPSU leaders" on this issue, acknowledged "reservations" regarding some Soviet actions, and reiterated Ghosh's earlier appeal for a more satisfactory explanation of why Stalin had been able to perpetuate his "excesses."

While the reserved attitude expressed in the resolution on the de-Stalinization issue cuts across intra-party factional lines and is therefore likely to persist, the same is not true of the hesitant, indecisive public position still being taken by the CPI vis-à-vis the crucial Sino-Soviet conflict. The continuing slide of the Soviet and Chinese parties toward open schism—demonstrated in recent months by the renewal of violent attacks by Peking and Tirana on Khrushchev and his policies—may be expected to place increasing pressure upon the Indian and other important Communist parties to commit themselves unreservedly. Should the leftist forces

[21] Published in *New Age*, August 26, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the CPI eventually succeed in compelling the party leadership to shift to a posture of open sympathy for Peking (like that of the Indonesian party), this would mean a serious defeat for the CPSU and a marked strengthening of the already visible tendency among the Far Eastern Communist parties since the 22nd Congress to move away from Moscow and closer to Peking. On the other hand, in the more likely event that the pro-Soviet forces in the Indian party—probably still in the majority—should compel the leadership to take a more forthright stand in support of Moscow against Peking, the CPSU will have successfully beaten off the Chinese threat to an exposed and vital Soviet salient in the worldwide Communist struggle—though probably at the cost of heightening disaffection among the pro-Chinese elements of the CPI and hastening an eventual factional schism.

WHETHER OR NOT such a schism occurs, the fortunes of the CPI within India must in the long run be closely tied to the factional struggle and the choice the party will ultimately be forced to make between Moscow and Peking. For a policy of nonalignment with either the CPSU or CPC on policy issues disputed by the two bloc leaders does not appear likely to remain possible indefinitely for the Indian party. In particular, the CPI cannot forever continue to straddle the issue of Communist policy toward the Nehru government, which has been one of the focal points of disagreement between the Soviet and Chinese parties, and must eventually lean either to one side or the other. Similarly, the questions of whether or not to continue relying primarily on parliamentary methods of attaining power, whether or not to go on seeking an alliance with the "national bourgeoisie" (and on what terms), and what line to take towards the left wing of the Congress party cannot be indefinitely glossed over by means of compromise resolutions.

The cautious policies which Moscow has enjoined upon the CPI over the last decade, although designed to serve Soviet foreign policy interests, have not been without profit to the Indian party: they have helped it to gain a mass following and to become the second largest party in the Indian parliament. They have not, however, brought the day of revolutionary triumph (thought in the heady days of 1948 to be just around the corner) within sight. The harsher line urged upon the CPI by Peking—similarly inspired by selfish national interests—has seemingly appealed to those in the Indian party who feel, with some justice, that the party's revolutionary élan and vigor are slowly being sapped by obedience to Soviet dictates. The party right wing, on the other hand, apparently feels that to attack Nehru openly and renounce the parliamentary line in favor of revolutionary militancy would cast away all the gains the party has made. It now seems likely that a clear-cut choice between continued adherence to enervating "revisionism" (as the leftists see it) and a return to reckless "sectarianism" (as the rightists see it) can be made by the CPI only after resolving the inner conflict in the party over its alignment in the wider Sino-Soviet struggle.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

The PKI and the Peasants

By Donald Hindley

EDITORS' NOTE: Ever since Mao Tse-tung demonstrated that communism could rise to power on the backs of the peasantry, Communist leaders in other predominantly agrarian, non-industrialized countries have dreamed of emulating the Chinese example. None has pursued this strategy more assiduously, or with greater initial success, than D.N. Aidit, leader since 1951 of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), which as a result now boasts the largest peasant following of any non-governing Communist party in the world. In the following analysis, Mr. Hindley shows how the PKI managed to build up that following and points out the reasons why the party leadership, in spite of its achievement, now finds its mass peasant support to be of dubious value in advancing its aspirations to the conquest of political power.

IN JANUARY 1951 a group of young Communists, led by D. N. Aidit, captured control of the Indonesian Communist Party (PKI), a control that it still maintains.[1] Owing to deficient leadership in the preceding years—of which the abortive Moscow-inspired Communist rebellion unleashed at Madiun in September 1948 was an illustration—the party was small, with only about 5,000 members, and loosely organized. The Communists had been eliminated from the governing elite of the young Indonesian republic and had few adherents either in the higher levels of the bureaucracy or in the armed forces. The government's power was sufficient, if applied, to enforce severe curtailment of PKI activities.[2] The Indonesian working class was small, and the peasants were as yet largely untouched by Communist organization. And Java, where the party's chief support was concentrated, did not lend itself to protracted guerrilla warfare—with the exception of areas already occupied by the fanatical Moslem and anti-Communist Darul Islam rebels.

Confronted by this unpropitious situation, the Aidit leadership early in 1952 formulated a broad, national united front strategy wherein it saw the best hope of improving the party's political fortunes. This strategy, which envisaged ultimate Communist victory only in the distant future, set three main, interrelated tasks for the PKI: (1) to build a disciplined mass party; (2) to attract, mobilize, organize and lead the three "most revolutionary classes"—the workers, peasants, and petty bourgeoisie; and (3) to gain the tolerance and cooperation of as many as possible of those political elements that were not openly anti-Communist.

The party leadership placed emphasis on acquiring mass support because it felt that the PKI, having failed

[1] For a detailed study of the Aidit leadership's rise to power and the subsequent history of the PKI, see the author's *The Communist Party of Indonesia, 1951-1961; A Decade of the Aidit Leadership* (Ph.D. thesis, Australian National University, 1961). An introduction to "Aiditism" is to be found in Justus Maria van der Kroef, "Indonesian Communism under Aidit," *Problems of Communism,* November-December 1958, pp. 15-23.

[2] This was shown in August 1951, when a government "razzia" against the PKI brought Communist activity to a virtual standstill.

Mr. Hindley, currently Assistant Professor of Politics at Brandeis University (Waltham, Massachusetts), spent ten months in Indonesia in 1959-1960. His research on the Indonesian CP was undertaken while he was affiliated with the Australian National University in Canberra.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

signally to win over the nationalist elite, must build its strength among those elements of society as yet outside the political forum. Aidit and his colleagues believed that by adopting a suitably moderate and friendly demeanor, the party could expand its popular following and thereby win the cooperation of, and a degree of influence over, important non-Communist elements within the fragmented Indonesian political elite engrossed in the incessant struggle for governing power. They calculated that this, in turn, would allow the PKI freely to extend its organizational activities among the masses, to isolate and weaken the anti-Communist forces, and eventually to achieve Communist participation in a "national unity government" as a steppingstone towards the goal of an Indonesian "people's democratic republic" under Communist control. Once a mass, disciplined party following had been developed, the leadership estimated, it could be used to intimidate or literally force the governing groups into relinquishing power in favor of the PKI.

As some 70 percent of the Indonesian population consists of peasants, the success of the PKI's national united front policy hinged on the party's ability to win the support of a major section of the peasantry. By mid-1953 the party had consolidated its organization in the urban areas, and the Aidit leadership was ready to begin rural work. By early 1962, less than nine years later, the leadership claimed over one million peasants enrolled directly in the party and eight millions more in Communist-controlled mass organizations. In terms of pure numbers, this unquestionably represents an impressive achievement. But as the present survey will show, there are various factors which severely limit the political effectiveness of the party's peasant following in the context of the changed political situation in Indonesia today.

The Peasants in PKI Strategy

In Java, where the PKI has gained most of its rural support, the peasantry is largely passive[3]—an indication that in the main the Javanese peasants have not yet come to believe that existing inequalities are man-made and unjust rather than predestined, and that organized action by the peasants themselves can remove them. Landholdings are fragmented, and laborers constitute over 50 percent of the village population; but unemployment, as distinguished from underemployment, is scarce, as tradition still largely ensures that all villagers either receive land to sharecrop or obtain work as laborers on the land of wealthier neighbors. Large landholdings are few, and variations in income are generally not great. What might be termed "shared poverty" prevails, and population growth tends to produce a general decline in living standards, rather than an utterly impoverished class. In general, the peasants retain considerable respect for their wealthier neighbors as well as for village officials and local functionaries of the government rural administration. Politically, then, the peasants are essentially non-revolutionary.

Nevertheless, Aidit declared in July 1953 that "the agrarian revolution is the essence of the people's democratic revolution in Indonesia," and his thesis was endorsed by the Fifth National Congress of the PKI in March 1954. At the congress Aidit stressed that "the first task of the Communists is to draw the peasants into the national united front." He explained:

> **Without the participation of the peasants, the national united front cannot possibly be strong and powerful. Without the participation of the peasants, the united front can at most bring together 20 to 30 percent of the people. . . . Therefore the strong and powerful national united front is the national front based on the alliance of workers and peasants.[4]**

It became an article of faith for the PKI that, despite their "backwardness," the peasants could become "the firmest ally of the workers" because they suffered from vestiges of feudal exploitation, from exploitation by landlords and moneylenders, from the occupancy of 20 percent of agricultural land by plantations, and from the general poverty of Indonesia allegedly resulting from imperialist economic domination.

The PKI, however, has not viewed all peasants as being uniformly reliable as potential allies. From an analysis of the economic situation in the villages, the Aidit leadership, consciously echoing both Lenin and

[3] For an examination of the condition of the Javanese peasantry, see Donald R. Fagg, *Authority and Social Structure: A Study in Javanese Bureaucracy* (Ph. D. thesis, Harvard University, 1958); Clifford Geertz, *The Development of the Javanese Economy* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956); Geertz, *The Religion of Java* (Glencoe, Illinois, 1960); Geertz, *The Social Context of Economic Change* (Cambridge, Mass., 1956); Robert R. Jay, *Santri and Abangan: Religious Schism in Rural Central Java* (Ph.D. thesis, Harvard University, 1957); Selosoemardjan, *Social Changes in Jogjakarta* (Ph.D. thesis, Cornell University, 1959); G. William Skinner (ed.), *Local, Ethnic, and National Loyalties in Village Indonesia* (New Haven, Conn., 1959); Hurustiati Subandrio, *Javanese Peasant Life: Villages in East Java* (Postgraduate thesis, London University, 1951); and B. ter Haar, *Adat Law in Indonesia* (New York, 1948). Also of considerable use are Boyd R. Compton's *Village Notebooks,* issued by the Institute of Current World Affairs, New York, in 1956.

[4] D. N. Aidit, *Djalan ke Demokrasi Rakjat bagi Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1955), p. 53.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Is the PKI a Peasants' Party?

Perhaps some comrades ask: Does the PKI wish to become a peasants' party? That is certainly not the intention. The PKI is the party of the working class, the party of the proletariat, from its foundation until now and into the future. But as I have said elsewhere, the Indonesian proletariat and its political party must be the creator and the leader of the revolution and also the leader of the peasants.

The proletariat is certainly the class that leads the Indonesian revolution. But the basis of the Indonesian revolution, or the basic force of this revolution, is the peasantry. To consolidate the leadership of the proletariat in the Indonesian revolutionary movement means first of all to consolidate the work of the PKI among the peasants. In order to do this, the PKI must be the true leader of the peasants, the leader of the tens of millions of villagers.

—D.N. Aidit, addressing the 2nd National Peasants' Conference of the PKI, July 16, 1961.

Mao Tse-tung, concluded that agricultural laborers and the poor peasants "are the village semi-proletariat, . . . the most reliable of the allies of the proletariat."[5] As for the middle peasants, embracing those who enjoy a degree of economic independence, the party held that some are forced to rent additional land from landlords, that many would benefit from land reform, and that all suffer from imperialist exploitation; therefore, the middle peasants, too, are "a reliable ally of the proletariat" and "not only can become part of the anti-imperialist revolution and the agrarian revolution, but also can accept socialism." Finally, regarding the rich peasants who actually participate in agricultural work, the Aidit leadership concluded that a correct approach to them by the party could persuade them to take a neutral position in the struggle against the landlords and to join in the struggle against imperialism.

Since the 1954 congress, the party leadership has frequently reiterated that "the most immediate task" of the Indonesian Communists is "to eliminate the survivals of feudalism, to develop the anti-feudal agrarian revolution, to confiscate the land of the landlords." For accomplishing these goals, the PKI has proclaimed its strategy to be: "Make the peasant laborers and poor peasants the base, unite with the middle peasants, neutralize the rich peasants, and strike against the landlords." However, owing to a complex of reasons, the Indonesian Communists have remained relatively restrained in their actual policy towards the landlords. "Sectarian," "adventurist," and "provocative" activities are regularly denounced by the party leaders.

Fundamentally, this moderation reflects the estimation of the Aidit leadership that Indonesia is not yet ripe for a Communist-led revolution. With few exceptions, the peasantry and even the urban workers continue to be repelled by "radical" actions, and the leadership is also aware that such actions by the Communists would inevitably alienate the non-Communist political forces, who are overwhelmingly superior in terms of power and whose tolerance is essential to the continuation of above-ground PKI activity. Consequently, in order to build up mass support and win the cooperation of non-Communist elements, the PKI leaders have painstakingly worked to create an image of the party as militantly patriotic, friendly and self-effacing vis-à-vis the non-Communist forces, opposed to the use of violence in the pursuit of its objectives, sympathetic towards religion, and representative of the whole people rather than dedicated to narrow sectional interests.

In line with this general strategy, the PKI has moved cautiously in its rural activities so as not to go beyond the limits of the peasants' restricted political consciousness or to alienate the non-Communist forces. Hence, it has thus far avoided indiscriminate attacks against even the landlords. In fact, Aidit stated in July 1956:

We also agree to cooperate with the anti-imperialist landlords, but at the same time we fight to reduce rents for rice lands, and to ensure that the landlords do not exploit the peasants *too much*.[6] [Author's italics.]

The party has also been careful to maintain its differentiation between the rich peasants, "who must be neutralized, and not attacked," and the landlords.

Organizing the Rural Masses

At the same time that it strove to fashion a favorable image of the party, the Aidit leadership pursued the task of attracting and organizing a mass following by championing the material interests of the various sections of "the people." The PKI remained the focal organization, assimilating members and extending its organizational network as quickly as possible. But because of the backward political awareness of the Indonesian urban and rural masses, the party leadership chose to form

[5] D. N. Aidit, *Masajarakat Indonesia dan Revolusi Indonesia* (Djakarta, 1957), p. 62.

[6] *Harian Rakjat*, July 10, 1956.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

nominally independent mass organizations with simple programs of action, so as to attract large numbers of sympathizers who would otherwise have remained beyond the party's influence. These organizations enabled the PKI to tap hitherto inaccessible sources of members and cadres for its own ranks, and they have become the chief reservoir of potential recruits for the party.

Mass organizations in Indonesia have not sprung up spontaneously from the masses, but have been the creation of educated, politically-conscious urban cadres. Since 1951, and particularly since the end of 1953, the PKI has had outstanding success in developing a wide network of thes eorganizations, as well as in building a mass party. Its success has been due partly to the apathy of non-Communist Indonesian politicians towards working among the poorer sections of society and partly to the ample funds and organizational skill at the PKI's disposal. In the rural areas of Indonesia, Communist-led mass organizations have played an active role in championing the interests of the peasants in general, of youth, women, village officials, and cultural workers.

According to official party figures, the PKI swelled its peasant membership from less than 80,000 in March 1954 to more than one million by April 1961. As of September 1959 the party had branches in 84.2 percent of Java's 21,047 villages, and the number has since increased. Among the mass organizations, the Indonesian Peasants' Association (Barisan Tani Indonesia, or BTI) claims to have increased its membership from 360,000 members in September 1953 to 4.5 millions in April 1962, and as of April 1959 it claimed subbranches in 11,259 Javanese villages. The youth organization, Pemuda Rakjat, likewise grew from only 70,319 members in June 1953 to 1,250,000 in September 1961, about 80 percent of its membership coming from the peasantry. The Indonesian Women's Movement (Gerakan Wanita Indonesia, or Gerwani) multiplied its membership from 40,000 in June 1953 to 1,120,594 in December 1961, while the Indonesian Village Officials' Association (Persatuan Pamong Desa Indonesia, or PPDI) claims another 350,000 members.

Despite these quantitative advances, the PKI has experienced great difficulty in developing competent and reliable rural cadres. In general, the poorer peasants lack the skill and desire to become cadres, while the middle and rich peasants who more commonly take cadre positions often tend to disregard the interests of their poorer neighbors. Sometimes cadres who have become village officials or managers of cooperatives have exploited their positions to their own advantage. Moreover, peasant cadres, being villagers themselves, are generally loath or unable to see and exploit actual or potential intra-village conflicts; and urban cadres usually have neither competence in the regional languages nor desire to work in the villages.

As the PKI is a non-governing party, it cannot take its cadres too severely to task, but must attempt to improve them slowly. A network of cadre schools has been built up by the party and its mass organizations;[7] higher cadres have been encouraged to spend time in the villages; and special conferences of peasant cadres have been held. Nevertheless, the quality of the rural cadres still remains unsatisfactory. Since early 1959, the party has also undertaken organized research into village life with a view to heightening its skill in choosing methods and targets of action that are attuned to the needs and wishes of the peasants in different areas and different villages.

The rapid growth of Communist support in Java is evidenced by more than the claimed increases in the membership of the party and especially of the mass organizations, for which the figures appear exaggerated. The results of the general elections of September 1955 and of the local elections held throughout Java during 1957 indicated considerable and rapidly increasing electoral support for the PKI. In 1955, the party received 5,477,707 votes in Java, or 20.6 percent of the total vote, a high figure for Indonesia's multi-party system. In the 1957 elections, it increased its vote in all 100 electoral districts in Java, receiving 7,514,197 votes, or 27.4 percent of the total. This represented an increase of 37.2 percent in less than two years. It should be noted further that the PKI received only a slightly lower percentage of votes in the rural areas than in the cities.

The Party's Tactical Approaches

There is no question, then, that the PKI and its mass organizations have achieved a sharp and rapid expansion of their peasant support. Mention has already been made of some of the conditions which permitted this expansion: namely, the apathy of the other political parties towards engaging in organizational work among the poorer sections of society, especially the peasantry; the attractive public image of the PKI built up by the Aidit leadership; the financial resources and organizational skill of the Communists. But, of course, the main reason for the party's success is to be found in the practical actions which the Communists have under-

[7] PKI leaders claimed that during the party's first three-year plan, from August 1956 to August 1959, more than 270,000 cadres and activists graduated from party schools or had completed a party course.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

taken to prove themselves solicitous of the material interests and welfare of the peasantry.

The PKI first entered the countryside in the plantation and forestry areas. During the Japanese occupation and the Indonesian national revolution, many thousands of squatters had occupied plantation and forest lands, but following the recognition of Indonesian independence by the Netherlands in December 1949, the national government began an eviction drive against them. The result was a series of bitter clashes in which the Communists fought alongside the peasant squatters and often succeeded in preventing their eviction or in obtaining compensation for those evicted. Although legal safeguards of the squatters' interests were enacted in 1954 for estate lands, and in 1956 for forestry lands, disputes did not cease. In fact, the government's seizure of all Dutch-owned estates in December 1957 led to increased pressure on the squatters.[8] Thus, the PKI and its mass organizations, by mobilizing and championing the squatters, have been able to win militant peasant support in the squatter areas.

The regions cultivating sugar cane have also provided the Communists with a point of ready entry into the rural areas. Since 1950, the government has fixed what it considers reasonable rents to be paid for lands leased by peasants to the sugar mills for cane growing. The system has, however, been strongly opposed by the peasants because the renting of cane lands to the mills is near-compulsory and the prescribed rents are regarded as too low. The Communists have therefore pressed a demand that the leasing of cane lands be completely voluntary, and that rents be fixed by agreement between the mills and the peasants or their representatives.

The PKI and its mass organizations have found still another problem to exploit to their advantage in the areas pillaged or threatened by rebels and bandits. In Java, there is such an area extending from Tegal in Central Java through the mountainous region of West Java to the Sunda Straits. Attacks on villages by bands of Darul Islam rebels occur almost daily.[9] Since November 1951, therefore, the PKI has agitated for government confiscation of land belonging to "pro-bandit" landlords and its free distribution among poor and landless peasants. The party has also been loud and persistent, though unsuccessful, in demanding that the government provide the peasants with weapons to defend themselves, and it has actively promoted the formation of village guard units. The Communists further display their solicitude for the victims of armed bands by organizing periodic collections of food and clothing which are redistributed to peasants who have been robbed or burned out by the Darul Islam.

IN THE GREAT MAJORITY of Javanese rural villages, however, such especially favorable conditions for exploitation have not been present, and the PKI has been faced with relative social calm and a dearth of overt intra-village conflicts. For this reason as well as because of the wider needs of its national united front strategy, the Aidit leadership has generally pursued tactics of cautious moderation in the rural areas.

In July 1953 Aidit rejected the earlier slogans of the Communist-led peasant associations demanding the "nationalization of all land," which had only served to make the peasants suspicious of the PKI. He replaced them by new slogans calling for "redistribution of land to the peasants" and "peasant private ownership of land." But because of the low level of the villagers' political consciousness, he further emphasized that party work among them must begin at the simplest level:

Only by practical work among the peasants, only by leading them in struggles for their everyday demands—demands that seem small, insignificant, unimportant—only in this way can the party's cadres and members have close relations with the peasants and receive their trust. Only by actions that seem small, insignificant, unimportant, can the peasants' organization grow stronger, wider and more solid. Only through the organizing and education of the peasants can the peasants' struggle be raised to a higher level. Only through this work can the peasants be educated and mobilized so that the time will become ripe to carry out the slogans of "land for the peasants" and "peasant private ownership of land."[10]

Thus, the Aidit leadership recognized that at least for several years the PKI would have to limit itself to "small but successful" actions aimed at strengthening the peasants' confidence both in themselves and in the Communists. The party warned:

Passionate and "leftist" measures not based on the true consciousness of the peasants must not be taken. Measures of that kind confuse peasants and retard their consciousness.[11]

[8] The latest major incident occurred in Kediri, East Java, in November 1961, when at least six squatters were killed and eighteen wounded during an attempt to resist eviction.

[9] The size of the problem is indicated by a government statement that, as of January 1960, the Department of Social Affairs had registered 343,650 refugees from terrorist activities in Central and West Java. Kartosuwirjo, leader of the Darul Islam, finally surrendered to government security forces on June 4, 1962, but it remains to be seen whether this will end rebel activities.

[10] D. N. Aidit, "Haridepan Gerakan Tani Indonesia," *Bintang Merah,* July 1953, pp. 339-40.

[11] PKI, *Tuntunan untuk Bekerdja dikalangan Kaum Tani* (Djakarta, 1955), p. 47.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Two principles to which the Communist leadership has constantly adhered in organizing any peasant action are that "the peasants must be convinced of its justice, correctness and benefits," and that "the party must always strive to draw in and mobilize 90 percent of the village inhabitants."

Tactics of "Small but Successful" Action

The Aidit leadership has carefully listed the "small but successful" actions best calculated to attract and mobilize the peasants.[12] These range from agitating for reduction of interest rates on peasant loans to organizing mutual assistance for peasant households in distress and for the repair of village roads, bridges, and irrigation canals. The party attempts at the same time to use each small action as a means of raising the peasants' class consciousness and militancy. For example, whenever mutual assistance is organized to help a family afflicted by illness or death, the cadres explain that the peasants' ill health and short lives are due to their exploitation by the landlords.[13]

Both Pemuda Rakjat, the youth organization, and Gerwani, the women's association, have mobilized their members in support of PKI and BTI actions on behalf of the peasants, but their own mass memberships have been built up by concentrating primarily on appeals to the specific everyday interests and needs of the youth and women's segments of village society. Pemuda Rakjat has fought alongside the PKI and BTI in campaigns to improve peasant conditions because many of its own members are young peasants already working in the fields. Like the PKI and the other Communist-led mass organizations, it has been particularly active in the field of mutual aid. These activities are mainly of two kinds: the organization of teams to build or repair roads, bridges, houses, irrigation ditches, and gutters; and the organization of assistance to members in time of need or illness. Among people who are generally poor and as yet unprovided with adequate social services, aid of the latter type is a highly effective method of winning and retaining support for the PKI and its mass organizations as it provides at least a minimum of security which the peasants would be reluctant to forfeit.

Another method of winning support which the Communist organizations have utilized to good advantage is the provision of recreational activities during leisure hours, something to relieve the darkness and boredom of the villages after sunset. Pemuda Rakjat organizes volleyball, badminton, and football games, and has established physical training groups. It also sponsors a wide range of cultural activities in the villages, including traditional regional forms of entertainment as well as singing, musical and dramatic groups. In addition, it provides general educational courses and instruction for cadres.

Gerwani's activities are similarly broad in scope but focus primarily on social welfare matters of particular interest to women. According to its chairman, anti-illiteracy courses are still the main activity in Central and East Java. Gerwani also organizes *arisan* groups in which all members of the group contribute a certain amount each week and each member in turn receives the whole sum; it provides mutual assistance to members in times of need, such as death, birth, illness and pregnancy; it offers instruction in cooking and handicrafts, organizes small-scale credit groups, and lends assistance in the solution of marital disputes.[14] Little direct political education is given to members, but Gerwani likewise endeavors to instill the general idea that bad conditions are the work of class enemies and may be changed through organization, and that the PKI is the only party which truly defends their interests.

New Slogans and Methods

According to Aidit, Communist activities in the villages became "fully flexible" as a result of the first national peasants' conference convened by the PKI in mid-April 1959. By this he meant that the conference marked the party's elaboration of organizational methods and targets for action that could effectively attract peasants in different areas as well as different strata of peasants within each village.

While continuing to pursue campaigns for increased farm laborers' wages and the reduction of interest rates on peasant loans, the party since the 1959 conference has made the so-called "6:4" slogan the "axis" of its peasant program. Under this slogan the PKI has campaigned for a division of crops between sharecroppers and landowners in the ratio of 60 to 40 percent, respectively. On November 20, 1959, the party succeeded in forcing parliamentary enactment of a bill providing

[12] *E.g.*, see *ibid.*, p. 44, and Aidit, "Haridepan," *op. cit.*, p. 339.

[13] Asmu, "Beladjar dari Sidang Pleno DPP-BTI ke-III untuk Mengatasi Kelemahan Partai dilapangan Perdjuangan Tani," *Bintang Merah,* February-March 1955, pp. 59-60.

[14] Indonesian women in general lack marital security because of the ease with which a husband may repudiate his marriage. According to statistics of the Ministry of Religious Affairs, the number of marriage repudiations within the Moslem community during 1954-58 was from 50 to 52 percent of total new marriages plus reconciliations between separated spouses.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

for a minimum 5:5 division of crops, and under persistent Communist pressure the heads of most level-two autonomous regions, who were entrusted with implementing the act, have since issued the necessary regulations. At the village level, however, the Communists have met with continued reluctance on the part of the poorer peasants to take action against defiant landlords. The official organ of the BTI, Suara Tani, stated in January 1960:

> **The 6:4 action and other actions against the landlords' exploitation are entirely new for the peasants and even for most BTI cadres. The existence of examples of successful action will facilitate *our work to convince the peasants of the justice of the 6:4 demand* and of the power of the peasants' unity.[15] [Author's italics.]**

Since 1957, but especially since 1959, the PKI and BTI have also been introducing a new form of peasant organization in the villages. Three types of *klompoks,* or groups, have been formed alongside the existing village sub-branches of the party and BTI organizations with their large and heterogeneous memberships.[16] The groups are kept small, and membership in them is open to peasants irrespective of political affiliation, religious belief, or whether or not they are members of the BTI. Those of the first type are laborers' groups, embracing landless farm workers as well as poor and middle peasants who must work for others to supplement their income. These are organized on the basis of type of work, such as hoeing, planting, and harvesting. Groups of the second type are composed of tenant farmers, and those of the third type embrace peasants who work their own land. The groups in this last category function, in effect, as mutual aid teams in the sphere of agricultural production. The groups as a whole are designed to serve as a means of broadening the party's influence, of finding potential member and cadre talent, and of pressing more effectively the demands of the different social groups within the village.

Another important decision taken by the 1959 peasants' conference of the PKI was to discard the party's previous antipathy to cooperatives. The conference decided that the formation of cooperatives would provide the Communists with an additional instrument for assisting the peasants and strengthening the party's political influence and control over them. However, because the peasants still needed to be convinced of the benefit of cooperatives, it was decided that the movement must advance "step by step." The first step would involve the formation of mutual aid teams in agricultural production, small savings-and-loan groups, and groups for the joint purchase of improved rice seed. Then, after the peasants had become convinced that full-scale cooperatives would be to their advantage, these would be formed on the basis of "voluntary, democratic, open, mutually beneficial, self-established, and non-political" principles. The party has since been training cadres in the management of cooperatives, but the movement progresses slowly. Writing in July 1961, a BTI cadre reported that "it is certainly not easy to speed up the cooperative movement among the peasants."

An interesting feature of Communist work in the villages since the 1959 conference has been the assistance given to peasants in increasing farm production. Communist cadres have been active in popularizing eight principles for increasing rice yields: *i.e.,* plough deeply, plant closely, improve seedlings, give more fertilizer, improve tools, weed the crops, combat diseases, and improve irrigation. The BTI has also been instrumental in developing improved strains of rice and in organizing the distribution of the new seeds.

Land Reform and the PKI

In 1959 and early 1960, Communist cadres confidently assured the author that the "bourgeois" government of Indonesia would never institute land reform. They were soon proved wrong. Between September and December of 1960, the government instituted a land reform act imposing a maximum limit on the size of landholdings in each regional administrative unit.[17] Throughout most of Java the maximum holding per family (plantations excluded) is fixed at 5 hectares (12.4 acres) of irrigated land or 6 hectares (14.8 acres) of unirrigated fields. The law required landholdings in excess of the maximum to be redistributed to peasants owning little or no land, with the beneficiaries to pay for their new land over a period of fifteen years.[18]

The PKI and BTI publicly welcomed the land reform law and promised assistance in its implementation, but they also maintained that the 1959 crop division law and the land reform act "will not entirely eradicate

[15] *Suara Tani,* January 1960, p. 3.

[16] For information on the klompoks, see *Suara Tani,* May-June 1961, p. 7; and PKI, *Konfernas Tani ke-II PKI* (Djakarta, 1962), pp. 11-17.

[17] Department of Information, *Land Reform in Indonesia and Basic Regulations Governing This* (Djakarta, 1961), 31 p.; and "Kuputusan Menteri Agraria tentang Penegasan Luas Maksimum Tanah-Pertanian," *Pembanguanan Desa,* March-April 1961, pp. 38-44.

[18] Given the present rate of monetary inflation, the real price paid by purchasers of redistributed land over the 15-year period could be very low.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

imperialist and landlord power, but will only restrict it." In a sense they were right. The law requiring a 5:5 division of crops between landlords and tenant farmers is only a first step toward reducing farm rents. And land reform, in Java at least, cannot eradicate the land problem, which is basically one of land shortage rather than of landlords.

Even if the provisions of the land reform act are effectively enforced without evasion by the landlords, far less than 500,000 hectares will become available for redistribution in Java. This is a relatively negligible amount to divide among Java's approximately 40 million peasants, the great majority of whom are landless or poor peasants. In other words, despite the reform, the great majority of Javanese peasants will remain landless or poor and will still have to work as laborers or tenant farmers on the land of their better-off neighbors. Thus, the problems of farm laborers' wages and land rents will also remain, and in the absence of cheap government credit facilities the poorer peasants will continue to fall prey to moneylenders. Therefore the "everyday needs and demands" of most peasants will not be altered radically by the land reform program. Meanwhile, in order to retain the support of those who may rise to middle peasant status by acquiring redistributed land, the Communists are already organizing mutual aid teams, production boosting campaigns, and cooperatives.

Shifting Party Fortunes

Thus, by laborious, patient work designed to prove themselves the staunchest defenders and promoters of the peasants' everyday interests, the Indonesian Communists under Aidit's leadership have won broad and increasing support among the rural population. During the period of parliamentary democracy which lasted until early 1957, this mass peasant support appeared to be bringing the party nearer to its major goal, the acquisition of governmental power. Thanks partly to its display of organizational skill and expanding mass support, the PKI was able to win the cooperation of the Indonesian Nationalist Party (PNI), which turned to the Communists for aid in its struggle against the Moslem Masjumi party. PNI-PKI cooperation to bar the Masjumi from a dominant place in the government continued from 1952 until April 1957, when "Citizen Sukarno" suspended parliamentary principles in appointing the non-party Djuanda cabinet.

At no time during this cooperation did the PNI show readiness to admit the PKI to participation in the government, but the Communist leaders were satisfied for the time being with their gains under the alliance. On the one hand, the alliance assured the PKI of freedom to expand its organization and gave it a certain degree of nationalist respectability; on the other, it served to exclude the more strongly anti-Communist Masjumi from a controlling governmental position while at the same time helping to intensify the division and antagonism between the PNI and Masjumi, the two largest parties. Moreover, in a multi-party parliamentary democracy where the non-Communist parties were divided among themselves, the Communist leaders had reason to hope that the continued expansion of the PKI's popular support, and hence of its parliamentary representation, would enhance the party's ability, through judicious alliances, to exert a strong influence on national policy and eventually gain entry into the government.

During 1956-57, however, the political situation in Indonesia altered radically. By the middle of 1958, President Sukarno and the army had emerged as the dominant political forces, with parliament and the parties relegated to an ever-diminishing role. For want of a better alternative, the PKI sought to ally itself with Sukarno; and the latter, needing a counterbalance to the army and mindful of the PKI's organizational strength and mass popular following, accepted the party's proffered hand as a matter of expediency. However, while Sukarno has prevented the army from proscribing the PKI, he has at the same time collaborated with the military in implementing a policy designed to render the Communists incapable of challenging the ruling groups.

The Dilemma of the PKI

The PKI thus finds itself caught in the web of Sukarno's semi-authoritarian "guided democracy." General elections are postponed indefinitely; parliament is reduced to an ineffective, appointed body; strict censorship exists; all political activities are closely watched by the police, the army and President Sukarno, and the parties are threatened with proscription if they step out of line; strikes are forbidden and any militant action by either workers or peasants is summarily and forcibly dealt with. In short, the ruling forces, especially the army, are firmly entrenched and are not prepared to permit any political party, particularly the PKI, to win power by parliamentary or any other means. Only Sukarno's historically ephemeral presence stays the army from outright repression of the PKI.

The new situation poses some vital and difficult questions for the party leadership: Of what political value is the PKI's mass following, now and in the foreseeable future? Can this mass support be utilized to further

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the party's advance to power through the display of apparent strength? Or, if the ruling forces should refuse to be intimidated, can the party's mass following be mobilized for a new bid to seize power by revolutionary action? The answers to these questions lie beyond the scope of the present article, but in large part they are suggested by an evaluation of the real power derived by the PKI from its mass peasant support.

The Indonesian peasants generally—and especially, perhaps, those of Java—are basically passive and conservative in their political outlook, not militant or revolutionary. Precisely by pursuing moderate, non-revolutionary tactics since it gained control of the PKI, the Aidit leadership has indeed succeeded in winning the support of a substantial proportion of the peasantry. But by the same token it has failed so far to develop any significant degree of revolutionary militancy among them. The peasants welcome Communist assistance in the solution of their small but urgent problems, and in return they are willing to join the party, or its subordinate mass organizations, and to give the PKI their votes —but little else. However, if the PKI is to gain power under the altered political conditions now confronting it in Indonesia, it *must* have support that is militant and revolutionary—that will bravely oppose both "class enemies" and "the authorities." This the peasants, with the possible exception of a handful of squatters, are not now ready to give, nor are they likely to become so disposed in the foreseeable future.

Thus, the PKI leadership today finds itself in a difficult dilemma largely of its own making. The massive peasant support which the party so painstakingly and successfully built up by putting on a face of moderation, and which was of real political value during the pre-1957 period of untrammeled parliamentary government, has now become—because of its essentially passive and non-militant character—largely ineffectual in bolstering the PKI's position vis-à-vis the forces presently dominating the Indonesian political scene. These forces have swept aside "free-fight liberalism"; they possess the means to defend their political primacy by force; and they are carefully circumscribing the Communists' freedom of action.

To break out of this dilemma, the party leadership could conceivably shift its strategy and attempt a rapid cultivation of militancy among its supporters, but it would then risk precipitating mass desertions from the party fold, as well as severe government repression that would disrupt the patiently built Communist organization and reduce it once again to an underground shell. It therefore seems more likely that the PKI leaders will endeavor to hang on to their organizational network and mass following and to preserve a *modus vivendi* with the ruling groups, hoping that the rapid expansion of the population and deterioration of the economy will eventually produce a situation in which power will somehow fall into the party's hands. Such a vague and uncertain prospect can hardly be a very encouraging one for a party whose strategy once seemed to have placed it on the highroad to success.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Communism and Nationalism

By Richard Lowenthal

A critique of an essay by John H. Kautsky in the recent study edited by him, Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism, *New York & London, John Wiley & Sons, 1962.*

AS THE EAST-WEST competition for influence in the underdeveloped regions of the world has grown more intense, our interest in the political systems, problems and movements of these regions has increased rapidly. Thanks to a wealth of useful monographs, we are today far better informed about Asian nationalist movements, Latin-American revolutions or African one-party regimes than only a few years ago. Yet the effort to draw fruitful theoretical generalizations from this mass of information is still in its early stages: even a pioneering work like *The Politics of the Developing Areas* by Gabriel A. Almond and James S. Coleman (Princeton University Press, 1960), though it has greatly added to the store of conceptual tools for comparative analysis, does not generally relate these concepts to the problem of development itself; it does not set out to create a theoretical framework for studying the role of politics in the process of development.

It is the great merit of Professor John Kautsky's "Essay in the Politics of Development" that it boldly attempts just that, and does so with the consistency, clarity and penetration required in theoretical work. Kautsky takes the facts assembled by contemporary research and asks what they can teach us about the influence of industrialization on the nature of the political process in developing societies, about the social basis and political function of anti-colonial nationalism and communism, and about the prospects of totalitarianism and democracy in those countries striving for modernization. In addition to his own essay, Professor Kautsky has included in the volume a dozen related papers by other authors, including one of mine. If in view of this fact it may be thought somewhat unconventional for me to discuss Kautsky's essay here, I can only plead two excuses—my conviction of the importance of the questions he has raised, and the strength of my disagreement with some of his answers.

THE CENTRAL, STRIKING thesis that emerges from Professor Kautsky's essay is what he calls "the convergence of communism and nationalism." It may be summed up in three points. First, the victorious Communist and anti-colonial nationalist movements have sprung up in response to similar situations of underdevelopment; led by similar groups of alienated intellectuals, they have been pursuing similar aims of rapid industrial modernization under conditions of the greatest possible independence from the old industrial powers. Second, the initial differences in ideology between the Communist and the anti-colonial nationalist movements have not been a major factor in determining the outcome of the enterprise, either with regard to progress in industrialization or to the emergence and durability of totalitarian political forms. Third, the ideological differences themselves tend to disappear because the Soviet Communist leaders, having become exponents of a national managerial bureaucracy, no longer have any serious interest in the class struggle and "world revolution" as distinct from the expansion of their own power; they have therefore caused the Communists in the developing countries to change their strategy and ideology to an extent where the latter become virtually indistinguishable from "genuine" nationalist parties. Moreover, the Soviet leadership has been increasingly

Mr. Lowenthal, a frequent contributor to this journal, is Professor of International Relations at the Free University of Berlin.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

turning toward direct cooperation with the established nationalists, often without regard to the fate of the local Communists.

The first of these three points broadly circumscribes the area of agreement between Professor Kautsky and a number of other students of the problem, including, *e.g.,* Hugh Seton-Watson, George Arnold, Morris Watnick, Bernard Morris, Edward Shils, as well as this writer. That the Communists, despite their claim that they represent the industrial proletariat, have come to power only in industrially underdeveloped countries; that their "objective" role there has been to promote rapid national industrialization in an anti-Western framework rather than to approach the classless society; that this achievement constitutes the most powerful appeal of the Communist model to the more or less Westernized, but anti-Western, intelligentsia which typically leads the nationalist movements in the underdeveloped countries (and which in many ways resembles the prerevolutionary Russian intelligentsia)—all this is common ground between us.

What is more, Mr. Kautsky has contributed valuable new insights in this part of his analysis. This applies particularly to his discussion of the difference between "classical" nationalism in Europe, which arose on the basis of common cultural (linguistic or religious) traditions, and the new nationalism of the underdeveloped countries, which frequently seeks to create a common political loyalty for groups divided by major linguistic and religious differences on the basis of the common struggle against colonial dependence and for modernization within the framework of existing state frontiers. As he rightly points out, this analysis of the nature of the new nationalist movements further underlines the parallel between them and Communist revolutionary movements—not only those which were partly inspired by nationalist sentiment, as in Yugoslavia, China, and Viet Nam, but even where this was not so, as in Russia.

WHAT I HAVE referred to as the second main point of Kautsky's thesis—the comparative irrelevance of the initially dominant ideology to the outcome of any particular Communist or nationalist revolution—is not explicitly stated by him in this form, but is implicit in his whole approach, which he himself describes as "an interest-group theory of politics." Throughout his essay, he asks consistently how the process of industrialization, by changing the constellation of interests, changes both the form and content of political struggles—never how the impact of political ideas and institutions may speed up or slow down the process of industrialization. He is, of course, aware that this "interest-group approach" might be regarded as a somewhat watered-down (not to say Kautskyan) form of Marxism, but he argues that it is just in societies in process of industrialization, as distinct from stagnant agrarian societies on one side and fully industrialized societies on the other, that the clash of changing interest groups is the very stuff of politics.

The argument sounds plausible, but it seems to obscure the basic distinction between the "old" industrial societies of the West and the "underdeveloped" world. In the West, a number of factors—from the existence of a strong and independent urban middle class to a religious climate conducive to the subordination of other values to the rational discipline of production—generated a spontaneous social-economic dynamism. In the "underdeveloped" countries, whose traditional societies have brought forth no such dynamism, the pressure for modernization has arisen as a conscious reaction to the disruption of the traditional order by the Western colonial impact; hence, the transformation of their undynamic societies and antiquated pre-industrial institutions and attitudes has to be accomplished, in the main, by political means—that is to say, by government-sponsored action and by the "educational" influence of political movements. It follows that while a semi-Marxist "interest-group" approach may be largely adequate for interpreting the politics of industrialization in the West, an analysis of the corresponding process in the late-comer countries will miss essential factors if it does not pay attention to the independent role of political ideas and institutions. Herein, indeed, lie the deepest sources of similarity between the developmental problems and the role of the intelligentsia in Russia and in the ex-colonial countries.

But if that is so, the effectiveness of the process of politically directed modernization is likely to vary according to whether the ruling group of intellectuals is inspired by a Communist ideology, or is developing its own mixture of nationalist and "socialist" ideas but seeks to apply the Communist model of party organization, or whether it is equally eclectic in the institutional and ideological fields. Given that communism and nationalism are responses to the same problem, each is likely to have its distinctive advantages and disadvantages as a solution. The achievements of Stalinism as a method of rapid industrialization by subjecting primitive rural masses to low consumption standards and industrial discipline are obvious; so are its costs, not merely in terms of brutality and mass suffering, but of the prolonged and apparently incurable stagnation imposed on agriculture by forced collectivization. On the other hand, as Professor Kautsky has pertinently

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

observed, some of the early nationalist attempts at modernization have failed either totally, as in Kuomintang China, or partially, as in Kemalist Turkey, and have been followed by a "second-wave" revolution after some time. It is a question of great importance which specific weaknesses of ideology or institutions have contributed to such total or partial failures, and whether similar weaknesses are present in some of the contemporary regimes of the nationalist intelligentsia. A theory of the politics of development leaves a gap if it does not ask this kind of question.

LET ME NOW come to the third and main point of Kautsky's thesis—his view that, under the pressure of Soviet foreign-policy needs, the strategy and even the ideology of the Communist parties in underdeveloped countries have been transformed so thoroughly as to become virtually indistinguishable from their "genuine" nationalist rivals. Mr. Kautsky traces this change from the adoption of the "neo-Maoist" strategy in 1949/50, under which the Communist parties in newly emerging countries were bidden to forge a bloc of four classes (including, along with the proletariat, the peasants, and the urban petty bourgeois, also the "national bourgeoisie") for the tasks of the anti-imperialist and anti-feudal revolution. Since this coalition of classes was not to be represented by a coalition of parties, but embodied in the Communist party alone, Kautsky regards the change as not merely strategic but ideological—as an abandonment of the fiction of the working-class character of the Communist parties.

The next step, in Professor Kautsky's view, was the switch of the new nationalist-minded multi-class Communist parties from systematic and sometimes violent opposition to the established nationalist regimes to a policy of active support first for their "positive neutralist" foreign policy, and then for their Soviet-supported domestic development program—a switch made in response to the needs of post-Stalin Soviet diplomacy. Finally, Kautsky asserts, the strategy of "national democracy," as laid down in the Moscow Declaration of the 81 Communist parties of December 1960 and incorporated in the new CPSU program, has sanctioned the abandonment of the class struggle and the goal of a "socialist revolution" in favor of a program acceptable to any radically modernistic, anti-Western nationalist. He concludes that the question whether people like Sékou Touré or Castro are "genuine" nationalists or "really" Communists is meaningless: "such nationalists have come to be like Communists because Communists have come to be like them" (p. 87).

The most obvious objection to this rather startling view is that it is contrary to the actual development of Communist policy in the last three years. In fact, except for some remarks on Cuba, none of the examples given by Professor Kautsky refers to events that have taken place after 1958. He is right, of course, in saying that the immediate goal of Soviet policy for the underdeveloped countries, both before and after that date, has not been "socialism" in the sense of total Communist rule, but the severance of their economic ties with the West, the destruction of their traditional upper class by radical land reform, and the initiation of planned industrialization with Soviet aid and advice —in short, the complex of measures now defined as the program of "national democracy." Between 1954 and 1958, both Moscow and Peking tried to promote this program through generous diplomatic and economic support for the established nationalist governments while restraining at the same time the activity of the local Communist parties. Moreover, the neo-Maoist strategy of those parties had previously been based on the idea that only Communists could lead the national liberation movement to victory; hence, the mere fact that the Soviets now belatedly recognized that many former colonies had achieved independence under nationalist leadership left the local Communist movements in a strategic void.

But the more Soviet policy proceeded from the minimum aim of neutralizing the new nations to the bolder effort of committing them to an anti-Western attitude, the more it became apparent that the non-Communist nationalists, however ready to accept Soviet credits and diplomatic support in particular conflicts with the West, were quite unwilling to renounce Western aid in principle and make themselves unilaterally dependent on the Soviet bloc. Thus by 1959, the Soviets became convinced that their goal could only be achieved by combining their diplomatic efforts from without with Communist pressure from within: they did not stop offering credits to uncommitted nationalist regimes, as the Chinese apparently urged, and did not make such credits dependent on Communist influence in the recipient countries, but they began to work out a new strategy for strengthening that influence.

In a series of international Communist discussions held under Soviet leadership from 1959 onwards,[1] it was stressed that the national liberation revolution was

[1] The first of these, dealing with the role of the "national bourgeoisie," was held in May 1959 in Leipzig, East Germany. Extracts were published later that year in the *World Marxist Review* (edited in Prague, Czechoslovakia, and published there as "Problems of Peace and Socialism" in a number of other languages), No. 8/9, 1959.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

not completed with the attainment of political independence alone; to fulfill its tasks to the end, a four-class alliance including the "national bourgeoisie" was still needed, but only the Communists could direct that alliance along the right path despite the inevitable waverings of the bourgeoisie.

By the fall of 1959, a Moscow-directed journal, the *African Communist,* was launched in London with the specific purpose of educating Africans in the ideological difference between nationalism and communism, and stimulating the formation of Communist parties in tropical Africa.[2] At the same time, Communist-controlled trade unions in the colonial and ex-colonial countries were similarly activated: in June 1960, the Peking session of the General Council of the World Federation of Trade Unions (WFTU) called on all working-class organizations "to assume the leading role in forming and consolidating a united national front, based on the alliance of workers and peasants and rallying all other anti-colonial forces."[3] Any supposition that this formula might have been forced on the Soviets against their will was soon dispelled by Khrushchev himself, who in his January 1961 report on the Moscow conference of 81 Communist parties, again restated the Communist concept of "national democracy":

> **. . . the correct application of Marxist-Leninist theory in the liberated countries consists precisely in finding the forms which . . . will make it possible to unite all the healthy forces of the nation and to assure the leading role of the working class within the national front in the struggle to eradicate imperialism and the remnants of feudalism and to clear the way for a movement that will ultimately lead to socialism.**[4]

In effect, then, rather than marking the final assimilation of the Communists in underdeveloped countries to other movements of the nationalist intelligentsia, as Professor Kautsky assumes, the new strategy of "national democracy" heralds a renewed Communist bid for leadership of the national fronts in rivalry to the established nationalist movements. The discussion of the new concept that ensued after the 81 Parties' Conference in Soviet periodicals[5] and, above all, the text of the new party program also show clearly that this strategy has been consciously conceived as a form of transition to the second, "socialist" stage of the revolution. The "national democratic" regime is assigned the task of starting its country on a "non-capitalist road of development," which then turns out to be the road to "socialism"; at the same time, the orthodox definition of "socialism" as comprising full-scale nationalization of industry and collectivization of agriculture under the rule of the Communist party is maintained. By winning the leadership of the "national democratic front" with a radical program for completing the revolution against imperialism and feudalism, the Communists expect to acquire a basis for an eventual complete seizure of power in the name of the "socialist revolution"—*i.e.,* for finally overthrowing the nationalists.[6]

One may legitimately ask how so experienced a student of Communist policy as Professor Kautsky could have come to conclusions so manifestly in conflict with recent developments. Part of the explanation, suggested by the argument of his essay, may be found in his earlier great contribution in this field, *i.e.,* his stress on the importance of the neo-Maoist strategy in freeing Communist parties of the underdeveloped countries from the shackles imposed by their fictitious claim to be class parties of the industrial workers.[7] Now, however, he seems to have jumped to the conclusion that this "proletarian fiction" was the *only* specific difference between the Communist parties and the other movements of the anti-colonial nationalist intelligentsia, and that its abandonment would be sufficient to make the two movements indistinguishable in principle.

A SECOND SOURCE of error, in this writer's opinion, is Professor Kautsky's acceptance of the widespread fallacy about the "managerial" evolution of the Soviet regime. He seems to believe that the Soviets have forced the Communist parties in underdeveloped countries to abandon all ideological goals distinguishing them from the ordinary anti-colonial nationalists, because he is convinced that the Soviet Communist Party

[2] The *African Communist* is officially published on behalf of the (illegal) CP of South Africa. However, the magazine explicitly calls for the formation throughout tropical Africa of study circles which might become the germ of important Communist parties. It prints contributions from Soviet, British and French Communists specializing on African questions, and articles from it are reprinted as authoritative statements in the Communist press of other countries.

[3] *World Trade Union Movement* (English edition published in London by the Communist World Federation of Trade Unions), No. 7, 1960.

[4] *World Marxist Review,* No. 1, 1961.

[5] See in particular Boris Ponomarev in *Kommunist,* No. 8, 1961; A. Arzumanian in *Pravda,* December 17, 1961; and M. G. Kirichenko in *Sovetskoe gosudarstvo i pravo,* No. 11, 1961.

[6] For a fuller exposition, see my paper "National Democracy and the Strategy of the Post-Colonial Revolution," presented to the Fourth International Conference on World Politics, Athens, September 1962.

[7] John H. Kautsky, *Moscow and the Communist Party of India,* New York, Wiley, 1956.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

itself has abandoned any serious interest in world revolution. This belief stems from his conviction that the CPSU, having long ceased to consist of the professional revolutionaries from the old intelligentsia, and having become instead a party of bureaucratic managers, must have adopted the essentially conservative and nationally limited outlook of that "new class."

Both assumptions lead us back to the same difficulty —the limitations of the "interest-group approach" as applied to Communist parties. Because Professor Kautsky views the Communist parties of the underdeveloped countries simply as movements of the intelligentsia that came into being with a misunderstanding of their own social basis, he believes that the removal of that misunderstanding will suffice to wipe out their specific character. In sum, he underestimates not only the importance of the Communists' ideological commitment to a worldwide mission and a goal far transcending national modernization, but also the effects of their particular form of centralist organization. Since he holds the same basic view of the Soviet Communist Party, he assumes that the change in the character and function of the Russian intelligentsia—hence in the interests of the group "represented" by the party—must be reflected in the party's ideology and policy.

The root of our disagreement, then, lies in different views of the nature and extent of the organizational and ideological transformation Lenin wrought in creating the Bolshevik party. Kautsky holds that Lenin, in order to adapt his faction of the Russian Social Democratic Labor Party to the conditions of underdeveloped Russia, turned it from a working class party into an organization of "professional revolutionaries, *i.e.* of intellectuals" (p. 65). In this writer's opinion, however, Lenin created an instrumental party of a truly new type, which cannot usefully be described as an "interest group" in the sense of representing the interests of any particular section of society apart from its own institutional and ideological interest in power. His original reason for doing so was his conviction that the overthrow of Tsarism and the creation of a revolutionary provisional government could not be accomplished by any one of Russia's social classes unless there was a political organization, anchored in all the classes but independent from each, which could channel all their specific discontents into a general movement and provide the necessary organizational backbone of the struggle for power.

To accomplish this aim, Lenin had to organize part of the existing circles of revolutionary workers and intellectuals into a centralized party built from the top downward and geared to transmitting the will of the leadership to the people rather than vice versa. He had also to transform the optimistic determinism of the Marxian promise of salvation into a conditionally optimistic messianism in which the achievement of the classless society was made dependent, not upon an "inevitable" victory of the proletariat, but upon the victory of a particular party imbued with the "correct" class-consciousness and pursuing, thanks to the wisdom of its leader, the right political strategy. The result was a party—eventually multiplied in many countries—which "represented" neither the proletariat (though it did at times enjoy working-class support) nor the intellectuals (the majority of whom were never pro-Bolshevik before the revolution). It was a party which could, thanks to its centralist and non-democratic organizational structure, draw on the support of different social groups (*i.e.*, change its "social basis") according to the dictates of the struggle for power.

Experience has shown that parties of that type, if out of power, are capable of an amazing persistence in their ideological sense of mission, in their aspiration to total power, and in the corresponding awareness of basic conflict with all other parties—despite variations in their immediate appeal and tactical attitudes from "left sectarianism" to broad "national fronts."

TO OUR READERS

The Editors have received a number of requests from individuals and organizations throughout the world who wish to be placed on the mailing list of *Problems of Communism*. In all cases the requests have had to be relayed to the appropriate distribution centers. *Please note:*

Readers outside the United States may obtain copies free of charge by addressing requests to the nearest office of the United States Information Service (a list of these offices appears on the back inside cover of the July-August and September-October 1962 issues).

Readers in the United States may subscribe to the magazine by sending $1.50 to the Superintendent of Documents, Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C.

PLEASE FOLLOW THESE DIRECTIONS AND DO NOT ADDRESS SUBSCRIPTION REQUESTS TO THE EDITORS.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

History has also shown that the ruling Soviet party has been able to preserve its worldwide revolutionary aim, and again the corresponding sense of unbridgeable conflict with non-Communist powers, long after its "objective" role of national modernization has been fulfilled and its membership transformed to comprise the managerial "new class." The reason for this is simple: just as the Communist parties in former colonial countries are not "interest groups" of the intellectuals, so the CPSU has not become an "interest group" of the bureaucratic managers. Its primary interest is to preserve its power as an institution, which coincides with the group interest of only the party apparatus personnel—*i.e.,* those technicians of power and ideology who, in contrast to the technicians of production or defense, could not rely on holding equivalent positions under a different regime. As the victory of First Secretary Khrushchev over his rivals following Stalin's death has shown, the party machine is still capable of successfully resisting pressures from various sections of Soviet society, including the pressure of the managerial bureaucracy inside the party. But it could not preserve its monopoly of power without maintaining the basic political and ideological goals which alone legitimate its rule. That is not to say that such monopoly must last forever—only that it is more likely to be broken in the kind of open contest with new social forces that occurs during a succession crisis than to disappear gradually by a process of continuous "mellowing."

WHAT HAS JUST been said about the persistent, specific characteristics of Communist parties and regimes could have been summed up in one word—*i.e.,* "totalitarian." I have so far avoided that term because Professor Kautsky, in discussing the prospects of totalitarianism and democracy in countries undergoing industrialization, has given it a special definition of his own: he defines totalitarianism as "a set of methods" (comprising terror, total regimentation of the people by compulsory organizations, and total control of opinion by a monopoly of information) "used . . . by a group or several groups in control of a government in order to retain that control" (p. 91). According to the nature of the groups involved, he then distinguishes between "totalitarianism of the aristocracy" and "totalitarianism of the intellectuals." The first type includes all "fascist" regimes which, in Kautsky's view, have the task of preserving the power of the traditional aristocracy when it is threatened by some of the new groups created by industrialization. These regimes, he believes, are characterized by an alliance between the aristocracy, the big capitalists (who are opposed to the rise of organized labor), and the "fascist movement" proper (whose core is formed by the uprooted pre-industrial middle classes); and all such alliances seek to prevent further modernization that would undermine aristocratic rule.

The second type of totalitarianism—still according to Kautsky—arises when a regime of modernizing intellectuals, whether Communist or simply nationalist in its ideology, finds its rule endangered by the growth of other vocal and well-organized interest groups. Such a regime may then turn to totalitarian methods, not in order to stop the process of modernization, but to stay in power while continuing to enforce national unity and impose the sacrifices which in its view are required by modernization.

There is, of course, no such thing as a "right" definition of a theoretical concept—only a more or less useful one. But a definition may be positively misleading if it implies regularities which are not to be found in the empirical world; and I am afraid that this is the case with Professor Kautsky's assumption that any group in control of a government may turn to the use of totalitarian methods at will. While some forms of police terror are in fact available to any government that is strong and ruthless enough to rule without legal limitations, the specifically modern devices of total regimentation and opinion control can be effectively applied only with the help of a sufficiently strong, centralistically organized and ideologically unified political movement or party. Also, experience seems to show that unless such a movement existed before its leaders seized power and, indeed, had been the instrument of their victory, it cannot be created subsequently at the rulers' command. The repeated failure of President Nasser's attempts to create an ideological movement that would organize the Egyptian masses in support of his government is surely not accidental. This same difficulty may have caused Dr. Castro to fall back on the Communists and merge what remained of his own many-shaded movement with their disciplined organization. I know of no ruling group that has effectively used modern "totalitarian methods" in Professor Kautsky's sense unless it was based on a pre-existing, revolutionary, totalitarian movement.

IF THIS CONDITION limits the potential of totalitarian regimes in developing countries ruled by the revolutionary intelligentsia, it does so *a fortiori* in states in which the traditional aristocracy has retained power. In fact, with all due respect to Professor

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Kautsky, I even beg to doubt whether such a system as his "totalitarianism of the aristocracy" ever existed. For while a number of the European right-wing dictatorships of recent decades may be described in his terms as based on alliances between the traditional aristocracy, conservative capitalist groups and "fascist movements" composed wholly or partly of the uprooted old middle class, they approached totalitarian effectiveness in their methods of rule precisely to the extent to which the fascist movements succeeded in eliminating the aristocrats from power.

Of the examples mentioned by Professor Kautsky, who seems less at home in this field than in his main subject, the aristocratic Horthy regime in Hungary encouraged no fascist movement and during most of its existence maintained a genuine multi-party system. The Pilsudski regime in Poland, which tried to balance between the landowners and more modern interests, attempted to suppress the opposition but failed completely and never succeeded in mobilizing an organized movement either. The Franco regime in Spain corresponds most closely to Kautsky's formula of an alliance between the "traditional aristocracy" (the army and the Church) and a "fascist movement" (the Falange) playing a secondary role. Yet at the same time Franco's Spain proves the point Professor Kautsky has missed: that a regime founded on an alliance of independent forces cannot create an effective organizational and ideological unity, and therefore cannot be fully totalitarian. Mussolini consciously tried to establish a totalitarian regime based on a totalitarian fascist movement; but by compromising with the monarchy and the aristocratic forces grouped around it, he allowed an island of independent power to survive from which his rule could be unhinged in its final crisis. Of all the fascist movements, only Hitler's Nazis had both the strength and the totalitarian consistency to destroy the independent power (as distinct from the economic position) of their aristocratic and capitalist allies who helped them into the saddle, and only they created a truly totalitarian regime. But the claim of these modern totalitarian nihilists to represent the traditional values of the aristocracy was just as fictitious as the claim of the Communists to represent the interests and democratic values of industrial labor.

One could sum up this argument by saying that totalitarianism is never conservative, but always revolutionary, and that it arises not as a device invented by a ruling group in peril, but as a movement brought forth by a society in crisis. Further, the leading role of rootless intellectuals, stressed by Kautsky with respect to the Communist and nationalist movements of the underdeveloped countries, applies also to the Nazi movement of highly industrialized Germany and to the early cadres of Italian Fascism: in every case, we see a similar leadership of underemployed intellectuals and frustrated officers of the younger generation, of "superfluous people" who regard themselves as an elite but feel alienated from the erstwhile social and political order. It is from these elements that some leaders have forged the new instruments for first mobilizing mass despair and then exercising total power—the totalitarian parties. If the ideological content of the promised utopia was utterly different in the Nazi and the Communist cases, so was, after all, the nature of the crises that gave them their chance: the paralysis of economic life and political institutions in an advanced industrial country in the German instance, and the conflict between a stagnant traditional order disrupted by foreign influence and the desire for independent modernization in the case of Russia.

BUT TO LEAVE the matter at this point would still imply an unjustified concession to economic determinism. For while it is true that profound social crises in modern conditions tend to produce totalitarian ideologies among the intellectuals and thus offer opportunities for the creation of totalitarian movements, it is not true that such ideologies are predestined to become the dominant intellectual currents and that such movements must necessarily defeat their competitors. The same paralyzing economic crisis which produced the victory of Nazism in Germany produced the New Deal in the United States. The same agonizing problems of development which brought communism to power in a few countries have made the bulk of the intelligentsia in many other countries turn to movements of a different type—movements which pursue similar nationalist and "socialist" goals without the dogmatic exclusiveness and the utopian worldwide ambitions of a secular messianism.

And even where such movements imitate Communist organizational forms, they do not have the same tendency to preserve them beyond their practical usefulness for the task of modernization, nor do they inspire the same sense of unbridgeable conflict with the old industrial countries of the West. In short, they do not invest their concrete tasks with the same pseudo-religious significance and hence, as the example of Kemalist Turkey has shown, offer less resistance than the Communists to the pressures for democratization that arise with the development of a modern society. So far from expecting a convergence of nationalism and communism

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

in the underdeveloped countries, it is this author's belief that the ideological difference between them will become more important as the new societies approach the goal of industrial modernization.

Once again, we are back at the methodological question of what value should be assigned to the independent role of ideas and institutions—as distinct from the interests of economically defined groups—in the process of development. Introducing his "interest group approach," Professor Kautsky asserts that rather than assuming that social groups perceive their interests rationally and act accordingly, he has simply relied on historically observed regularities of behavior: groups with certain interests, he argues, act in a predictable way whatever their hidden motivations may be (p. 7). Yet in fact, his method tends to exclude from discussion the whole range of contemporary political phenomena which cannot be understood without reference to the despair of senselessness and the passion of belief. If he were right, German Nazism would have turned out to be the calculated rule of the conservative classes that many people expected, instead of a mad machine pursuing aims of racial domination and racial extermination; and Soviet communism would have begun to democratize its regime at the time when Stalin started his blood purges. The point of the study of totalitarianism, I submit, is to explain why these eminently rational predictions went wrong.

Cuba's Charismatic Communism

Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities,
by Theodore Draper.
New York, F. A. Praeger, 1962.

Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas,
by Daniel James.
New York, Avon, 1962.

Reviewed by Karl E. Meyer

A READING OF *Castro's Revolution,* a collection of magazine articles somewhat hastily thrown together, confirms the impression that Theodore Draper is without question the outstanding interpreter of Cuba's volatile brand of communism. His research, for one thing, is prodigious. There is hardly a relevant document in Spanish, English, French, German, or Italian that Draper has not tracked down and shrewdly appraised. When Jean-Paul Sartre writes a new preface for a Brazilian edition of his book on Cuba, Draper gets a hold of a copy and pounces on a dissembling statement with the deadly proficiency of an entomologist snaring a rare bug.

For another thing, Draper comes to his task with exceptional credentials. He is a deservedly praised historian of American communism and is thoroughly at home in the labyrinth of Marxist-Leninist ideology. This background is peculiarly appropriate in some ways because the old-line Communists in Cuba have more than a passing resemblance to their comrades in the United States. Blas Roca and Lázaro Peña are like William Z. Foster and Eugene Dennis in the sense that it is inconceivable that either set of leaders could, on their own, overturn a society and lead a popular revolution: they all evoke the scent of Stalinism.

In turns cynically opportunist and blindly sectarian, the Cuban Communists managed, until Fidel Castro's rise, to make themselves odious to most of their countrymen. During Fulgencio Batista's palmy days as Cuba's strong man, the Communists became allies of the regime, won some cabinet positions, and consolidated their hold over the labor movement. And when Castro first went into the hills in 1956, they committed a blunder that is now famous in dismissing the young

Mr. Meyer is an editorial writer for the Washington Post *and co-author with Tad Szulc of* The Cuban Invasion—The Chronicle of a Disaster *(New York, Praeger, 1962). His articles have appeared in a wide variety of American and British journals.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

rebel as a "Putschist" and deriding his movement as bourgeois and romantic. It was not until the eve of Castro's victory that Carlos Rafael Rodriguez, perhaps the ablest of the Old Communists, went to the Sierra Maestra to make a formal pact with Fidel.

ALL THIS IS painstakingly spelled out by Draper in telling the doleful story of Castro's perversion of the revolution. The core of Draper's thesis is that Castro promised one kind of revolution--liberal, democratic and non-Communist—and delivered another, wiping out in the process the middle class that had given him his strongest initial support and whose sons filled the leadership of his movement. Draper is devastating in exploding the myth that Castro, at the time of his victory, was leading a "peasants' and workers' " revolt.

The turning point came in October 1959 when Major Huber Matos, a hero of the revolution, was arrested on charges of treason and sentenced to twenty years in jail for the crime of opposing Communist penetration of the rebel army. After this, the democratic promises of the revolution were systematically scuttled, but Castro's own political orientation was still not clear. Apologists for *el Lider Máximo* took the position that the hostility of the United States was chiefly to blame for the ugly features of Castroism, that elections were unnecessary since the new regime enjoyed overwhelming support, and that Castro was not a Communist but a radical nationalist giddy with excess. Draper offers a telling commentary on the moral premises of this position:

At bottom, all these "neo" and "direct" democracies rest on a simple proposition: that the Leader and his people are one and indivisible. Hence they need no representative institutions, no elections, no loyal or disloyal oppositions, no free or partially critical press, none of the rights and safeguards traditionally associated with democracy.

The horror of this thinking is that it wipes out the lessons to be learned from the most desperate and tragic experiences of our time. If there is anything that should have burned itself into our consciousness, it is the excruciating evil of the popular despot, the beloved dictator, the mass leader.

This was originally written in late 1960, and events have been less cruel to Draper than to those who confidently asserted that Castro and the Communists were natural enemies. Draper traces the origins of the third phase of the revolution—the communization of Cuba—with care and objectivity, noting every semantic nuance that led to December 2, 1961, when Castro openly announced his conversion to Marxism-Leninism.

What explains Castro's *volte-face?* Draper makes no pretense of knowing Castro's secret life and offers no lurid pseudo-revelations. But to those who have known the Cuban rebel before his ascent to power, Draper seems to be on the right track when he writes, "Fidel Castro—as much demagogue as idealist, as much adventurer as revolutionary, as much anarchist as Communist or anything else—was suddenly and unexpectedly catapulted into power without a real party, a real army or a real program."

ANYONE WHO FAIRLY reviews Castro's career will find that there is more consistency in his temperament than in his ideas. He is driven more by impulse, vanity, resentment and rebelliousness than by any coherent collection of abstract goals. On January 1, 1959, the levers of power were thrust into his hands as the regime he was fighting literally collapsed. His program was vague, but his ambition was not. Castro wanted to stride the world as a fellow colossus with Khruchchev, Nehru and the rest—and the surest path to celebrity was to take on the mighty United States, displaying the same audacity that enabled him to erode the authority of the well-armed Batista dictatorship. And the ultimate audacity was to become an ally of the Soviet Union.

Draper goes on to say, "Still, as long as the Communists need him at least as much as he needs them, further surprises cannot be ruled out. Fidel's ego may give the Communists as much trouble as it has given many others." Submissiveness of any sort is out of character for Castro, and it is quite conceivable that within the Communist world he may venture in directions that will alarm his Soviet sponsors.

This, of course, remains a matter for speculation. It is possible, however, to speak with more certainty about the past, and here Draper performs a service by calmly analyzing the notion that Castro was "pushed" into Soviet arms by United States blunders. He presents a convincing brief to the contrary, although in the reviewer's opinion he pays insufficient attention to the role played by sectors of the American press, business interests involved in Cuba, and exile pressures. "The real flaw in American policy," he rightly observes, "was sterility. If it did not push Castro into the arms of the Communists, it did very little to make it hard for him to go where he wanted to go."

Draper's analysis throughout is adult and subtle; he does not seek to compress his data in a preconceived mold. He pays Cubans the compliment of taking them seriously and not turning them into the pallid automata of an external conspiracy. His study of the island, in-

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

deed, has left him with the conviction that the seeds of liberation lie within the Cuban people themselves:

As long as there are men in Cuba who believe in civil liberties, representative government, land reform instead of Soviet-style state farms, freedom of expression, association with the democratic West and free trade unions, there will be an underground . . . If no one else provides the necessary conditions for its growth, Castro and the Communists will do so.

IN CONTRAST TO *Castro's Revolution,* Daniel James' well-intentioned book is shallow and frequently shrill. It is not, however, without virtues. James, who has written previously about Communist penetration in Guatemala, is competent and knowledgeable. His basic approach is interesting: he has interviewed virtually every major defector from Castro's Cuba, beginning with Luis Díaz Lanz (and excluding all former supporters of the Batista regime). He has amassed a good deal of useful detail and preserved some anecdotes that might otherwise have slipped through the sieve.

But this is a Book With a Thesis—namely, that the Castro movement was from the outset a Communist plot. The author is systematically unfair: Castro is never given the benefit of any doubt, whereas virtually all of his enemies are taken at their word. The tone is polemical. When Fidel is quoted as saying, "Prison is for us our academy for struggle and nothing will deter us when the hour arrives," James adds, gratuitously, ". . . a typical Communist cry." Typical, also, of a heavy editorial hand.

Without indicating disagreement, James writes: "Cubans I interviewed agreed that in Mexico [in 1956] Castro received his final indoctrination in communism and that the July 26th Movement, which had ostensibly been created as an instrument of Cuban nationalism, was largely in Communist hands." All evidence of conflict between the Communists and Castro is dismissed as a clever ruse.

The trouble is that by using this technique James can prove anything he wants. He can accept data which fit, and explain away anything that does not as a trick. More than that, no one reading James' book could really understand how so perfidious and so wholly unattractive a figure could ever command so much fanatic support. James has put Castro into a shrinking machine and produced a party hack who looks suspiciously like the mediocre Jacobo Arbenz.

But Cuba is not Guatemala, and Fidel Castro is not Arbenz. "Those who have long dismissed [Castro] as 'nothing but a Communist'," Draper remarks, "and those who have deceived themselves or others that he could 'never be a Communist,' have both oversimplified him beyond recognition. He did not come to power or to communism by the route of any other national Communist leader, and both the Cuban and Russian Communists have no exact precedent for dealing with him. Until he goes through the usual quotas of internal crises, factional struggles, changes of line, and tests of loyalty to a higher Communist power, his place in the Communist movement cannot be fixed once and for all."

If we are to understand the phenomenon of Cuban communism at all, surely the difference in analysis is crucial. It is precisely because Castro is so *ambiguous* a figure that he defies conventional analysis and retains an appeal that Arbenz or Blas Roca could never have. In contrast to the organizational or conspiratorial Communist, Castro is what might be termed a charismatic Communist. When Fidel gets on television to expound the verities of Marx and Lenin, it is not Communist dogma that persuades, but rather the gifted tongue of Fidel. The economic confusion, the erratic speeches, the emotional mass demonstrations—all these spring from the charismatic nature of Castro's tropical variant of communism.

A reader of James' book would get the impression that the entire Cuban revolution was basically a fraud and that Castro is so widely detested that US marines would be enthusiastically welcomed as liberators. A reader of Draper's book would not be so sure. A classic counterrevolution could work against Arbenz in Guatemala, but the events of April 1961 would seem to suggest that it cannot work against Castro's Cuba. Any effective response to charismatic communism requires more analysis of the thinking of people inside Cuba than of those in exile outside. It requires the sophistication to realize that Cuban communism may produce its Imre Nagy as well as its Fidel Castro. It requires, in short, the kind of suppleness and insight exemplified by Theodore Draper's book.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

NOTES and VIEWS

Sino-Soviet Trade: A Barometer

WHILE THE occasional outbursts of public disagreement between Moscow and Peking have earned front-page headlines in the world's press, the more intimate features of Chinese-Soviet partnership remain to this day in the shadows. An examination of the economic relations between the two powers may thus offer some welcome insights into the uneasy alliance. While much remains to be explained even on this plane, available information suggests that at first the Soviets were quite generous with financial credits and other forms of aid. Subsequently, however, economic considerations may not only have intensified the discord between the two Communist capitals, but may, in fact, have been among the causes generating it. It is the purpose of the present note to trace the course of this development.

The exact dimensions of Soviet economic aid (aid refers here only to economic credits) to China are difficult to ascertain since formal long-term credits appear to have been liberally, if perhaps grudgingly, supplemented with short-term loans which in large part are unaccounted for in official statistics. The full impact of Soviet economic aid to China is best evaluated by studying the formal aid agreements in relation to the Sino-Soviet balance of trade. From 1949, when the Communists seized power, until 1961, only two formal economic credit agreements were signed between the two countries.[1] The first, at an interest rate of one percent, was announced in February 1960, and committed the Russians to deliver $300 million worth of goods between 1950 and 1954. Repayment in Chinese exports was to begin in 1954 and to continue for ten years until 1963. This agreement was supplemented in October 1954 by a Soviet loan of $130 million, bringing the total formal commitments to $430 million.

However, when viewed in the context of trade, the scope of Soviet aid appears considerably larger. In the early 1950's, the Soviet Union had a persistent export surplus with China (see page 48). Between 1950 and 1955, the Soviets had in fact shipped to China close to $1 billion more than they had received in return, and if the 1949 shipments were included, the figure would be well over $1 billion, since the major portion of the $350 million worth of goods exchanged in that year[2] undoubtedly consisted of Soviet exports.

The present significance of this trade gap cannot be evaluated precisely. When one country exports more than it imports from another country, it does not always mean that the net exporter is making up the difference with some form of foreign aid or credit. The two countries may, for example, be members of a three-country multilateral trade arrangement and the full picture of their trade relations may be obscured by the lack of trade data from the third country. In the present case, however, the type of exports involved, the internal conditions of the Soviet Union and China, the bilateral nature of their economic relationships, and the timing of the aid agreements all suggest that trade and aid are closely connected in Sino-Soviet economic dealings and that the Chinese trade deficit was largely financed through short-term credits.

Aside from short-term loans, other factors may explain the apparent gap in the trade balance. First of all, the Soviet export surplus may have been inflated by inclusion into the regular trade statistics of military aid extended in the form of outright grants. Secondly, some of the transfers of Soviet assets may have been compensated by ownership rights, i.e., corporate stock, rather than by Chinese promises to pay. In the manner of imperialist investors, the Soviets after the overthrow

[1] For details of the agreements, see *Vneshniaia torgovlia* (Moscow), October 1959, p. 6; September 1961, p. 5.

[2] M. Sladkovskii, "Razvitie torgovli Sovetskovo Soiuza s Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikol," *Vneshniaia torgovlia*, October 1959, p. 3.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SINO-SOVIET TRADE

(in millions of dollars)

Year	Soviet Exports	Soviet Imports	Excess of Exports	Excess of Imports
1950	$ 388	$ 191	$ 197	
1951	478	331	147	
1952	554	414	140	
1953	698	475	223	
1954	759	578	181	
1955	748	643	105	
Total			993	
1956	733	764		$ 31
1957	544	738		194
1958	634	881		247
1959	954	1,100		146
1960	816	847		31
1961	367	551		184
Total				833

Sources: 1950-1958: M. Sladkovskii, "Razvitie torgovli Sovetskovo Soiuza s Kitaiskoi Narodnoi Respublikoi," *Vneshniaia torgovlia,* October 1959, pp. 3, 6, 9.
1959-1960: Ministerstvo Vneshnei Torgovli, "Vneshniaia torgovlia Soiuza SSR za 1960 god," *Statisticheskii obzor,* Moscow, Vneshtorgizdat, 1961, p. 9.
1961: *Far Eastern Economic Review,* June 28, 1962, p. 642.

of Chiang Kai-shek participated in joint stock companies formed on the Chinese mainland. Their contribution to such enterprises usually consisted of captured Japanese assets and reparations, but it is possible that in some instances imports from the USSR were represented as well.

However, even if one assumed that military aid and capital stock transfers were included in the Soviet export surplus, the officially announced loans fall far short of explaining the accumulated Chinese trade deficit. In light of this, two points seem especially important. First, the original 1950 loan called for credit extensions of $60 million a year until 1954. Our table shows, however, that the annual trade deficit was always double this amount and, in three of the five years, was more than triple this sum. In fact, the full amount of the loan was used up in 1951, or perhaps even in 1950, if 1949 trade deficits are included. Second, while a token repayment may have been made in 1954 (according to the agreement, repayments in the form of a net flow of Chinese exports were to begin at that time), Chinese imports continued to exceed exports, and the new loan of $130 million was then announced by the Russians. Net repayment was not made and the balance of trade did not shift until 1956.

WHAT, THEN, was the magnitude of Soviet aid? The question could be answered in two ways. It could be argued that Moscow's assistance consisted of the $430 million worth of officially announced credits. Alternatively, it could be asserted that the Chinese trade deficit, which at its peak totaled almost $1 billion, is a closer approximation of Soviet help. Since the Chinese did have these imported goods on hand, and since trade deals, except for those covered by loan agreements, were supposed to be made on a bilateral and yearly *quid pro quo* basis only, the latter view seems more accurate. This also appears to be the position of the Peking government, which in 1957 reported receipt of 5,294 million yuan (approximately $1.3 billion) in Soviet loans.[3] Recently, Soviet observers too have taken this attitude: instead of quoting the lower (ruble) figure announced by their government, they now cite the higher Chinese yuan estimate.[4] Thus it seems fair to say that by 1956, the Russians had rendered the Chinese something like $1 billion of economic credit, consisting in large part of unanticipated short-term loans.

While the extension of $1 billion worth of economic loans over a seven-year period does not appear overly charitable, it was something of a strain for the Soviet economy in the early 1950's. The actual burden, in fact, was probably greater than the credit figure indicates, since during the same period the Russians also exported almost $3 billion worth of other goods to China. Although these latter deliveries were paid for with Chinese exports, it is highly questionable whether they were comparable to the Soviet exports in quality and strategic importance. American Lend Lease shipments to the Soviet Union during World War II represented a somewhat similar case: the dollar amount may have been small in terms of the Soviet gross national product, but

[3] U.S. Department of State, *Current Backgrounds,* No. 464, p. 14.

[4] Yu. V. Gankovskii, ed., *SSSR i strany vostoka. Ekonomicheskoe i kulturnoe sotrudnichestvo,* Moscow, Vol. 1, 1961, p. 18.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

the items involved were scarce commodities and equipment which were essential to the Soviet war effort. In the present instance, over 50 percent of the Chinese steel output in 1957 was produced in Russian-built furnaces and almost half of the coal extracted came from Soviet-equipped mines. Furthermore, throughout this period the Russians trained thousands of Chinese technicians in Soviet factories and schools and provided millions of dollars worth of blueprints and patents.[5]

On the whole then, an appraisal of Soviet economic support for China in the first half of the 1950's indicates that the Russians were quite generous. Beginning in mid-1955 and in 1956, however, the situation changed sharply. Not only did Soviet exports drop below Chinese imports, but the USSR also chose this moment to begin an impressive program of help to other developing but non-Communist countries. Shortly thereafter, the Chinese launched foreign aid programs of their own, and the brotherly cooperation between the two Communist powers turned into competition for political favor in the underdeveloped world.

As the table on p. 48 indicates, the Chinese began to make net repayments on their loans in 1956. This was accomplished by a substantial expansion of exports to the USSR while Soviet exports to China began tapering off. Although Soviet exports increased again in 1959 (i.e., during the last stages of the "great leap forward"), China's exports to the USSR continued to exceed imports from that country.

Explaining this change in the balance of trade, some observers have argued that in their great faith in the results of the "great leap forward," the Chinese themselves may have decided that they no longer needed Soviet aid. But even if this charitable view were correct—which is open to much doubt—it must have been distressing for the Chinese, who at the time were in the process of repaying their debt, to see their Communist ally engaged in redirecting economic resources to the Afghans, Indians, Indonesians, and Egyptians among others. By 1958, each of these countries had received promises from the USSR of more than $100 million in aid. As of 1961, India alone had received commitments of more than $800 million, which is more than had been originally promised the Chinese, and almost as much as what was actually delivered. Most of this aid—from the Bhilai steelworks to the Aswan Dam—could have been used in China, and, what is more, the Chinese through their repayments in effect contributed to the Soviets' ability to undertake their economic offensive in the neutralist countries.

That the Chinese reacted to this diversion of Soviet aid with some rancor became apparent in the course of the recent public recriminations between Moscow and Tirana. When just about a year ago the Albanian press bitterly attacked the Soviets for "aiding non-socialist underdeveloped countries before the socialist states have become showcases of prosperity," [6] few people doubted that the Albanians were expressing the sentiments of their mentors in Peking. The Russians in turn responded by calling their former Albanian allies—and obliquely the Chinese leaders—"egotistic" and unmindful of the "principles" of "proletarian internationalism."[7]

Paradoxically, the change in Soviet foreign aid policy may also account for the defiant launching in 1956 (when Peking started net repayment of its debts) of an active aid program by the Chinese themselves. On terms almost always more favorable than those of the Soviets, the Chinese promised several hundred million dollars of aid to neutralist as well as Communist countries. Many of the recipients, such as North Korea, North Vietnam, Outer Mongolia, Nepal, Ceylon, Yemen, Indonesia, Ghana, Guinea, and Cuba, ultimately ended up with loans from both the Soviet Union and China.[8] What is more, in some instances there were clear signs of competition between the Chinese and the Soviets as to which of the two countries would emerge as the most disinterested and generous friend in need.[9]

IT WAS NOT until April 1961, when the tension between Moscow and Peking had just about reached its climax, that the first formal credit agreement since 1954 was signed by the two powers.[10] Responding somewhat less than magnanimously to the serious economic crisis in China, the Soviets tendered an interest-free loan of 500,000 tons of raw sugar (worth $40 million), to be repaid in 1964-67. (Needless to say, the Chinese at the time were in need of other more important foods than Cuban sugar, of which they already had their share.) At the same time, Moscow extended a five-year loan of $320 million, which, however, only covered the bulk of Peking's cumulative short-term indebtedness. Despite a consistent excess of exports over imports in their trade with the USSR since 1956, the Chinese had failed to

[5] *Ibid.*, p. 20.

[6] *Pravda* (Bratislava), October 28, 1961.

[7] F. Konstantinov, "Raskolnicheskaia antimarksistskaia deiatelnost albanskikh rukovoditelei," *Kommunist*, No. 17, 1961, p. 48.

[8] M. F. Kovrizhnykh, ed., *Vneshniaia torgovlia stran narodnoi demokratii*, Moscow, Vneshtorgizdat, 1961, pp. 60-66.

[9] Colin Garrat, "China as a Foreign Aid Donor," *Far Eastern Economic Review*, January 9, 1961, p. 81.

[10] *Vneshniaia torgovlia*, May 1961, p. 17.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

liquidate their obligations to the Russians. Since they apparently had no other choice, the Soviets agreed to fund this indebtedness by the new loan which is to be repaid in five installments: $9 million in 1962, $55 million in 1963 and $128 million in both 1964 and 1965.

There is some uncertainty as to how the loan figure of $320 million was arrived at. The excess of Chinese imports over exports in trade with the USSR between 1950 and the end of 1960 amounted to nearly $350 million. If accumulated interest charges, the 1949 trade deficit, and Soviet military aid are included, Peking's total obligation as of 1961 must have been much higher than $320 million, as indeed official Chinese statements have indicated.[11]

It is possible that the 1961 loan agreement was made on the assumption that the Chinese would repay the rest of their arrears in the course of that year. Whether or not this in fact happened, a substantial repayment was made, since in 1961—perhaps the worst year in the economic experience of Communist China—Peking established a $184 million export surplus in its trade with the USSR. At the same time, Soviet exports to China fell to their lowest point since 1950.

This drop in Soviet aid and their own economic difficulties forced the Chinese to turn to the West for supplies of equipment and grain. To date, purchases of foodstuffs alone from Canada, Australia, South Africa and France have obligated Peking to payments of almost $600 million in scarce Western currencies.[12] In spite of these difficulties, however, the Chinese have managed to continue extending foreign aid of their own: in 1961 they granted a new five-year loan of $125 million to Albania and a $20 million credit to Ghana.

In retrospect, then, the period 1955-56 represents an important turning point in the history of Sino-Soviet economic relations, marking the beginning of a rapid contraction in Soviet aid as well as the initiation of an independent Chinese foreign assistance program. It need not be stressed how germane these events are to any inquiry into the broader conflict between the two Communist powers.

[11] See *Current Backgrounds, supra* (fn. No. 1).

[12] *Far Eastern Economic Review*, May 17, 1962, p. 311; *New York Times*, July 31 and August 8, 1962.

Marshall I. Goldman

(Mr. Goldman, author of numerous articles on the Soviet economy and a previous contributor to this journal, is a member of the Department of Economics at Wellesley College, Massachusetts.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Literary Ferment in the Ukraine

WHAT IS THE intellectual and artistic life of the Ukraine today? Is it merely a replica, colorful though it may be, but still a replica of art in Russia, just as Pavlo Virsky's Ukrainian Dancers are of Moiseev's Ballet? Superficially it may appear so, but to a student of that neglected area of the Soviet world, appearances prove misleading.

The difficulty of arousing interest in the Ukraine is considerable and stems largely from ignorance. How many foreign correspondents in the USSR speak Ukrainian or know anything about Ukrainian history? Recently an article in *The New York Times*[1] referred to the greatest Ukrainian poet, Taras Shevchenko, as a Russian. Sandwiched between Russia and the satellites, the "sovereign" republic—Ukraine—with a seat in the United Nations, is generally and with some justification treated in the West as a province of Russia. It takes a Djilas to raise the question: "Who knows anything nowadays about Ukrainian writers and political figures? What has happened to that nation, which is the same size as France and was once the most advanced nation in Russia?"[2]

The answer is that a great deal has happened to that nation since 1917. Physically it has survived Stalin's attempts to crush it (according to Khrushchev, the Ukrainians avoided the fate of the Balkars "because there were too many of them"). It has also survived the ravages of war, although its population at last count (1959) numbered only 37 million, which is about the same for the area as in 1926.

One grievous aspect of the nation's losses was the purge of Ukrainian writers, scholars and intellectuals in the 1930's. While literature in the Soviet Union has once again shown signs of life, very little of interest has been published in the Ukraine. It is not easy to replenish the reservoirs after a drain that took away no fewer than 100 writers.[3] There are no Ukrainian counterparts to Pasternak, Ehrenburg or Dudintsev, and until very recently perhaps the only reflection of the "thaw" was the partial rehabilitation of writers who disappeared in the 1930's. In the last year, however, events have shown unmistakably that new life is astir. In fact, a very lively debate has been going on in the pages of the Soviet Ukrainian literary magazines *Dnipro, Vitchyzna, Prapor* and the semi-weekly *Literaturna Ukraina,* significantly renamed from *Literaturna hazeta* in February 1962.

THE DISCUSSION BEGAN in January of this year after the Third Plenum of the Ukrainian branch of the Writers' Union, a session which was in large part devoted to "young poets" and their works. The main speaker and president of the branch, Oles Honchar, set the tone for the meeting by admitting the grave damage which the "personality cult of Stalin" had inflicted upon literature. "In those times," he said, "our culture suffered deep wounds because of the physical annihilation of a whole range of creative talents who have now been fully and justly rehabilitated."[4] (That last statement, incidentally, stretched the truth, since some writers have yet to be restored to grace.) Turning to the young poets, he explained that their works appeared as a reaction to the "inane and 'botanical' lyrics" of the past.[5] These young poets, who apparently are known as the "sixtiers" (*shistdesiatnyky*), include Ivan Drach, Mykola Vinhranovsky, Vitaliy Korotych, Mykola Synhaivsky and Yevhen Hutsalo. A woman, Lina Kostenko, is often associated with the group. She is the oldest, born in 1930; all the others were born in 1936, except Hutsalo who is a year their junior.

[1] S. Shabad, "American Boys Report on a Moscow School," *New York Times Magazine,* November 26, 1961.

[2] M. Djilas, *The New Class,* New York, F. A. Praeger, 1957, p. 102.

[3] See this writer's *Literary Politics in the Soviet Ukraine: 1917-34,* New York, Columbia University Press, 1956, pp. 234-36.

[4] *Literaturna hazeta* (Kiev), January 12, 1962.

[5] *Ibid.*

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Honchar offered some criticism of their works, but in general he supported them without much reservation. He praised their considerable "sophistication and also their 'fastidiousness,' attentiveness to language and their unconcealed aversion to clichés and stereotypes."[6] Encouraged by these kind words, several young poets, although not yet members of the Writers' Union (Drach, Vinhranovsky, Synhaivsky and Hutsalo were admitted two months after the plenum), frankly expressed their views in the discussion that followed. From newspaper reports, scant as these are, it is clear that the chief spokesman of the "sixtiers" was Ivan Drach and that he found several supporters among the literary critics, expecially Dziuba, Zahrebelny and Svitlychny. In his speech Drach made three main points: that new poets will "create the art of communism, of which Soviet Ukrainian art will form a part"; that young intellectuals are enthusiastic about foreign (Western European) art—especially Picasso, Van Gogh, Gaugin, Monet and Cézanne; and that several "forgotten" Ukrainian writers and artists of the past ought to be remembered and treated "with dignity."[7]

Perhaps the most significant remarks during the plenum came from Honchar when he referred to the dean of Soviet Ukrainian poets, Pavlo Tychyna. In his address Honchar said what must have been in the minds of all, that "the young poetry derives in fact somehow from the early Tychyna, when he, the first, perhaps, of our poets, peeped into the cosmos and heard its strange music; the young poets are also attracted by the monumentalism of Dovzhenko. . . ."[8] Dovzhenko, who has been called "the first poet of the movies"[9] and whose films *Zvenyhora* and *The Earth* were cleared of the Ukrainian "nationalist" stigma after Stalin's death, died in 1956. But Tychyna is still alive. Strangely, there was no evidence that he was at the meeting. Neither was there a sign of three other "elder" poets—Mykola Bazhan, Maksym Rylsky and Volodymyr Sosyura—whose early works, for a long time "forgotten" and proscribed, have had an obvious influence on the young poets. If these poets were physically present at the plenum, they did not speak. It would, of course, have been gratifying for them to hear the praises so generously offered to the young generation. On the other hand, their presence would have made transparently clear what the plenum so carefully avoided and exorcised with constant references to the new Party Program—the indestructibility of national cultural continuity and literary tradition. However emphatic were the pronouncements that the new poetry reflected a higher awareness of Communist goals, the new demands of readers, a greater loyalty to the party and a deeper love for the Fatherland (inevitably spelled with a capital and meant to refer to the entire USSR, not only to the Ukraine), the fact remains that the poems under discussion could only be understood in their Ukrainian cultural and linguistic context. The creation of a "multinational" Soviet literature "socialist in content and national in form," so ardently fostered for the last thirty years, has remained what it always was—a myth.

The "senior" among the "young poets" is Lina Kostenko, a graduate of the Kiev Pedagogical Institute and the Gorky Literary Institute in Moscow. She has published three collections of poems and, undaunted by initial sharp criticisms, has continued to write direct personal lyrics, several of which show mature craftsmanship and the successful rediscovery of the inner world of feelings.

The most original of the group is Ivan Drach. We are told that "Yevtushenko himself has praised him."[10] The popular Soviet poet Yevtushenko is of Ukrainian origin, and his contact with the Ukraine is attested by a nostalgic passage in the poem *Station Winter* (omitted in the English translation) as well as by his publications in the Kiev *Literaturna hazeta*. However, Yevtushenko writes in Russian and belongs to the tradition of Mayakovsky. Drach is Ukrainian not only because he writes in Ukrainian, but because his teachers are the early Tychyna and Bazhan. The poem which remains in the center of the current debate is Drach's "Nizh u sontsi" (A Knife in the Sun, 1961), a long (475 lines) "fairy-tale tragedy" in two parts.[11] Modernistically constructed, it is an ambitious attempt at a philosophic meditation on the recent history of the Ukraine and the future of mankind. The prologue to Part I sets this serious tone:

Whatever am I for? Which road is mine?
And has my fear sprouted
From the grey sorrow of Capricorn
To the clayey mud of my native village?

What shall I bear into the gray-blue distance?
Caress of wheat inside my youthful hands,
Or the black cancer of hydrogen orgies
Which eats the hearts of the five continents?

[6] *Ibid.*

[7] *Ibid.*, January 16, 1962.

[8] *Ibid.*, January 12, 1962.

[9] Lewis Jacobs, *The Rise of the American Film: A Critical History*, New York, Harcourt Brace & Co., 1939, pp. 322-23.

[10] S. A. Kryzhanivsky, "Buiannia molodykh syl" (A Flowering of Young Talents), *Radianske literaturoznavstvo* (Kiev), No. 1, 1962, p. 11.

[11] Published in *Literaturna hazeta*, July 18, 1961.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Before embarking on an orbital flight of history, the poet is persuaded by the 18th-century Ukrainian philosopher Skovoroda to look at his own country and to "enter into the human heart." This he does by visiting, in the company of the Devil, the last three decades of Ukrainian history. The Devil's boast that after the revelation of the past the poet will "tear up the red flag" proves vain in the end, but the glimpses of truth are horrible enough to shake the beliefs and to protract the agony of the poet. Most moving is a visit paid to the old peasant Mad Woman, who lost her three sons, two in the war, and the third in 1937. A chairman of a collective farm is buried amid gloom, poverty and "black, moire-like fields." The unexpressed sufferings of the peasants are conveyed in the technically brilliant wedding song of a violin whose name is Solomia, and the first part ends in a macabre dream—"Ukrainian horses over Paris." Part II, much weaker and more pretentious than Part I, deals with the poet's preparation to fly into outer space to remove the "knife" which the American scientists sent from Cape Canaveral to the sun. The Devil is gone and so is the magic of Drach's words.

THE DESIRE TO know life in its totality fills Drach's other poems, especially his "Spraha" (Thirst), in which the voices of a truly remarkable trio—Walt Whitman, Aphrodite, and a young Communist killed during the revolution—are unanimous in asking for the ultimate in life: "a thirst for truth, beauty and tenderness, a thirst for faithfulness, love and sorrow."[12] Drach, whose first collection was refused publication, is about to publish a volume of poems, "Sonyashnyk" (The Sunflower).

Mykola Vinhranovsky, a pupil of Dovzhenko, also found it difficult, according to the editor of *Dnipro,* to have his first poems printed because of their "strong figurative power."[13] Yet it was this quality that won them wide acclaim once they were published. There are certain baroque effects in Vinhranovsky's verse, and, like Drach, he views the wide world from a distinctly Ukrainian angle. Kiev, Dnieper and the Ukrainian landscape figure prominently in his poems, and his symbolic image of St. Vladimir "immortalizing all the Slavs with his cross" drew the ire of Soviet critics.[14]

Vitaliy Korotych, a physician, is the purest intellectual of the entire group. It is a relief to read someone whose thoughts center on the frailty and mystery of life and inquire into the relationship of things without necessarily coming up with an answer. In a poem, "Pure Art," Korotych writes:

> **There is no need to submerge**
> **Your thoughts in a sea of words,**
> **The heroes are not everywhere**
> **Beautiful and broad-shouldered.**
> **I am for pure art,**
> **And art is pure**
> **When it is made**
> **With pure hands and thoughts.**[15]

Korotych is the author of one collection, many short poems and a long poetic work entitled "Father's Return,"[16] full of shallow rationalizing about the purges of 1937.

Mykola Synhaivsky and Yevhen Hutsalo are less bold in their imagination but not less gifted than Vinhranovsky. Synhaivsky's *vers libre* is particularly effective. Hutsalo, whose poetry is reminiscent of the early Rylsky, has also written short stories.

All the writers in this group are Communists; they belong either to the party or to the Komsomol. Ideologically they profess unwavering loyalty to the cause; intellectually, they are dissenters, like Yevtushenko, perhaps without knowing it. Poetically and esthetically, they demonstrate a return to the mainsprings of modern Ukrainian poetry. This is rather surprising although most natural. A literature can be truly influenced and nourished only by itself and by what it willingly absorbs from outside. Whatever is imposed upon it will, after a time, fall away, and old trends will be picked up again. This is particularly true of a culturally underdeveloped country, where the energy necessary to assert a national identity has been stifled. Ukrainian poets may quote Tvardovsky (as Drach does) and invoke Mayakovsky (although now they also turn to Walt Whitman), but they make their verses out of the language perfected by its earlier masters, and continue the intellectual search of their compatriots.

The recently discussed "split personality" of Soviet literature cannot, therefore, be reduced to a struggle between the "anti-authoritarian idealists" representing "the westernizing part of Russia's tradition" and those siding with "the eastern, autocratic part."[17] The problem becomes much more complex if we consider, as we must, the non-Russian literatures. In these the return to earlier traditions inevitably leads to what, often

[12] Published in *Dnipro* (Kiev), No. 5, 1962.

[13] *Literaturna hazeta,* November 17, 1961.

[14] Kryzhanivsky, *op. cit.,* p. 9.

[15] "Chyste mystetstvo" (Pure Art), *Literaturna hazeta,* May 5, 1961.

[16] Published in *Dnipro,* No. 2, 1962.

[17] Peter Viereck, "The Split Personality of Soviet Literature," *The Reporter* (New York), March 15, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

unjustly, has been branded as "bourgeois nationalism," but has been in fact a desire for freedom and independence not merely in the political sense. The "cultural brinksmanship" of which Manya Harari writes so perceptively[18] is even more risky in the Ukraine than it is in Russia, because of such ever-present ghosts on the balcony as Khvylovy, the "national Communist" who, before committing suicide in 1933, called on Ukrainian writers to "turn away from Moscow,"[19] and the neo-classicist Zerov, who advocated the study of Western European sources.

The poetry of the "sixtiers" does not even suggest that such a return is contemplated, or indeed necessary. The protest of the young poets is, politically, very mild. They issue no slogans and their patriotism is tempered by Communist internationalism. Yet their protest after decades of un-poetry is both effective and lasting because it avoids the touchy national issue and instead produces solid poetic achievement, revealing rich native resources of language and thought. It is in this that they and their readers find a new independence and pride in their country.

The response to the Third Plenum and the boost given to the young poets by some journals led to a lively and sometimes acrimonious debate in ensuing months, a little reminiscent of the "literary discussion" of 1925-28. The "sixtiers" were stoutly defended by such critics as Kryzhanivsky, Svitlychny and Ostryk, who praised their boldness, freshness of imagery and a new kind of "ism"—Cosmism.[20] Wrote Svitlychny: "The very ability to see the whole earth, from a side and at a distance, allows one to think more deeply about world affairs, to think more concretely and responsibly. And not only about world affairs, but about oneself, about man and his potentialities."[21] (One might observe here that Soviet space exploration has helped make it possible to write about things universal without fear of total condemnation.) The attackers in the debate (Sheremet and Morhaienko[22]) accused the young poets of Byronism, arrogance, empty innovationism, but never of political errors. On March 23, at the time of the admission of the four young poets into the Writers' Union, a special commission to guide their work was set up, headed by Pavlo Tychyna.[23] It looked as if the prospects of the "innovators" were really bright, and while polemics raged in the press, Drach, Vinhranovsky, Korotych and Synhaivsky were publishing many new poems. Then, on June 29, the ax fell.

A MEETING OF THE Writers' Union roundly condemned the group and their friendly critics. One of the latter, Ivan Dziuba, was reprimanded very severely for "shameless self-advertisement, distortions of the actual conditions of modern Ukrainian literature and false political contentions."[24] Journals were rapped for printing works by the young poets which were "artistically and ideologically immature," and for publishing articles directing "the creative work of writers onto byways devoid of ideas." Great harm had been caused by "groupishness" and the attempt to "counterpose young *littérateurs* to their older colleagues." To remedy this unhealthy state of affairs it was decided to appoint a new editor of *Vitchyzna* and to "take concrete steps to improve the work of *Literaturna Ukraina* and the literary journals."

The matter did not rest there. In August, at the plenary session of the Central Committee of the Communist Party of the Ukraine, the case against the young poets was reiterated by party secretary Skaba in no uncertain terms. "Among the creative intelligentsia," he declared, "there are occasionally people who, under the guise of the struggle against administration, are trying to compromise the very idea of party leadership in literature and art. . . . They demand a 'freedom' of creation which would be completely free from Communist ideology."[25] Another speaker at the plenum, the writer Yuri Zbanatsky, deplored the fact that young writers are not taking advice from older writers, and the first secretary of the party, Podhorny, agreed that the party must pay more attention to literature. The resolutions of the plenum contained a clear warning to those young writers who have tendencies to "revisionist and nihilistic deviations."

[18] Manya Harari, "Letter from Moscow," *Encounter* (London), No. 106, July, 1962.

[19] Mykola Khvylovy, *Stories from the Ukraine,* New York, Philosophical Library, 1960, pp. 7-9.

[20] S. A. Kryzhanivsky, *op. cit.;* I. Svitlychny, "U poetychnim kosmosi" (In the Poetic Cosmos), *Dnipro,* No. 4, 1962; M. Ostryk, "V imia choho vony—hromy i blyskavytsi" (In the Name of What—All This Thunder and Lightning?), *Prapor* (Kiev), No. 111, 1962.

[21] Svitlychny, *op. cit.,* p. 147.

[22] M. Sheremet, "Neproste i shtuchne buty harnym ne mozhe" (The Uncommon and Artificial Cannot be Beautiful), *Literaturna hazeta,* November 14, 1961; P. Morhaienko, "Slovo v polemitsi" (A Remark in Polemics), *Dnipro,* No. 5, 1962.

[23] *Literaturna Ukraina* (Kiev), March 23, 1962.

[24] *Ibid.,* June 29, 1962.

[25] Report on the Central Committee Plenum in *Radianska Ukraina* (Kiev), August 11, 1962.

[26] Vinhranovsky's poems in *Literaturna Ukraina,* August 24, 1962, and Drach's "Telizhenske lito" (A Summer in Telizhentsi), *ibid.,* September 14, 1962.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

As so many times before, the oracle has spoken and the writing is on the wall. This time, however, the practical consequences of such censure are uncertain. The best evidence that the young poets have not been cowed into submission is their poems, published after the plenum. Not only have poets like Drach and Vinhranovsky not been silenced or "re-educated"; in their latest poems there is a note of defiance.[26] They will write as they please, they seem to say, and so far they are being published. The debate in the press still continues with the pros and cons of "young poetry" discussed as before, although with a little more caution. In a recent important article, "Fathers and Sons," Maksym Rylsky chastised the younger generation but refused to condemn it outright.[27]

It is too early to judge how far the authorities will go with their interference. The young poets, confronted with both a setback and a challenge, are not likely to lay down their arms. In any event, the ferment in Ukrainian literature can no longer be regarded as a side-effect of the Russian "thaw." It has the makings of a cultural revolution. In 1955, when Milosz wrote that "the poets and critics who dreamt of a *separate* Ukrainian literaure [his italics] have left the world," he was right.[28] Today this is no longer so.

[27] Maksym Rylsky, "Batky i dity" (Fathers and Children), *Literaturna Ukraina,* September 10, 1962.

[28] C. Milosz, *The Captive Mind,* New York, Vintage Press, 1955, p. 231.

George Luckyj

(Professor Luckyj is on the staff of the Department of Slavic Studies at the University of Toronto. This is his first contribution to *Problems of Communism.*)

Correspondence

EDITORS' NOTE: Readers are welcome to send communications dealing with matters discussed in *Problems of Communism.* Comments should be addressed to the Editors, *Problems of Communism,* US Information Agency, 1776 Pennsylvania Avenue, NW, Washington 25, D.C. (Please note: Communications concerned with subscription orders or inquiries should be addressed directly to local USIS offices or to the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office; see front inside cover for details.)

MARXISM, HUMANISM, AND RELIGION

TO THE EDITORS: I would be grateful for the opportunity to comment on George Lichtheim's review of my *Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx* ("Marx and His Critics," *Problems of Communism,* July-Aug. 1962).

The review conveys an impression that the book is some kind of conservative tract or polemic against the "German humanist tradition" (Lichtheim's phrase) and Marxism as its culmination. In fact, more than nine-tenths of it is exposition and textual analysis designed to show how Marxism arose in the mind of Marx and how it then evolved from an original philosophical version to the mature system of the later Marxist writings. The aim and effort was not to refute but to elucidate in a new way the genesis and meaning of Marx's thought. Critical assessment of Marx is almost wholly confined to a short concluding chapter.

Furthermore, my critical position itself has been misrepresented in Mr. Lichtheim's review. He attributes to me the view that it was presumptuous of the "German humanist tradition" to dispense with a "supernatural standard," that its "repudiation of religion" is at the origin of our contemporary world upheaval, and that we would do well to "retrace our steps" to the pre-Kantian religious world outlook (all quoted phrases are Lichtheim's). On these grounds my book is said to have "the great merit of relating the conservative position to its religious assumptions."

Actually, I did not criticize German philosophy for

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

dispensing with a supernatural standard but for setting up man as a divinity. And this criticism was explicitly predicated upon the proposition that man is inescapably human, *i.e.,* limited, imperfect, non-absolute. Such a view of man is common to Judeo-Christian theology and certain modern secular schools of thought and is equally arguable from both types of position. My book takes its stand on this common ground rather than upon a religious commitment.

The suggestion that I indict the "German humanist tradition" for its "repudiation of religion" is therefore very wide of the mark. Far from treating this philosophical tradition as anti-religious or post-religious, I interpreted the movement of thought from Kant to Hegel and beyond as *essentially religious* in the sense that a religion of human self-worship arose, becoming in Marx a "religion of revolution." My analysis thus defies, and is bound to be mangled by any attempt to apply to it, the abstract "religion-humanism" dichotomy that Mr. Lichtheim's thinking seems to presuppose.

In conclusion, I would like to comment on three specific points in the review:

1) Mr. Lichtheim says that the concepts of "Christianity" and "capitalism" make a "rather incongruous joint appearance" in my concluding chapter, and that he finds this "disconcerting."

The juxtaposition (however incongruous) was Marx's rather than mine and was introduced in earlier chapters of my book. There it was shown that Marx formed his original concept of "capitalism" as a phenomenon of human self-alienation on the conscious analogy of Feuerbach's concept of "Christianity" as a phenomenon of human self-alienation, and that Marx was still thinking in terms of this analogy when he wrote *Capital.* So the "joint appearance" in the concluding chapter, where I argue against Feuerbach and Marx that neither Christianity nor capitalism is *per se* a neurotic phenomenon of self-alienation, is only a reappearance.

2) Alluding to my critical argument just stated, Mr. Lichtheim goes on: "Capitalism may have a great deal to be said for it, but it is not the business of philosophers to spring to its defense. They should leave that to their colleagues of the economic faculty." The implication is that I (as a philosopher) had no business arguing that capitalism is *not* a neurotic phenomenon of self-alienation.

I doubt that my colleagues among the economists have much interest in this particular issue concerning capitalism. But I am willing to grant my own professional inadequacy with respect to it if Mr. Lichtheim will grant that Marx, a philosopher with but a few weeks' or months' study of economics behind him at the time he fashioned this central idea of Marxism, had no business arguing that capitalism *is* a phenomenon of human self-alienation.

3) As if to correct a misconception propagated in the book, Mr. Lichtheim states that "Marx had no intention of staying at the level of philosophical speculation." He adds that I have obscured Marx's "practical and revolutionary" intent by saying that the Marxist system, like medieval Christianity, undertakes to provide an "integrated, all-inclusive view of reality."

In fact, I have stressed, as heavily as any scholar I know, the revolutionary activism of Marx, the fact that he "takes issue with the 'contemplative' posture of the philosopher and issues the call for action to change the world" (p. 25). The argument of the book is that this goes along with the striving for an all-inclusive view of reality in the total religious pattern of Marxism, *i.e.,* that the so-called "unity of theory and practice" belongs to Marxism *as a religious phenomenon.*

ROBERT C. TUCKER
Professor of Politics,
Princeton University.

MR. LICHTHEIM REPLIES: I am sorry if Professor Tucker thinks I misrepresented his argument. I read his book carefully and discussed it with others, whose conclusions were similar to mine. It would therefore appear that any failure to grasp his purpose was not simply my own fault. I believe, however, there has been no misunderstanding at all. Rather it is a matter of looking at the same subject through differently colored glasses.

Insofar as he deals with Marx as a social theorist, Professor Tucker reflects an attitude which is more widespread in the United States than in Western Europe. I doubt if he realizes how curious some of his remarks sound to non-Americans. This is not a party matter: in a review of Tucker's book, the *Economist*—not exactly a socialist publication—thought it odd that he should have gone to the extreme of denying the reality of class conflict in 19th-century Europe. The fact is that "capitalism" has emotional connotations for Americans which it does not possess for other people. Incidentally, it is not the case that Marx, in the 1844 manuscripts, ignored economics altogether. His standpoint at the time was that of all the early socialists, although the phraseology in which he expressed it was derived from Hegel and Feuerbach.

This brings me to Professor Tucker's main complaint. I had supposed that the conservative implications of his viewpoint would be as evident to him as they have been to various reviewers of his book, and it puzzles me that he should disclaim them. I have always regarded conservatism as a respectable intellectual position (though one which for various reasons I am unable to share), and I live in the hope that its exponents will make a thorough effort to come to grips with philosophic radicalism, of which Marxism is of course one variant. Professor Tucker's work is an interesting effort in this direction, not least because he has taken the bull by the horns and implicated the entire tradition of German Idealism, from Kant (and by implication Lessing) onward. I thought this praiseworthy, and I fail to understand why he should think me guilty of misrepresentation.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

I am, however, quite willing to admit that I also regard the effort as misconceived. It rests upon a *petitio principii.* Professor Tucker says in his letter, "I did not criticize German philosophy for dispensing with a supernatural standard, but for setting up man as a divinity." This, of course, is how the matter looks to supernaturalists, but no German philosopher—with the exception of Nietzsche, who predictably went mad—would have accepted Professor Tucker's implication. They thought they were being commonsensible in rejecting theology and asserting that the actual content of supernatural religion is in fact natural. Their standpoint was shared by Goethe, whom Professor Tucker by implication treats as a "neurotic" (p. 32 ff.): presumably in contradistinction to the level-headed Kierkegaard, whose utterances he quotes with approval. I do not see how all this can be regarded as anything but an extreme, though scholarly and indeed academic, restatement of a viewpoint which is quite incompatible with any form of humanism. And why not? The more disagreement, the better.

I did not in my review comment on Professor Tucker's rather curious discussion of Kantian and Hegelian logic in terms of psychological compulsions; nor did I point out that what he describes as "Kant's perversion of the idea of freedom" (p. 37) has its counterpart in the writings of Lessing, Herder, Schiller, and Wilhelm von Humboldt, whose perfectionist view of world history was the source of all subsequent liberal and socialist theorizing on the subject. I contented myself with remarking that his cast of mind is unsympathetic to the German humanist tradition, and I should be exceedingly surprised if any reader of his work came to a different conclusion. It was not my intention to argue the case for another manner of viewing the world, but merely to point out that the conservative standpoint is indeed rooted in religious presuppositions. And why on earth should it not be?

Index to Volume XI (1962)

Annual indices for Volumes IV-X (1955-61) appear in the November-December issues (No. 6) for each year. Prior volumes are indexed in No. 6, Vol. III (1954). Numerals to the right of the columns refer to bimonthly issue numbers.

THE SOVIET UNION

The Three Funerals of Joseph Stalin, by Robert Conquest 1
Khrushchev and the Purges, by Lazar Pistrak 1
The Party's New Rules, by Leonard Schapiro 1
Forward to Communism?, by Rush V. Greenslade ... 1
How Statistics Are Made, by Jan S. Prybyla 1
Some Aspects of Soviet Reality, by JUSTAN 1
Moscow in Ferment 2
An End to Concentration Camps?, by Paul Barton 2
That's No Lie, Comrade [on *vranyo*], by Ronald Hingley 2
History in the Remaking, by Kazimierz Grzybowski .. 2
Art and Artists in the USSR
Forbidden Fruit, by Nina Juviler 3
The Young vs. the Old, by Vladimir Slepian 3
Hooliganism—and How (Not) to Deal with It, by A. Morris 4
The "Cold War" on the Literary Front, by David Burg
Part I: The Writers' Underground 4
Part II: Groups, Trends, Genres 5
How Strong Is the Leader?, by Thomas H. Rigby 5
The Peasant vs. the Consumer, by Seweryn Bialer .. 5
Crime and Punishment
Execution: Hallmark of "Socialist Legality", by Leon Lipson 5
The Wages of Economic Sin, by Harry Willets .. 5
The New Image of Russia: I
Liberalization—A Balance Sheet, by Robert Conquest 6
Is Coercion Withering Away?, by Jeremy Azrael .. 6
Literatary Ferment in the Ukraine, by George Luckyj 6

INTERNATIONAL COMMUNISM

Schism Among the Faithful, by Richard Lowenthal .. 1
Long Divisions and Fine Fractions, by Alexander Dallin 2
Workers Disunite, by G. E. Lynd 2
Helsinki—The Last Youth Festival?, by Paul E. Sigmund 5

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

SINO-SOVIET RELATIONS

Peking's Picture Puzzles, by Arthur A. Cohen 4
Sino-Soviet Trade: A Barometer, by Marshall I. Goldman 6

EASTERN EUROPE

De-Stalinization in Eastern Europe
Albania: An Outcast's Defiance, by William E. Griffith 3
East Germany: Lesson in Survival, by Melvin Croan 3
Bulgaria: The Value of Scapegoats, by Boris Christoff 3
Rumania: Don't Rock the Boat!, by G. M. Razi .. 3
Czechoslovakia: The Past Reburied, by Ivo Duchacek 3
Hungary: Pressures from Above, by Paul Landy .. 3
Poland: A Matter of Timing?, by Adam Bromke .. 3
Literature in Ulbricht's Germany, by Peter Demetz .. 4

NONCOMMUNIST AREAS

Communism in Africa
Soviet Views on Africa, by Lazar Pistrak 2
Scholarship and Propaganda, by Christopher Bird 2
The Role of China, by Kurt London 4
The Indian CP Between Moscow and Peking, by Harry Gelman 6
The PKI and the Peasant, by Donald Hindley 6

BOOKS

Die Wirtschaftliche Entwicklung der Volksrepublik China, by B. Grossman; *Agrarian Policy of the Chinese Communist Party,* by Chao Kuo-chun—reviewed by Alexander Eckstein 1
Power and Policy in the USSR, by R. Conquest; *Russland unter Chruschtschow,* by Boris Meissner; *The Red Phoenix,* by Harry Schwartz; *Moscow Journal,* by Harrison E. Salisbury—reviewed by Leon Gouré 1
The Jewish Problem in the Soviet Union, by B. Z. Goldberg—reviewed by Robert Conquest 2
Red China—An Asian View, by Sripati Chandrasekhar; *Awakened China,* by Felix Greene; *Hurricane from China,* by Denis Warner—reviewed by Michael Lindsay 2
The Social Basis of American Communism, by Nathan Glazer; *Writers on the Left,* by Daniel Aron—reviewed by William C. Gausmann 3
Egy regeny regenye (The Novel of a Novel), by Ervin Sinko—reviewed by George Gömöri 3
Soviet Books in English—essay-review by Ronald Hingley 4
Russia under Khrushchev, by Alexander Werth; *Evolution of Soviet Society,* by Damodara Kurup; *Soviet Man and His World,* by Klaus Mehnert; *The Taprot of Soviet Society, by N. Vakar*—reviewed by Adam Ulam 4
Unity and Contradiction—Major Aspects of Sino-Soviet Relations, edited by Kurt London; *The Sino-Soviet Dispute,* by G. F. Hudson, R. Lowenthal and R. MacFarquhar; *The Sino-Soviet Conflict: 1956-1961,* by D. Zagoria—reviewed by Henry Pachter 4
Civil Defense in the Soviet Union, by Leon Gouré—reviewed by Gerd Ruge 4
Philosophy and Myth in Karl Marx, by R. C. Tucker; *The Tyranny of Concepts; A Critique of Marxism,* by Gordon Leff; *Marx—Penseur de la Technique,* by Kostas Axelos—reviewed by George Lichtheim . 4
The Achievements of Soviet Medicine, by L. Friedland—reviewed by Mark G. Field 4
The Unexpected Revolution, by Paul Kesckemeti; *Rift and Revolt in Hungary,* by Ferenc A. Vali—reviewed by Paul Ignotus 4
Le Gouvernement de l'U.R.S.S., by M. Mouskhely and Z. Jedryka; *Les Paysans sovietiques,* by Jean Chombart de Lauwe—reviewed by Henri Chambre 4
The Russian Provisional Government, 1917, edited by Paul Browder and Alexander F. Kerensky—reviewed by Jesse D. Clarkson 5
The Pasternak Affair: Courage of Genius, by Robert Conquest—reviewed by Leo Laufer 5
Religion in the Soviet Union, by Walter Kolarz; *The Churches and the Soviet Union,* by Constantin de Grunwald; *The Russian Revolution and Religion,* by B. Szczesniak; *Communism and the Churches,* by Ralph Lord Roy—reviewed by Jeremy R. Azrael .. 5
Stalin and the French Communist Party, 1941-1947, by A. J. Rieber—reviewed by Marshall D. Shulman 5
Communism and Nationalism (essay-review of *Political Change in Underdeveloped Countries: Nationalism and Communism,* edited with an original esssay by John H. Kautsky)—by Richard Lowenthal 6
Castro's Revolution: Myths and Realities, by T. Draper; *Cuba: The First Soviet Satellite in the Americas,* by D. James—reviewed by Karl E. Meyer 6

CONTRIBUTORS' INDEX

Azrael, Jeremy R.—Review 5
Is Coercion Withering Away? 6
Barton, Paul—An End to Concentration Camps? ... 2
Bialer, Seweryn—The Peasant vs. the Consumer 5
Bird, Christopher—Scholarship and Propaganda 2
Bromke, Adam—Poland: A Matter of Timing? 3
Burg, David—The "Cold War" on the Literary Front, Part I: The Writers' Underground 4
Part II: Groups, Trends, Genres 5
Chambre, Henri—Review 4
Christoff, Boris—Bulgaria: The Value of Scapegoats 3
Clarkson, Jesse D.—Review 5
Cohen, Arthur A.—Peking's Picture Puzzles 4
Conquest, Robert—The Three Funerals of Joseph Stalin 1

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Review 2
Liberalization—A Balance Sheet 6
Dallin, Alexander—Long Divisions and Fine Fractions 2
Demetz, Peter—Literature in Ulbricht's Germany .. 4
Duchacek, Ivo—Czechoslovakia: The Past Reburied 3
Eckstein, Alexander—Review 1
Field, Mark G.—Review 4
Gausmann, William C.—Review 3
Gelman, Harry—The Indian CP Between Moscow and Peking 6
Goldman, Marshall I.—Sino-Soviet Trade: A Barometer 6
Gömöri, George—Review 3
Gouré, Leon—Review 1
Greenslade, Rush V.—Forward to Communism? ... 1
Griffith, William E.—Albania: An Outcast's Defiance 3
Grzybowski, Kazimierz—History in the Remaking .. 2
Hindley, Donald—The PKI and the Peasants 6
Hingley, Ronald—That's No Lie, Comrade [on *vranyo*] 2
Soviet Books in English 4
Ignotus, Paul—Review 4
JUSTAN—Some Aspects of Soviet Reality 1
Juviler, Nina—Forbidden Fruit 2
Landy, Paul—Hungary: Pressures from Above 3
Laufer, Leo—Review 5
Lichtheim, George—Review 4
Lindsay, Michael—Review 2
Lipson, Leon—Execution: Hallmark of "Socialist Legality" 5
London, Kurt—The Role of China in Africa 4
Lowenthal, Richard—Schism Among the Faithful ... 1
Communism and Nationalism (review) 6
Meyer, Karl E.—Review 6
Morris, A.—Hooliganism—and How (Not) to Deal with It 4
Pachter, Henry—Review 4
Pistrak, Lazar—Khrushchev and the Purges 1
Soviet Views on Africa 2
Prybyla, Jan S.—How Statistics Are Made 1
Razi, G. M.—Rumania: Don't Rock the Boat! 3
Rigby, Thomas H.—How Strong is the Leader? 5
Ruge, Gerd—Review 4
Schapiro, Leonard—The Party's New Rules 1
Shulman, Marshall D.—Review 5
Sigmund, Paul E.—Helsinki—The Last Youth Festival? 5
Slepian, Vladimir—The Young vs. the Old 3
Ulam, Adam—Review 4
Willets, Harry—The Wages of Economic Sin 5

IN FUTURE ISSUES

A Correspondent in Moscow ..... Sacha Simon
The Soviets and the Foreign Press ..... David Floyd
Press and Propaganda ..... Leo Gruliow
What Can We Learn about China Today? ..... Richard Hughes
Post-Stalin Russia: An Appraisal ..... Wolfgang Leonhard
Trouble in Bulgaria? ..... Nissan Oren
The Czech Coup in Perspective ..... Stanislav Koutnick

NOTE: Due to technical reasons, the third and concluding part of Mr. Burg's essay "The 'Cold War' on the Literary Front" could not appear in this issue, and will be published in the January-February 1963 issue.

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED

Where to Obtain *Problems of Communism*

NOTE: In the United States, *Problems of Communism* is available on sale at the Superintendent of Documents, US Government Printing Office, Washington 25, D. C. Price per copy: $.35; subscription price: $1.50 a year; additional $.50 for foreign mailing if orders are placed in the United States. Outside the United States, single copies or subscriptions may be obtained free of charge through requests addressed to the nearest office of the United States Information Service. Following are the locations of USIS offices:

EUROPE

AUSTRIA—Vienna, Linz, Salzburg
BELGIUM—Brussels
DENMARK—Copenhagen
FINLAND—Helsinki
FRANCE—Paris, Bordeaux, Marseilles, Strasbourg, Tours
GERMANY—Bonn, Berlin, Bremen, Düsseldorf, Frankfurt, Hamburg, Munich, Stuttgart
GREAT BRITAIN—London
ICELAND—Reykjavik
ITALY—Rome, Florence, Genoa, Milan, Naples, Palermo, Trieste, Turin
NETHERLANDS—The Hague
NORWAY—Oslo
PORTUGAL—Lisbon
SPAIN—Madrid, Barcelona, Seville
(See note below on the Spanish-language edition published in Latin America)
SWEDEN—Stockholm
SWITZERLAND—Bern, Geneva
YUGOSLAVIA—Belgrad, Zagreb

NEAR EAST AND SOUTH ASIA

AFGHANISTAN—Kabul
CEYLON—Colombo
CYPRUS—Nicosia
GREECE—Athens, Thessaloniki
INDIA—New Delhi, Lucknow, Bombay, Calcutta, Madras, Bangalore, Trivandrum, Hyderabad
IRAN—Tehran, Isfahan, Khorromshahr, Meshed, Tabriz
IRAQ—Baghdad
ISRAEL—Tel Aviv
JORDAN—Amman
LEBANON—Beirut
NEPAL—Katmandu
PAKISTAN—Karachi, Lahore, Dacca
SAUDI ARABIA—Jidda
SYRIAN ARAB REPUBLIC—Damascus
TURKEY—Ankara, Istanbul, Izmir, Adana
UNITED ARAB REPUBLIC—Cairo, Alexandria
YEMEN—Taiz

FAR EAST

AUSTRALIA—Canberra, Sydney, Melbourne
BURMA—Rangoon, Mandalay, Moulmein
CAMBODIA—Phnom Penh
HONG KONG
INDONESIA—Djakarta, Medan, Surabaya, Jogjakarta
JAPAN—Tokyo, Kobe, Fukuoka, Yokohama, Nagoya, Sapporo, Osako, Niigata, Sendai, Hiroshima, Kyoto, Kanayawa
KOREA—Seoul, Pusan, Taegu, Kwangju
LAOS—Vientiane, Pakse, Luang Prabang, Savannakhet
MALAYA—Kuala Lumpur, Penang
NEW ZEALAND—Wellington
PHILIPPINES—Manila, Cebu
SINGAPORE
TAIWAN—Taipei, Kaohsiung, Taichung
THAILAND—Bangkok, Chiengmai, Korat, Songkhla, Udorn, Ubol
VIET NAM—Saigon, Hue, Can Tho, Dalat

AFRICA

ALGERIA—Algiers
BURUNDI—Usumbura
CAMEROUN—Yaounde
CENTRAL AFRICAN REPUBLIC—Bangui
CHAD—Fort Lamy
DAHOMEY—Cotonou
ETHIOPIA—Addis Ababa, Asmara
FEDERATION OF RHODESIA AND NYASALAND—Salisbury, Blantyre, Lusaka
GABON—Libreville
GHANA—Accra
GUINEA—Conakry
IVORY COAST—Abidjan
KENYA—Nairobi
LIBERIA—Monrovia
LIBYA—Benghazi, Tripoli
MALAGASY REPUBLIC—Tananarive
MALI—Bamako
MOROCCO—Rabat, Casablanca, Fez, Marrakech, Tangier
NIGER—Niamey
NIGERIA—Lagos, Enugu, Ibadan, Kaduna, Kano
REPUBLIC OF CONGO—Brazzaville
REPUBLIC OF THE CONGO—Leopoldville, Stanleyville
REPUBLIC OF SOUTH AFRICA— Pretoria, Johannesburg, Capetown
SENEGAL—Dakar
SIERRA LEONE—Freetown
SOMALI REPUBLIC—Mogadiscio
SUDAN—Khartoum
TANGANYIKA—Dar-es-Salaam
TOGO—Lome
TUNISIA—Tunis
UGANDA—Kampala
UPPER VOLTA—Ouagadougou
ZANZIBAR—Zanzibar

LATIN AMERICA

A list of USIS posts where the Spanish-language edition (*Problemas del Comunismo*) may be obtained is published in its current issue. The English edition is also available at these posts and in Brazil (Rio de Janeiro, Belo Horizonte, Brasilia, Curitiba, Porto Alegre, Recife, Salvador, Sao Paulo.)

PRODUCED 2005 BY UNZ.ORG
ELECTRONIC REPRODUCTION PROHIBITED